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ABSTRACT 
The exaction of labour and military service from the Africans in colonial Natal formed the 
corner-stone of domination and control over them. 
Theophilus Shepstone conducted so-called 'Native Affairs' by applying his own 
idiosyncratic ideas on an ad hoc basis and he and the Natal authorities allowed themselves 
much room for discretionary action. 
Demands for labourers and levies were made in the context of British metropolitan and 
Natal colonial attitudes to race, colour, class and the work ethic. 
The disruption in the lives of people in Natal gave prospective colonisers the opportunity 
to propagate the myth of an 'empty' Natal. 
When Britain annexed Natal, locations were established to accommodate those African 
people not already settled as labourers on former Trekker farms. Isibhalo labour and 
military service could be drawn from these locations. Both these demands, it was 
maintained, were based on the model of the Zulu king's traditional right to call up men 
for labour and military service. The governor of Natal was likened to the Zulu king and 
could make the same exactions. 
When more isibhalo labourers were needed, labour was drawn from categories not 
included in the original system, and beyond the districts and counties in which the 
labourers lived. 
African men from the locations were called upon to provide military levies to prevent not 
only the establishment of power bases alternative to that of the Natal government, but also 
the destabilisation of the Natal border areas. 
Levies and/or labourers were raised in the Anglo-Zulu War, the First Anglo-Boer War, 
in the Second Anglo-Boer War and Bambatha's 'rebellion'. The effective use of the levies 
was severely hampered by the fear of arming Africans with firearms. 
The hostility generated against the Natal government by years of oppression found an 
outlet in resistance even before the end of the colonial period. The Kholwa became 
leaders in covert political opposition which became increasingly intense as further 
deprivations impoverished and marginalised the African people in Natal. The system of 
raising forced African labour and military levies was a major factor in this disintegration. 
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Modern Zulu orthography has been used in this dissertation, except that the colonial terms 
used for counties and districts have been retained, as have the methods of spelling of Zulu 
names in quotations and footnotes. 
' Zulu ' has been used throughout without adding the English plural's' . The Ngwe people 
have been referred to as amaNgwe for greater t1uency . 
(v) 
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British metropolitan and Natal colonial attitudes 
to race, colour and the work ethic 
1 
Although the British government decided in December 1842 to annex Natal, the final 
proclamation to that effect was published only in August 1845; and Martin West was 
appointed first Lieutenant-Governor of Natal in December of that year. 
The new British colonial presence was numerically small, both in terms of officials and 
settlers. Two challenges faced this new government, viz. the establishment of an 
infrastructure, especially of roads; and the establishment of a military presence to maintain 
law and order within the territory and resist aggression from without. These challenges 
required men for labour and military service. The metropolitan and colonial attitudes to 
race, colour, the work ethic and the spread of civilisation produced a mindset, reinforced 
by previous conquests of pre-industrial peoples and the annexation of their territory, which 
allowed the intruders to regard colonisation as justifiable. It is not surprising therefore, 
that the British in Natal turned for both these requirements to the aboriginal population 
who could be coerced into military service as levies and forced labour on public works. 
The word isibhalo, used for this forced labour, is derived from bhala, meaning 'to write', 
as the labourers were registered when they were sent forward by the chiefs. 
The demand for African labourers and military levies in the colony of Natal from 1845 
onwards was an integral part of European colonialism, set in the broader context of the 
2 
inexorable expansion and migration of human beings over the earth, resultant upon the 
relentless increase in human population. Before the Christian era no excuses were offered 
for conquest, the annexation of the land of conquered peoples for settlement, the 
competition for mineral and agricultural resources and the exploitation of human resources 
in the fonn of labour. Once European Christians had persuaded themselves of the concept 
of a 'just war', in wars of aggression as well as defence, and had rationalised conquest and 
annexation as the justified spread of civilisation and Christianity, the colonising of land 
occupied by militarily or economically weaker peoples proceeded apace . 
As far as British colonisation was concerned, the metropolitan attitude towards colonies 
and their indigenous peoples, and the colonial attitude towards them, further shored up this 
justification, as did the attitude of Christian missionaries . Interwoven with the 
metropolitan attitude were fmnly held ideas about class, Social Darwinism and the work 
ethic, whereas the expanding industrialisation of Britain, requiring increasing supplies of 
raw materials, made colonisation a necessary economic activity . By late Victorian times 
colonial expansion, linked with military endeavour, which included the incorporation of 
conquered peoples as subordinate military allies, came to be accepted as the nonn, and 
even romanticised, as in this effusion written by a Daily Mail journalist on 22 June 1897 
during Queen Victoria's Diamond Jubilee celebrations when a march-past of Imperial 
troops took place: 
And you began to understand, as never before, what the Empire amounts to .. . we 
send out a boy here and a boy there, and the boy takes hold of the savages . .. and 
teaches them to march and shoot ... and believe in him, and die for him and the 
Queen.! 
As quoted in E. Longford, Victoria R.I . (London, Weidenfeld and 
Nicolson, 1964), p. 549. 
3 
Until the end of the eighteenth century, the terms 'common people' or 'lower orders' were 
used to denote those in British society who were regarded as inferior, intimating that this 
categorisation was part of a natural social order. Thereafter the term 'lower classes' was 
commonly used.2 Mason has pointed out that, although the concept of class in English 
society was undoubtedly strong, it was not legally defined. One could move up the scale 
by buying land and other property with money acquired in trade, and the 'taint of trade' 
would be nearly forgotten by the third generation.3 
An example of this is provided by the fortunes of the family of Frances Colenso, wife of 
Bishop J.W. Colenso. Her grandfather, Thomas Bignold, was a Norwich merchant and 
banker, and her father, Robert John Bunyan, was a businessman. The Bunyan children 
moved easily into Harrow and Cambridge for the boys, and the Academy for Young 
Ladies in Cheltenham for Frances: educational institutions favoured by the privileged 
social classes. 4 
By the end of the eighteenth century, when labour was in great demand for industries, 
those in the upper levels of the class structure had developed a work ethic for all those in 
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'lower classes' should be forced to work, it was said, 'by moral compulsion and the hard 
facts of economics. ,5 
Briggs identifies four main elements which were held up as ideals in Victorian times: the 
gospel of work, seriousness of character, respectability and self-help; and he quotes 
Carlyle's dictum that 'Properly speaking, all true Work is Religion. ,6 
As Wellington points out,7 nineteenth century British attitudes to race, even in the 
metropolitan area, involved considerations of class values and class-consciousness, and in 
the wider sphere, ethnocentrism and imperialism. Racism (or racialism), with its doctrine 
that some races are naturally superior to others; and the ethnocentric belief that one's own 
cultural group or society is superior, reinforced xenophobia: the fear or hatred of things 
foreign. The supporters of the theory of polygenesis (that the races of man are derived 
from more than one original stock) as opposed to those who supported the monogenesis 
theory (that only one original stock provided the ancestors of man) could point to this 
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By the nineteenth century, racism and colour prejudice began to converge. 
8 
Mason 
makes the point that 'colour prejudice is older than European imperialism'; and he 
suggests that this prejudice is possibly linked with 'the symbolism and metaphor of 
colour', equating darkness and blackness with evil, and lightness and brightness with 
good.9 Racism, too, has a longer history than Victorian imperialism, as is evident in 
William Shakespeare's Othello and The Merchant of Venice. Racism usually implies the 
right of the so-called superior group to rule the so-called inferior group and discriminate 
against it. In the 1860s, the anthropologist James Hunt, of the London - based 
Anthropological Society, founded in 1863, maintained that there was a hierarchy of man, 
and that the negro was the lowest form of man, and was, indeed, the link between human 
and anthropoid life,10 and therefore inferior to the white race. Racists could argue that 
this placed Africans in a natural position of subservience. 
Much of the anthropologists' concern with the origin of man was based on Charles 
Darwin's researches, published in his Origin of Species (1859) and his The Descent of 
Man (1871). His conclusions in the former work, concerning the survival of the fittest 
and a natural selection of breeding in the many species of living organisms, had been 
anticipated by other scientists,l1 and the anthropologists' interest in the origin of man 
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conclusions concerning natural selection, and the survival of the fittest. Mason has stated 
that their argument was that 
... it was natural - and right because it followed the pattern of nature - for a 
stronger group of men to dispossess, exploit, and indeed destroy, one less fit to 
survive. 1'1 
What had been the propounding of the results of research and observation was regarded 
by the Social Darwinists as a categorical imperative. Sir Bartle Frere, in the 1880s, in 
the Journal of the Anthropological Institute,13 gave examples of the conquest of inferior 
by superior peoples14 as a natural law. 
Darwin's major works were published some fourteen and twenty-six years respectively 
after the establishment of the British colony of Natal, but many of the colonisers were 
already imbued with strong views about class and race as well as the assumption of the 
cultural superiority of the Europeans, to the detriment of the weaker and exploitable 
African peoples. The work ethic, race, class and ethnocentrism formed a paradigm of 
nineteenth century Britain, and became more intense as Britain moved into the Victorian 
era after Queen Victoria's accession in 1837, and when Social Darwinists put forward 
their own interpretations of Charles Darwin's work. However, most of the early hunter-
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colour-conscious, and some of these hunter-traders were absorbed into African society and 
culture. 
As Miles points out, migration might locate people into a different class site,15 and this 
may well have occurred in Natal. The acquisition of landed property by settlers in Natal 
placed them in a position of upward social mobility. Denoon states that 
... permanent class divisions had no fixed place in the settler societies, and it may 
even be true that there was more social mobility in settler societies than in most 
others. 16 
This would, however, not include the African people who would be forced to remain 
permanently in a lowly position. Bishop l . W. Colenso recognised this translocation and 
social mobility by suggesting the immigration to Natal of some 10 000 English people in 
three classes: 'young gentlemen', with money enough 'to become at once large landed 
proprietors'; 'small farmers' with less money, who could rent farms and eventually 
become prosperous enough to buy land for themselves, and 'honest and industrious 
labourers', who would earn large wages and eventually also become independent farmers 
and landowners. 17 Henry Francis Fynn, who moved from the barefoot hunter-trader 
incorporated into Zulu culture, to the respected magistrate of later years, is an example 
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instances acquired, they were willing to relegate the Natal Africans to a permanent 
position of submissive inferiority; and racial and ethnocentric statements reached a ready 
audience. 
The colonists themselves did not escape the disdain of those who regarded Natal as only 
a temporary home before they returned to the mother country. Bishop Colenso' s 
daughter, Frances, put the following words into the mouth of Atherton Wylde: 'I .. 
determined to try that last resource of the desperate - a life in one of the colonies. ,18 
Sir John Robinson, first Prime Minister of Natal, 1893 - 1897, and himself a colonist, was 
aware of social gradations within colonial society, and affected to despise those colonists 
who did not hold aloof from the Natal Africans; and, displaying class and race-
consciousness, wrote: 'It is impossible to mix only with savages for weeks and months and 
years, without sinking in the social scale.' 19 
Censure of colonials, voiced by the Colenso family, especially after the Langalibalele 
affair, rested essentially, though justifiably, on reprehensible colonial actions during this 
episode, and not on considerations of class or a disparagement of colonials per se. 
18 
19 
M.J. Daymond (ed) , Atherton Wylde (Frances Colenso), My Chief and I 
(Pietermaritzburg, University of Natal Press, 1994: reprint; originally 
published 1880), p. 2. 
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The poQr conditiQns suffered by isibhalQ fQrced labQurers and the military levies fQrmed 
part Qf the explQitatiQn which was regarded as justifiable in dealing with supposedly 
inferiQr peQple, and accQunted fQr the cQIQnial resistance to. the provisiQn Qf better shelter, 
clQthing and general wQrking cQnditiQns fQr bQth labQurers and levies; and to. the prQvisiQn 
Qf better weapQnry and training fQr the levies. The cQIQnial fear Qf the KhQlwa 
(Christian) self-imprQvement, Qf their growing entrepreneurial skills and their political 
aspiratiQns was roQted in a disapproval Qf any attempts at incQrporatiQn into. privileged 
European sQciety; and the prQsperity Qf bQth the KhQlwa and the Hlubi, anQther powerful 
grQup, was regarded as a threat, since they provided eCQnQmic cQmpetitiQn as cQmmercial 
farmers and in Qther enterprises. The cQIQnial ideal, Qf which SQcial Darwinists WQuid 
have approved, appears to. have been to. make sure that these African peQple remained in 
perpetual subservience. During the 1914 - 1918 WQrld War, this view surfaced again 
when the SQuth African LabQur Corps was to. render service in France. Misgivings were 
expressed that this service WQuid raise the political expectatiQns Qf the African men and 
WQuid expose them to. sQcial cQnditiQns 'nQt CQmmensurate with their status in the 
UniQn. ,20 
NQt all cQIQnials and Qther Qbservers were swept into. the grossest attitudes tQwards 
African peQple in Natal. SQme, the CQlenso family in particular, protested against the 
treatment meted Qut to. them, but even the ColensQs did nQt attack imperialism and 
cQIQnialism; Qnly their applicatiQn in Natal. BishQP ColensQ himself, vQciferous thQugh 
he was in his attempts to. protect the powerless, 
20 
I. GleesQn, The UnknQwn FQrce (RivQnia, Ashanti Publishing, 1994), p. 
26. 
10 
· .. never reached a deeper insight into the nature of colonialism or realised he was 
observing and protesting against not an aberration but the essence of the 
system.21 
Natal as a source of raw materials, especially hides and ivory for export to Britain, was 
exploited by English hunter-traders from the 1820s. In a reversal of the later situation, 
they came to Natal not as conquerors but as clients of the Zulu kings, Shaka and Dingane. 
Being in a position of weakness, they were unable to demand labour, as the colonial 
authorities did later. The labour they needed consisted of bearers to transport their trade 
goods on foot, and this was not forced labour; and the allies who assisted them on such 
military expeditions as were led by Cane and Ogle to Ntunjambili, and by Cane to the 
Thukela in 1838, were men from their own settlements around Port Natal, who hoped to 
gain captured cattle from the Zulu. 
Far from demanding military levies to assist them, some of the hunter-traders were 
themselves conscripted to assist the Zulu king, Shaka,in shooting elephants and in joining 
in military campaigns against the Ndwandwe chief, Sikhunyana, and against Mlotshwa and 
Beje, two chiefs formerly subject to the Ndwandwe chief, Zwide.22 This situation was 
reversed once the Europeans gained the ascendancy in Natal, and they maintained this 
position of power throughout the colonial period. 
21 
22 
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1982 : reprint), p. 91. 
J. Stuart and D. McK Malcolm (eds), The Diary of Henry Francis Fynn 
(Pietermaritzburg, Shuter and Shooter, 1950), pp. 120, 122 - 129. 
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The early days of indulgence, by Natal Africans, of foreigners, rested initially on the 
reciprocal advantages to be gained from trade and interaction between a pre-industrial and 
an industrial society . Those fugitives from Shaka and Dingane, who clustered around the 
traders at Port Natal, regarded the traders' small settlement as a refuge, and were not in 
awe of them as a superior race. The take-over by whites and their shift into a position of 
dominance took place when they gained the military initiative, even if this was achieved 
by using surrogates such as allied or subordinate Africans. The Africans in Natal, 
including those who left Zululand, lost any position of power they might have had when, 
before the British annexation, Mpande kaSenzangakhona fled across the Thukela and 
sought alliance with the Boers in 1839. Even when the Boers capitulated to the British, 
and Natal was annexed, there was no significant resurgence of power among the Natal 
Africans, and the British retained the ascendancy previously held by the Boers. 
The Christian missionaries who came to Natal and Zululand from Britain brought with 
them the assumption that the civilisation, to which they referred as being inseparable from 
their spreading of the Gospel, was that of their own values and ideals and the whole 
framework of their society, which they regarded as unquestionably the best and which 
should be imposed on others. They were not content with propagating the basic doctrines 
of the Christian faith, but added considerably to this teaching by their interpretation of 
how these tenets should be applied. This application, not surprisingly, encompassed their 
own social mores and cultural paradigm, which rather quaintly, included their notions of 
suitable clothing. 
12 
Many of the missionaries also perpetuated the perception that all Africans were inferior 
and belonged to the class on whom the work ethic should be imposed. Captain A. F. 
Gardiner stated that the object of his mission journey to the Zulu people was to open a 
way for Christian ministers to introduce ' ... true religion, civilisation, and industry, into 
those benighted regions. ,23 The Methodist missionary, the Rev. W.C. Holden, held 
strong views about the position and treatment of Africans, which ret1ected his ethnocentric 
opinions on race and class: 
The Kaffirs are children of a larger growth and must be treated accordingly -
children in knowledge, ignorant of the relationships of civilized society ... the 
great difficulty in governing them is, to treat them as men - children, teaching 
them to submit and to obey are essential to their own welfare ... many of them are 
unable to appreciate or understand our excess of civilized kindness, being strangers 
to those refined feelings which operate in the breasts of Christians. 24 
By 1887, Holden's arrogant views on the Natal Africans showed greater distaste: 'They 
were', he wrote, 'simply naked barbarians, living and rioting in all the abominations of 
heathenism. ,25 Holden also made his views on the work ethic clear. He held that 
indolence was one of the greatest barriers to man's improvement. This indolence could 
be eradicated by a system of compulsory labour or slavery on the one hand, or by creating 
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wants. 26 The American missionary, Josiah Tyler, writing in 1891, commended 'the just 
and benign authority of England' as a means to raise the African people in Natal and 
Zululand 'gradually but surely to a high standard of Christianity and civilization. ' He 
approved of Zulu in the service of Europeans as 'generally obedient and peaceful. ,27 
It is clear that for Tyler the natural niche to be occupied by the Zulu was as servants, with 
the British as mentors. 
These missionaries reflected the general British and colonial opinion that the African 
people were inferior and must be obedient and industrious in the service of the white man. 
However, in 1874 a more sinister point of view emerged. On 26 January 1874, in the 
European Mail, misgivings were expressed about the conduct of the colonial authorities 
during the Langalibalele affair and the subsequent harrying of the amaNgwe. Sixty-nine 
Natal clergymen signed a memorial sent to Lieutenant-Governor Pine protesting against 
an article appearing in this publication, entitled Atrocities in Natal. 'These 
misstatements' , they wrote, might cause the Home government and Imperial Parliament 




from using those repressive measures which are sometimes necessary to protect a 
Christian Government, and civilize a people deeply sunk: in barbarism and 
sensuality.28 
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Not only was 'just and benign authority' to be imposed to convert and civilise, but 
merciless ' repressive measures ' were defended. 
All these views accorded well with the colonial attitude towards the Africans in Natal, and 
gave the colonists the approval of the Church in regarding the African people as inferior 
beings whose role was to work for the colonists and to be exploited and repressed. 
Frances Colenso, Bishop Colenso's daughter, recognised this attitude and recorded the 
reaction of the Africans to it: ' ... the black man did not care to be the white man's slave, 
and the white man could not endure the black man in any other position. ,29 However, 
Bishop Colenso himself, who was later to become a champion ofthe Natal Africans, could 
not detach himself entirely from his own class-consciousness and belief in the work ethic 
as a path to civilisation. He wrote: 
. .. I hope we shall be enabled to practise the younger natives in trades of various 
kinds, to teach them to cultivate the soil, and learn the value of land and adopt the 
habits of civilised life. We shall also ... train servants, male and female, for 
domestic purposes . . 30 
He appeared not to have noticed that Africans were crop-farmers who certainly appreciated 
the value of land. He later returned to the theme of the value of the work ethic, regarding 
some of Chief Phakade's people as more advanced 'in respect of civilization' because 
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Many colonists expressed their attitudes in action rather than in writing, as, for instance 
during the Langalibalele affair, the crushing of the amaNgwe and during Bambatha's 
'rebellion' . Some attitudes were, however, recorded in writing and show a similarity to 
those expressed by missionaries. The editor of the Natal Witness wrote on 15 January 
1847, 'The other class of our colonial population consists of men in a state of infancy as 
regards civilization. ,32 This paternalistic view was reiterated by Holden whose words 
were quoted verbatim by the ethnologist, W.A. Squire, in 1906. Squire added further 
disparaging remarks: 
He [the Natal African] is thriftless, thoughtless of the future, lazy and independent, 
his sole thought being of food and drink for himself. 33 
The 1852 - 53 Commission expressed the paternalistic colonial views in similar vein: 
... the true relation of a civilized Government towards its barbarian subjects is of 
a parental character .. , a civilized Government is found to take the most complete 
charge of such a ~pulation, to direct it, and exercise the most rigid control over 
its every action .. ' 4 
In 1859, in Dr. R.J. Mann's The Colony of Natal, characteristics more sinister than 
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The anger of the wild Kafir is blind and unreasoning ra~e .:. in this respect 
uncivilized barbarians very much resemble the lower and lfratlonal members of 
creation .,. In many of their social relations and habits the ~afirs are addic~ed to. 
practices ... not consonant with the higher and more enhghtened morahty of 
civilization. 35 
The remedy for the Africans' supposed fecklessness was at hand: 
He likes to roam free over his wild hills and to sit and dream at his own pleasure 
in his kraal; but he can be made to bend to the rein and the spur .. 36 
In this statement the colonists' real reason for supporting the 'civilising' of the Natal 
Africans becomes apparent: their need for labour and their anger at any resistance to their 
demands. The colonists deplored any attempts by the Natal Africans to escape their 
assigned proletarian status. They must supply labour and only their labour power should 
be for sale. No other niche in society and the economy should be allowed them. 
Natal Africans were discouraged or prevented from acquiring skills to equip them to 
function in industrial society. Those directly controlled by the Natal government and the 
colonists, i.e. those in the locations or on European - owned farms were economically 
marginalised as unskilled or, at best, semi-skilled labour, and their poverty and 
powerlessness were perpetuated. The Kholwa, however, not bound by many of the 
restrictions which applied to location- and farm-dwellers, adapted to and took advantage 
of changing circumstances, but their way to the ultimate prize they sought, 
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enfranchisement, was blocked by almost insurmountable conditions attached to the granting 
of the franchise. 
Harsh measures were proposed to enforce the subservience of Natal Africans. Sir Gamet 
Wolseley, Governor of Natal in 1875, added his views: 
I am convinced that for the management of a barbarous people the only 
punishments ever likely to be effective for keeping them in order are flogging and 
death. 37 
In 1879, after the Anglo-Zulu War, Duncan Moodie, a South African colonial writing of 
the war, approved of the actions taken by the High Commissioner, Sir Bartle Frere, and 
Sir Gamet Wolseley against the Zulu people. His assertions indicate that he was imbued 
with all the racist and ethnocentric attitudes which prevailed at the time: 
. .. when a power superior in arts and civilisation fmds it necessary to subjugate a 
comparatively barbarous one ... the temporary evils attendant upon conquest are 
greatly overbalanced by the blessings of ultimate good. 38 
In 1899, another colonist, G. Russell, also advocated a heavy hand to compel submission: 
, ... I quite concur in the views of the enlightened Boer that a modified form of slavery -
or serfdom - is good for the Natal African, that is, until he is "tamed". ,39 In the same 
year, Lord Milner encapsulated British colonial ambitions in Southern Africa, underlining 
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governing White Community, supported by well-treated and justly governed black labour 
from Cape Town to the Zambezi. ,40 Dr R.H. Lamb's views, put forward in 1908, 
echoed some of the sentiments already expressed by Wolseley and by colonists: 
the native population ... must either be civilised or exterminated ... they 
... 41 
represent the intellectual childhood of the human race .. 
The recurring themes that Africans were inferior, that they should be kept in subjection, 
that they should be forced to supply labour and that they had no other place in society than 
as labourers, permeated the attitudes towards them expressed by not only colonists who 
required their labour in towns and on farms, but also colonial administrators and even 
missionaries. If the ingrained prejudice expressed by the powerful, literate and articulate 
revealed these racist and ethnocentric views, others whose confidence in their own class 
position was more fragile, no doubt held similar views even more coarsely expressed. 
It has been pointed out that the settlers were ignorant of the ingenuity and appropriateness 
of problem-solving in traditional African society; of their social and moral rules; of the 
rational structure of 'tribal' life which provided for the protection of the individual and the 
equitable distribution of food and land.42 Western Europe emphasised the value of 
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failed to perceive was the importance of the extended family 'with its close network of 
obligations. ,43 
In an African society, housing and clothing, both derived from materials at hand in the 
immediate environment and adapted to the climate, were singularly appropriate. Social 
and economic cohesion was apparent in these three examples from Natal/Zululand: the 
distribution of land; the ukusisa practice and the ngena custom. Land, which belonged to 
the king or chief as the representative of the nation, was apportioned to each homestead 
head, for his use but not ownership, by the induna of his district. Every man, therefore, 
had the means to provide himself and his household with a livelihood. A man who 
owned numerous cattle might, in accordance with the ukusisa practice, distribute some of 
these to other households, where the inmates would be able to use the milk produced (an 
important source of protein in the form of amasi), and the oxen for ploughing (once 
ploughs had been introduced into the territory). The holders of the cattle might be 
rewarded for increasing the original stock by the gift of a beast. A woman, with her 
children, would not be left without security if her husband died. According to the ngena 
custom, a year after her husband's death, a widow might marry one of her husband's 
brothers and thus gain his protection. 44 
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The Natal Africans were placed in a predicament of impoverishment, deprived of their 
traditional means of survival and way of life, with land and resources diminished not only 
by the disruption and dispersion of the early nineteenth century, but also by the Boer and 
the British colonial conquests. Their lifestyle, as witnessed by European observers in the 
nineteenth century, was forced upon them by these circumstances and was the result of 
their efforts to regroup and recover. The land and its resources had in the past provided 
them with materials for their houses and their clothing; grazing for their cattle and fields 
for their crops to provide food; as well as cattle and grain as commodities for trade. 
Hunting had augmented their sources of food and clothing. So many of these resources 
had been reduced or appropriated that, for many, the only recourse that remained was to 
sell their labour. Few protests were made by colonists against these deprivations since it 
suited them to have the Africans' labour made available to them. However, as late as 
June 1906, Joseph Baynes objected to the passing of a Bill 'To consolidate and amend the 
laws relating to game'. He pointed out that this law would bear hard on the African 
people, and with other impositions, was 
.. . fast turning a light hearted, liberty-loving, courteous, honest, and virtuous race 
into a criminal, sullen, felonous, and bitterly discontented people.45 
Polygamy was regarded by the colonists as the norm among Africans in NatallZululand. 
In the earlier part of the nineteenth century this practice was a strategy to provide for the 
surplus of women caused by the loss of men in warfare, and reveals remarkable adaptation 
to circumstances and protection of the individual. The erroneous perception that all Natal 
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Africans and Zulus were polygamous has been repeated, with some reservations, ever 
since. Krige consistently discussed a plurality of wives. 46 Bryant threw some doubt on 
it. 47 Guy writes of 90% of Zulu homesteads at the time of Cetshwayo kaMpande being 
those of commoners and 'consisting of a man .. two or three wives .. ', which would give 
an unlikely proportion of men to women of 1:2 or even 1:3.
48 
The normal demographic distribution of male and female births is roughly equal, but more 
females than males survive childhood, and females generally live longer than males. Since 
it was unusual for any African adult to remain single, and divorce was infrequent, 
polygamy was probably more common in the early period of disruption in the nineteenth 
century than it was later on. J. Lambert acknowledges this, but points out that in the 
1860s the marriage of young women to much older men, who could afford to pay a large . 
lobolo, was not uncommon.49 Bishop Colenso recognised the disparity in numbers, 






Mr Shepstone told me ... this tribe had suffered more by war than any other in the 
district, having been dreadfully cut up by Shaka and Dingaan, and this may, in 
some measure, account for the great number of women in proportion to men, and 
for the extensive practice of polygamy among them. 50 
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That widespread polygamy was a colonial myth is shown by the Weenen county 
magistrate ' s report of December 1879. This was written shortly after the Anglo-Zulu War 
in which many men from this county were killed. Of the adults (over fourteen years old) 
47% were men and 53% women.51 This would have allowed only 6% of the men 
(probably chiefs or headmen or men rich in cattle) to have two wives, or only 3% to have 
three. In 1901 this demographic distribution of 47% men and 53% women was repeated 
for the whole colony of Nata1.52 Even by 1879 the African population in Natal had 
recovered, not only from the destructive internecine wars of the early nineteenth century, 
but also from their losses during the campaign against the Hlubi and the amaNgwe, and, 
despite the Anglo-Zulu War losses, had returned to the normal demographic pattern. 
The colonists sought in various ways to remedy the Natal Africans' unwillingness to 
provide labour for them, and some desired to capitalise on the practice of polygamy . . The 
Rev . W.C. Holden, in 1855 , declared that the abolition of polygamy would 
send thousands to work who are at present supported in independent idleness by 
their wives . .. But let the Kafir have only one wife, and he will be obliged to 
work.53 
Twenty years later, Wolseley pointed out that this perception still prevailed, and that 
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but the real objection they have to polygamy is ... that when a Kaffir becomes 
possessed of several wives he will work no more for the white man ... as his wives 
will thenceforth work for him. 54 
The perception of general polygamy played a part in plans for the taxation of the Natal 
Africans, which was a further device not only to raise revenue but also to keep them in 
subjection and proletarianise them. Theophilus Shepstone's memorandum of June 1849 
proposed a hut tax which would not only discourage polygamy but also be a property and 
income tax, as well as being practicable and simple to collect. It was to be levied only 
on hut-owners on location land, and not on private farms . 55 When the Hut Tax of 7/-
per hut was promulgated by Law No 6, 1857 of 10 July 1857 (increased to 14/- per hut 
by Law No. 13, 1875 of 17 December 1875), huts on European-owned land, where the 
occupants were in service and receiving wages, were not subject to the tax. Another 
exemption, which re-echoed the opposition to polygamy, was that Hut Tax was not 
payable on 'houses of European construction, inhabited by natives having one wife, and 
otherwise conforming to civilised usages . .. ,56 
The colonists approved of taxing the Natal Africans, and favoured increasing the burden 
, . . to compel the natives to work for wages, and with that end in view to increase the 
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was to compel them to work for the white man, it was, of course, also intended to raise 
revenue to pay expenses occasioned by their administration and contribute to the general 
revenue of the colony. In 1849, Shepstone estimated that a hut tax would raise £10 500 
in revenue, while the expenditure necessary to manage the locations would be only about 
£5 500. Some of this revenue would not initially be in cash. Cattle or other 'saleable 
substitutes' could also be used in payment, and would be sold for cash. 58 This would 
further impoverish the Africans in Natal, stripping them of cattle and, presumably, grain, 
the latter as a 'saleable substitute.' 
Equitable taxation from which all citizens benefit equally is an accepted principle, but little 
more than half of Shepstone's proposed hut tax would be used in African administration. 
After the 1857 Hut Tax was doubled in 1875 there was, no doubt, some resistance, and 
an ingenious justification was put forward some years later. The Secretary for Native 
Affairs (hereafter cited as SNA) advised that 
In informing Natives for the first time of the intention to impose a tax it would be 
advisable to inform them that it is in accordance with their own Customs that this 
tax is in lieu of the tribute which they used to pay their own Supreme Chief.. 59 
The later promulgation of the Poll Tax in 1905 (to be collected from 1906) threw the net 
wider, in order to raise more revenue and also to force more Natal Africans into the 
labour market and the cash economy. 
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In painting an attractive picture of Natal for prospective settlers, John Robinson, in 1872, 
as editor of The Natal Mercury, drew attention to the inequitable system of taxation in 
Natal. Receipts of taxation, he wrote, 
are derived from customs and excise duties, harbour dues, land sales, quit-rents, 
transfer and auction dues, native taxes, postage, fees and fines and a few minor 
charges. There are no direct taxes on the white population levied by the 
Government except the stamps on legal processes .. 60 
Natal Africans at that time paid direct taxes such as the Hut Tax, Dog Tax, the Marriage 
Tax as well as various fees and fines. By 1875, all these impositions accounted for about 
75% of all revenue. 61 The Natal Africans were, in addition, discriminated against in 
the payment of import duties. For example on ' ... Kafir Picks or Hoes or any pieces of 
iron made or fashioned so as to be easily convertible into Kafir Hoes or Picks ... ' the 
import duty was double that on hoes or adze hoes 'not classified as Kafir Hoes'. 62 In 
spite of these impositions, direct or indirect, Colonel Pearson, as Commandant of Troops, 
made the statement in March 1878, that the African people in Natal contributed little 
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Robinson's dis information for the benefit of intended settlers, about the Natal Africans, 
changed little between 1872, on the eve of the Langalibalele affair, and 1900, six years 
before Bambatha's ' rebellion'. In 1872 he wrote of their numerous herds, prolific 
cornfields, light burdens, the men spending their lives in beer-drinking, dances and hunts, 
interrupted only by a brief period of 'work amongst their white neighbours' to pay the Hut 
Tax and purchase wives. 64 In 1900, he wrote that ' .. native administration in Natal .. 
has .. produced a contented, loyal , and light-hearted population', on whom taxation 
imposed little burden.65 These effusions failed to take into account the relentless efforts 
of the Natal government and the colonists to proletarianise the African popUlation of Natal. 
Robinson recognised this pressure but attributed it to the colonists' desire ' to attack the 
main citadels of barbarism - polygamy, wife-barter, witchcraft and idleness', although he 
did admit that the opponents of Shepstone's policies wished to introduce measures' .. to 
compel the natives to work for wages, and with that end in view to increase the taxation 
upon them . . ,66 
The lack of success in this regard is clearly shown in the 1901 statement of those who 
entered service in Natal (Appendix 1),67 which would have included Zululand, annexed 
to Natal in 1897. Since in 1901 most Africans in service were males, it is more 
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and women together, except perhaps with regard to domestic servants among whom there 
might have been some women, although far fewer than are generally employed in this 
capacity today. Of the Africans who entered service in that year, approximately 22% of 
the total population, or 47% of the men were engaged. The average numbers in service 
at anyone time were 8,9% of the whole, or 18,8% of the men. Not all of these worked 
for the Natal government or the colonists, but in coal-mining, factories, railway works 
and harbour works run by or contracted out to private companies. Ricksha pullers worked 
for none of these, since they were independent once they had obtained their pullers' 
licences. 68 Africans employed by colonists in town and country (domestic servants, 
'togt' labourers, agricultural labourers) amounted to 6,4% of the whole African population 
or 13,5% of the men; 5,4% of the men worked for the government (this figure included 
those employed as isibhalo labourers, military levies and in the police force); 9% in 
mines, factories and on railway or harbour works; and 2% as ricksha pullers. 
The question arises as to how many of those in service were free labourers and to what 
extent even some of these were unfree in that they were not able to detach themselves 
from their employment. Weber has stated that free labour occurs when 'the services of 
labour are the subject of contractual relationship which is formally free on both sides,69 
This definition could well be relevant to those who offered their services to mines , 
factories and contractors engaged in railway and harbour construction; urban domestic 
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servants, 'togt' labourers and even the police, while, as we have seen, ricksha pullers 
were self-employed. 
Individual isibhalo labourers and military levies, sent forward by their chiefs, had no 
choice in their employment. Labour tenants on farms were generally unfree, since 
magistrates' reports reveal that there were very few formal contracts between landlords 
and tenants; merely oral agreements to supply labour in lieu of rent. 70 In addition, 
employers from Underberg and Estcourt (and no doubt, this occurred elsewhere) were 
reported to advance wages to labourers to ensure future service, and even advance cattle 
as lobolo for tenants' wives, to be paid off in labour for up to three years,71 which 
locked the men into a cycle of debt-induced servitude. 
Nevertheless, the numbers in service in 1901 reveal that, for all their efforts, the Natal 
government and the colonists were able to exercise compulsion to work for them on a 
relatively small number of Africans. Since so few were in formal employment within the 
colony, it can be concluded that many were engaged in their traditional farming in the 
crowded locations, or had escaped, in increasing numbers, to seek work or for other 
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In 1894 more than 21 499 Africans left Natal for this purpose.73 By 1908 this number 
reached 39 397.74 The Natal government and colonists, for all their efforts to compel 
the supposedly inferior African people to provide labour for them, were unable to do this, 
because, disadvantaged though they were, many of the Africans in Natal retained their 
freedom to choose their employment. Short of imposing a system of outright slavery, 
complete success in proletarianising the Natal Africans was not possible. 
In view of their background of ingrained class and race attitudes, the British colonisers of 
Natal, supported by those missionaries intent upon introducing the kind of civilisation 
which they perceived as being an integral part of their Christian mission, imposed on the 
Natal Africans the roles of labourers under compulsion and of conscripted military levies. 
Before this could be achieved, it was found necessary to justify annexation by putting 
forward humanitarian motives and the need to 'civilise' the inhabitants, whom the 
colonisers were at pains to portray as fugitives to an 'empty' Natal. 
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The British annexation of Natal. The establishment of locations from which to draw 
labourers and levies to serve the white colonial interests. 
Early British interest in Natal as a potential colony predated its final annexation by some 
twenty years. In the 1820s reasons put forward to support the acquisition of Natal were 
more honest in their avarice and less blurred by rationalisation than those put forward 
subsequently. Lieutenant F .G. Farewell, in September 1824, suggested that a British 
colony be established in Natal 'for civilising and establishing a trade with the interior of 
South Africa; which ... will eventually occasion a large consumption of English staple 
manufactures.'! In May 1829, Mr Saxe Bannister, formerly Attorney-General of New 
South Wales, wrote to the Secretary of State for the Colonies in support of Farewell's 
desire to see Natal annexed by Britain. He urged that Britain establish 'civil government' 
in Natal in order to increase trade, particularly in ivory and the produce from cattle. 
Primary produce such as butter, beef, tallow and 'similar commodities' could reach the 
colonial market, and in return the African people could consume 'proportionate quantities 
of manufacture': the classic colonial exchange of raw materials for manufactured goods. 
The expense of defending the Cape frontier would be lessened by establishing and 
J.C. Chase, The Natal Papers (facsimile reprint, Cape Town, C. Struik, 
1968; originally published 1843), part I, pp. 17 - 19. F.G. Farewell to 
Governor of the Cape, September 1824. 
31 
encouraging missionary enterprise in Natal with a view to 'civilising' the African people 
. h hI' ,2 and ' rendering peace WIt t em ess Insecure. 
Brookes and Webb, however, do not favour an economic motive in the later annexation 
of Natal, averring that Sir George Napier, the Cape Governor, at least, was motivated by 
humanitarian and strategic considerations.3 The latter factor was no doubt prompted by 
the December 1840 Voortrekker attack on Ncaphayi, son of Madikane, the Bhaca chief, 
and the possibility of the destabilisation of the eastern Cape frontier. 4 That Natal was 
already occupied, albeit sparsely, and that any large-scale settlement or annexation would 
encroach on the rights of these inhabitants, was not taken into account. 
The first English hunter-traders arrived in Natal five years before Bannister's letter was 
written. They came as clients of the Zulu king, Shaka kaSenzangakhona, then at the 
height of his power, Natal, or at least the coastal areas, at that time being part of the Zulu 
hegemony. From him they obtained concessions with regard to the use of the land around 
the bay of Port Natal, and were favoured in their trading endeavours which centred around 
ivory and hides. Their small number precluded them from building up a power base of 
their own, except that they welcomed fugitives from Shaka's rule and from other 
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settlement, this gave the hunter-traders slight status as minor chiefs. Shaka allowed this, 
regarding the traders as being subject to him. The possession of superior weapons 
conferred upon them an aura of power which attracted fugitives to their domain. Since 
their numbers were small, however, cont1ict with the Zulu was not an option open to 
them, and they turned instead to trade and interaction. Examples of this were Henry 
Francis Fynn and, later, John Dunn, whose marriages to African women assisted them in 
securing their trade routes. 
The position of the hunter-traders became precarious when Shaka's brother, Dingane, who 
was less friendly towards the hunter-traders than Shaka had been, become king after the 
latter's assassination in 1828. In June 1835, Captain A.F. Gardiner stirred the settlers out 
of their lethargy and called a meeting to establish the town of D'Urban, and sought 
recognition for the area between the Thukela and the Mzimkhulu rivers as a colony to be 
riamed Victoria. Ulterior motives were now veiled and the reasons for this proposed step 
were loftily stated as 
5 
.. for the sake of humanity, for the upholding of the British character in the eyes 
of the natives, for the wellbeing of this increasing community, for the cause of 
morality and religion .. 5 
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Although Sir Benjamin D'Urban, the Cape Governor, favoured the establishment of a 
British settlement in Natal, the Colonial Secretary, Lord Glenelg, was discouraging, but 
requested the appointment of Gardiner as Justice of the Peace at Port Natal.
6 
With the advent of the Voortrekkers to Natal , Governor Napier sent Major Charters with 
a force of about a hundred men, to Port Natal , to prevent these 'emigrant farmers', still 
regarded as British subjects, from establishing an independent government, controlling the 
port and attacking the 'native tribes. ,7 The capture of 'apprentices' by the Trekkers, 
which was thinly disguised slavery, was viewed with unease by the British, since slavery 
had been abolished in the British Empire in December 1834, with a four-year phasing-out 
period for the slaves as apprentices to their former masters until December 1838.8 
Charters's force was too late in coming and too ineffectual to prevent Andries Pretorius's 
commando from setting out to defeat Dingane's forces at the Blood River battle. Although 
Captain Jervis, left in command by Major Charters, mediated between the Trekkers and 
Dingane, by the time he left, in December 1839, the Trekkers regarded Natal as their own 
territory .9 Their dubious claim rested on the Dingane-Retief treaty which, in Dingane's 
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This was based on the assumption that Dingane ruled Natal south of the Thukela as 
Shaka's successor and by right of his conquests . The African inhabitants of Natal were 
not consulted. 
For the effective settlement of a mainly stock-fanning community in a pre-mechanised and 
pre-industrial society, the Trekkers had to address the two questions of land and labour. 
Once they had recovered from the Bloukrans massacres and were able to turn their main 
attention away from the rehabilitation of the survivors, the chief concerns of the Natal 
Volksraad were the distribution of land to the Trekkers, the provision of labour on the 
farms thus granted, and the re-settlement of those African people, already in occupation 
of this land, who exceeded their labour requirements. To this end the Volksraad passed 
resolutions in June 1839, granting to each adult male Trekker and to widows, if they were 
resident in Natal before 1 December 1839, two fanns in perpetual ownership on payment 
of twelve rixdollars per annum.lO Labour was to be limited to five African families on 
each farm, the Commandant-General alone having the privilege of being allowed more 
than five families. 11 Those African families regarded as surplus were to be resettled 
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African inhabitants of Natal seemed not an impossible number to remove forcibly: a false 
assumption never put to the test. 
When the British annexed Natal after the capitulation of the Volksraad, the allocation of 
land and labour was somewhat different. All land was presumed to belong to the state, 
to be retained as Crown Lands, or to be granted as locations or as mission reserves, or 
to land development companies and individual immigrant settlers, with labour available. 
The African people not required as farm labourers and not regarded as original occupiers 
of the land were to be swept into locations. From these, isibhalo forced labour on public 
works, and military levies were to be drawn; for the British, unlike the Trekkers, who had 
a well developed commando system, found it necessary to raise African levies for peace-
keeping and defence. 
In order to provide some gloss of legitimacy and respectability to this annexation of land 
and the levying of forced labour and military service, the British authorities in Natal 
supported the notion that Natal had been devastated and vast numbers of people 
slaughtered rather than dispersed by the depredations of Shaka and the destabilisation of 
much of the hinterland, and that those African people who settled there later were 
immigrants with no real claim to the land. Early observations recorded by Chase, if taken 
at face value, appear to give credence to this view. However, Chase's selection of 
documents appears to be a deliberate attempt to support the idea of an 'empty' Natal. In 
this way he contributed to what amounted to a willing conspiracy of inaccuracy which 
would justify colonisation. 
36 
In 1824, Lieutenant F.G. Farewell declared that territory in Natal, the use of which had 
been granted to him by Shaka, was ' nearly depopulated, not containing more than three 
or four hundred souls.' 13 Major Charters, obtaining his information from H. F. Fynn, 
stated that 'not less than 1,000000 human beings were destroyed' by Shaka who put to 
death all those he could overtake, and drove out fugitives 'leaving the countries which he 
passed over a solitude and waste. ,14 Frontier journals (unnamed), pressing for British 
annexation, described Natal as an 'unproductive wilderness.'15 Bannister continued in 
this vein: 
The country around the harbour and for two hundred miles westward towards the 
colony to a considerable depth inland, is uninhabited except by a few scattered 
individuals, the wrecks of the tribes exterminated by the desolating wars of the 
Zoola chiefs. 16 
Dr Andrew Smith, in 1834, urged the establishment of a British settlement in Natal 'now 
lying waste.' 17 Piet Retief, the Trekker leader, in his first interview with Dingane, in 
November 1837, is reported to have added his voice to this perception in referring to the 
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unoccupied from the Drakensberg to the sea .. ' 18 1. C. Chase approved of the May 1843 
British declaration of the District of Natal, and reiterated the statement, traceable to H. F. 
Fynn, that Shaka had destroyed a million people.19 losiah Tyler, in 1891, accepted 
these statements and repeated them: 
The country was once thickly populated, but that despot [Shaka] so devastated it 
by his armies that only here and there could be found a few stragglers, and they 
. f . 20 were In a state 0 starvatIOn. 
1.A. Wahlberg, the Swedish naturalist and independent observer, referred to the 
depopulation of Natal in the area along the Mtshezi (Bushman's) and Thukela rivers, in 
two entries in his journal: 'A number of deserted Kaffer kraals of stone or earth;' 'Many 
deserted Kaffer kraals, as on the preceding days,' to which he added 'Two farms at the 
Tugela. ,21 These farms may have been cleared of their African owners by the Boers 
and not by marauders from across the Thukela. 
H.F. Fynn, in giving evidence before the 1852 - 53 Commission, again described the 
devastation and depopulation of Natal on his arrival in 1824: a perception which had been 
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up to within a few miles of the Umzimvubu, I did not find a single tri?e, with the 
exception of about 30 natives residing near the Bluff.. Ther~ were neIther kr.a~ls, 
huts Kafirs, nor corn. Occasionally I saw a few stragglers, mere hvmg 
skel~tons, obtaining a precarious existence on roots and shell-fish. 22 
This view was accepted in the report of the 1852 - 53 commissioners who added that 'the 
whole country was a desert.. ,23 The descriptions referring to a devastated Natal were 
generally concerned with depopulation rather than the degradation of the land. J. 
Boshoff's account of the prospects for settlement in Natal, after his visit to the Natal 
Trekkers in May and June 1838, provided a most favourable account of the climate, 
vegetation and soil of Natal, as well as the prospects for mining coal and for stock-
farming;24 certainly enough to arouse the cupidity of prospective colonisers. 
In 1843, when the British authorities made the first move towards the annexation of Natal, 
they accepted the perception of an 'empty' Natal, and maintained that the vast majority 
of the African inhabitants there had no clear right to the land, being immigrants. This 
argument was used to justify the levying of forced labour and military service, supposedly 
owed as a debt of gratitude for the granting of location land as living-space. 
Hendrik Cloete, Her Majesty's Commissioner in Natal in 1843, accepted the statements 
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possess the best sources of information,' and who declared that, on the arrival of the 
Trekkers , between two and three thousand 'natives, widely scattered in small parties in 
fastnesses near Port Natal.. constituted the entire population of the country.' Since the 
final defeat and death of Dingane in 1840 a reflux of African people had taken place. 
Cloete disagreed with the Trekker plan to re-Iocate those not wanted on farms or settled 
in locations, in an area beyond the Mthamvuna river. He drew a distinction between those 
originally in the country and later immigrants from Zululand,25 regarding the latter as 
by far the more numerous , and as having no right to the land. Bryant has refuted Cloete 's 
assumption, pointing out that many of these supposed immigrants were in fact returning 
to their ancestral lands after captivity in Zululand or from their refuges to the south of 
Natal. Claiming that he based his information on his own investigations, and that he had 
obtained evidence from the African people themselves , Bryant calculated that probably 
65 % of the Natal African population at that time was aboriginal , 25 % from Zululand, and 
10% were aliens, such as Swazi, Tsonga and Sotho.26 
It was no doubt the defeat and death of Dingane, coupled with the 1843 - 45 power 
vacuum in Natal between the collapse of Boer power and the fmal British annexation, 
which accounted for the vast influx of people into Natal after 1840. Most of these had 
originally lived in Natal. This was confirmed when John Scott, Lieutenant-Governor 
25 
26 
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1856 _ 64, directed that evidence be taken from elderly 'natives' who had personal 
knowledge of the African inhabitants of the area before Shaka's time. Taking into account 
the possible fallibility of oral evidence, especially if leading questions are asked, it would 
appear that there had been at least ninety-four 'tribes' in Natal before the Shakan 
period.27 Of these, forty-three were 'ancient tribes of the country, which never had any 
other home, except during the turmoil and disruption caused by the ambition and 
aggressive acts of the Zulu chief Tshaka. ,28 Bryant calculated that there were at least 
fifty separate clans with about 100 000 members in Natal in pre-Shakan times.29 
These people, according to Theophilus Shepstone, 'lived so close together, that tribal 
change of residence was difficult, if not impossible. ,30 As archaeological evidence 
shows, the population increase accelerated, possibly on account of the introduction of 
maize from east Africa, since this cereal could be grown successfully in large 
quantities,31and was resistant to bird depredation. The closer settlement which followed 
led to friction and competition for land and other resources such as wood and water, as 
well as succession disputes. Another explanation of the disruption and pressure in this 
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century, the people were much agitated by the turmoil to the north and west, occasioned 
by widespread activity to obtain slaves to be shipped out through Delagoa Bay or even 
taken to the Cape. 32 This theory is contradicted by Eldredge as being anachronistic and 
lacking in evidence.33 Wright points out that the decline in the productivity of the land 
caused by poor farming methods rather than an increase in population has been postulated 
(by Guy) and denied (by Hall), to account for the disruption in Nata1.34 
The appearance of leaders, among them Shaka, responding to this de stabilisation , and 
willing to go to war over these issues, led to violent disturbances and the dispersion of 
groups of people. The increased and well organised militarisation of the amabutho and 
the campaigns of conquest undertaken by Shaka and other leaders created a demand for 
cattle to feed their armies as well as enhance their prestige, and even, possibly, to supply 
beef to ships calling at Delagoa Bay. In the case of Shaka, this exaction far exceeded the 
former tribute paid by subjugated peoples. His amabutho were engaged in warfare away 
from their home bases - the amakhanda - where food would have been supplied locally 
and, in part, by their own families. This plunder of cattle further impoverished the 
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Although in most accounts of the disruption of the northern Nguni, Shaka is cited as the 
main agent, it is clear that he was only one of the leaders, albeit the most powerful, in this 
area, who hastened the expansion and dispersion of its inhabitants. Earlier, Dingiswayo 
kaJobe of the Mthethwa and, in the Shakan era, Zwide kaLanga of the Ndwandwe, and 
Mzilikazi kaMashobana of the Khumalo, caused considerable realignment and dispersion 
of groups, although not necessarily wholesale slaughter. 
The careers of Matiwane KaMasumpa and his son, Zikhali, of the Ngwane people, 
although these two men were not as powerful as the aforementioned leaders, are examples 
of the numerous encounters and cont1icts which affected individuals and groups of people, 
causing them to nee and, in some cases, then to marshal their forces and return to an area 
where they had previously lived. The Ngwane were involved in actual or threatened 
cont1ict with Dingiswayo of the Mthethwa, Zwide of the Ndwandwe, Shaka and Dingane 
of the Zulu, Mpangazita of the Hlubi, Mzilikazi of the Khumalo (later Ndebele), 
Moshweshwe of the Sotho, British forces under Dundas, Sekonyela of the Tlokwa and 
Sobhuza of the Swazi,35 all of whom were attempting to expand and consolidate their 
own power bases. 
According to Lieutenant-Governor Scott's information, provided by Theophilus Shepstone, 
some of the Natal groups dispersed by Shaka's raids or, in a ripple effect, by those 
directly attacked by the Zulu amabutho, never returned to Natal as distinct groups. 
35 
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Individuals from these groups, who did return, attached themselves to more powerful 
aggregations who had retained their identity. Some, like the Mphumuza, the Nxamalala 
and the Thembu, were temporarily absorbed by the Zulu, but detached themselves and 
returned to Natal. Others, like the Bhaca, were driven southwards, but some of these 
returned as a distinct group to Natal after it became a British colony. The peregrinations 
of the Hlubi people have been well attested, some moving to the south, some joining the 
Zulu and some, under Langalibalele kaMthimkulu, re-entering Natal.36 
It is clear that, in this turbulent period, no single group south of the Thukela was able, for 
some years, to offer significant resistance to Boer or British colonisation, since all alike 
were in disarray. Their own best interests dictated that they should acquiesce to the 
demands made upon them by the British colonial authorities, after annexation, in the form 
of forced labour and military service. Collaboration was not a policy common to all 
groups, and where it was accepted, different groups showed various degrees of 
enthusiasm, depending on the regional and economic situation of each. It would be 
imposing European xenophobia on the Natal Africans to suppose that their instinctive 
attitude towards the European colonial power was inimical. Self-interest and their own 
powerlessness were important factors, and frequently the African people in Natal 
perceived that their best interest lay with the power base of the colonial authorities in 
36 Bird, Annals of Natal, vol. I, pp. 124 - 153. Enclosure No. 1 in 
Lieutenant-Governor Scott's Despatch No. 12, 26 February 1864; W.R. 
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protection against Zulu aggression, or in enhancing their economic progress or even, in 
the case of the Kholwa, in achieving their possible political advancement within the colony . 
Some groups, notably the Mphumuza under Thetheleku kaNobanda and the Nxamalala 
under Lugaju kaMatomela, occupied land so near the British seat of power, 
Pietermaritzburg, that it was to their advantage to accept alliance with the colonial 
authorities and derive as much benefit as they could from this link and from the fact that 
their position in the Swartkop (Zwartkops) location, in close proximity to 
Pietermaritzburg, allowed them to engage in profitable market-gardening. As early as 
1844, the Rev. A. Faure noted that those African people living near Pietermaritzburg were 
bringing firewood and garden produce into the town to sell .37 In July 1876 Lady Barker 
remarked on the sale, in the town, of poultry and eggs from a nearby homestead.38 
Durban, too, offered similar opportunities. G. Russell, writing of the situation in Durban 
in the 1850s, recorded that bundles of reeds were brought into the town for sale by 
African women, as were firewood, grass brooms, mats, fruit and vegetables. 39 
Chiefs farther afield, such as Phakade kaMacingwane of the Mchunu, and other chiefs in 
the Ween en location, were able to build up their own power bases but remain ostensibly 
loyal to the colonial power, According to the 1852 - 53 Commission, Phakade and these 
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adding, as largely as possible, from extraneous sources. This was so marked that the 
commissioners, four-fifths of whom were colonists, complained that Phakade in particular 
I I . 40 was given too much latitude by the oca magIstrates. It was from the locations 
farthest away from Pietermaritzburg and Durban, the inhabitants of which could not 
expect to provide produce for the markets in these towns, that many migrant labourers left 
Natal to seek work. 
In all this early turmoil it would have been difficult for Commissioner Cloete, in 1843, 
to define precisely which groups or individuals could be termed 'Zulu.' An increasing 
population, competition for grazing, water and land for tillage had caused groups of people 
over the centuries to move southwards between the Drakensberg and the sea. 
Considerable acceleration was occasioned by expansionist military leaders bent on 
conquest. It was only with Shaka's conquest, absorption and consolidation of those Nguni 
living to the north of the Thukela river that a distinct and powerful Zulu nation came into 
being, if one disregards his father Senzangakhona's small chiefdom. Shaka and his 
brother and assassin, Dingane, held sway over many people beyond the consolidated 
group, and exacted tribute from them. Commissioner Cloete was referring to those 
northern Nguni who had been directly ruled by Dingane and his brother and successor, 
Mpande, when he wrote about 'a most alarming influx of Zulus .. within the last three or 
four years . .'41 These fugitives included Mpande himself in 1839,42 Phakade of the 
40 
41 
NCP 8/3/1 Proceedings of the Commission Appointed to Inquire into the 
Past and Present State of the Kafirs in the District of Natal, 1852 - 53, p. 
34. . 
Bird, Annals of Natal, vol. II, p. 311. H. Cloete to the Honourable 1. 
Montagu, Secretary to Government, 10 November 1843. 
46 
Mchunu in the latter part of Dingane's rule,43 and Mawa44 in 1843, with their 
adherents. Perhaps they were taking the option referred to by Holden: 
This is, however, one law of considerable importance ... if a person or family is 
dissatisfied with his or their chief, they can leave their own tribe and place 
. f h h' f 45 themselves under the protectlOn 0 anot er c Ie ... 
This view was contradicted by Lieutenant-Governor Pine in 1874 in connection with the 
Langalibalele affair. Advised by Theophilus Shepstone, he declared that leaving the 
jurisdiction of the Supreme Chief without his sanction was looked upon as treason.
46 
Whichever of these statements was correct, there is no doubt that the fugitives from 
Zululand to Natal were hostile to the Zulu authorities of that time, but were themselves 
Zulu. 
In the period 1839 - 43, to which Cloete referred, the first significant, although not 
numerous, int1ux of Swazi took place when Chief Mswati's half-brother, Malambule, 
sought refuge with the Wesleyan missionary, James Allison, among the Nene people under 
their chief, Sigweje kaMngayi. Mswati cast out Allison and Sigweje's people, who 
entered Natal. They purchased land near Waschbank.47 Later in 1851, a hundred 
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Edendale from Indaleni which he had established in 1847.48 They were not part of the 
location system, and, being Christian and literate, applied for exemption from 'Native' 
law. They were, therefore, strictly speaking, not subject to the demands for forced labour 
and military service, although attempts were made from time to time to involve them. Not 
being assigned to locations, they were able to occupy land suitable for farming, since they 
had purchased it and had some say in its selection. 
These Kholwa were the forerunners of other Christian landowners who entered Natal and 
settled down at Edendale, Driefontein and Kleinfontein, not only as enterprising 
commercial farmers, but also as traders, carriers and artisans. 49 They became so 
prosperous through these enterprises that they were able to provide notable voluntary 
military assistance to the British during the Anglo-Zulu War. Their ambition to gain the 
franchise in reward for this aid was, however, to meet with failure 'and, in later years, 
after the colonial period, the Kholwa, in their disillusionment, produced many leaders of 
political action against the South African government. · 
Tsonga traders were present in the Zulu domain from early times, trading between the 
Zulu and Delagoa Bay. An int1ux, into Natal, of Tsonga on a large scale belongs to a 
later period when, from the 1870s, John Dunn obtained the services of gangs of Tsonga 
48 
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labourers , especially on railway construction and on large sugar estates. 50 Otherwise, 
the 10% aliens of Bryant's estimate, which included Sotho, were mainly small groups and 
individuals who had entered Natal. 
As early as November 1843, Commissioner Cloete suggested, with regard to the 
homesteads and lands of the African people who w~re originally in Natal, that 'certain 
tracts of land should be inalienably vested in the chiefs of such kraals .. ' He proposed 
further, the settlement of the 'number of intruders in the colony,' i.e. those whom he 
regarded as having no right to land in Natal, in six or more locations at a distance 'from 
the contaminating influence of the chief town and port,' i.e. Pietermaritzburg and Durban. 
He favoured Dr Adams's Umlazi as one of these locations; another two might be 
established near the Mzimvubu, and a third, controlled by the missionary Aldin Grout, on 
the banks of the Tongati river or the Mvoti river; a fourth at the upper sources of the 
Mkhomazi river; a fifth at the Mtshezi (Great Bushman's) river or the Mpofana (Mooi) 
river; and a sixth at the upper end of the Great Thukela (Tugela). Since the Umlazi and 
the Umvoti locations would be controlled by the missionaries Adams and Grout, the future 
British colonial government could, in Cloete 's view, expect 'a gradual improvement in the 
habits and morals of this benighted people .. ,51 
The other four proposed locations would be remote from both Pietermaritzburg and 
Durban, and would serve as labour pools for farmers farther afield, as well as sources of 
50 
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isibhalo labour and military service. Originally, in 1846, it was recommended to the 
location commissioners that they establish markets in the towns 'for the sale of the 
produce grown on all the locations .. ' as this would stimulate the industry of the location-
dwellers to sell their surplus crops at a lower price than would be demanded by European 
farmers. 52 However, any chance that the location-dwellers might have been able to 
build up their own prosperity in competition with the white farmers was negated by the 
resistance of these farmers and by the poverty of the location land assigned to the 
Africans. Later, in the 1870s, the Hlubi, by expanding their lands beyond the locations 
assigned to them, were to challenge this notion, as they produced surplus, reasonably 
durable and marketable produce. 
It was left to the British officials of the new colony of Natal, annexed to the Cape as an 
autonomous district in 1845, to carry out Cloete's suggestions. It would seem that, in 
establishing the locations, the Natal government wished to confine the 'intruders' within 
limited and defined areas, rather than give them favourably situated farming land adequate 
for their needs and future prosperity. This establishing of locations would have had the 
effect of forcing them on to the labour market as wage labour. The paucity of their share 
of land is shown by the fact that, initially, the approximately 80 000 - 100 000 African 
people to whom the locations were assigned, received some two million acres (809 400 
hectares) i.e. about eight to ten hectares each, and one-sixth of the total area of Natal.53 
The remaining five-sixths of the land was Crown Land, or was allocated to land 
52 
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development companies; to white farmers, many of whom were absentee landlords; or as 
mission reserves. Further locations and mission reserves (some of the latter being carved 
out of existing locations) were later proclaimed, until, by 1864, there. were forty-two 
locations and twenty-one mission reserves. By 1889, the area covered by these was 
2 198 546 acres (889 751,56 hectares): not a great increase in the area of land considering 
the African population growth in over forty years.54 
In establishing the locations the Natal government forcibly removed some African people 
from land suitable for pastoral farming and agriculture. Holden wrote of the choice of 
location land and the forced removals, and he attempted to justify these actions: 
The large tracts of country, thus selected, were such as Natives alone could use, 
being exceedingly rugged and mountainous, and only fit for such people to occupy: 
but in the more open parts, if a farm happened to be claimed by a Native, the 
claimant was to have another farm given in some other suitable place by 
government, so as to allow the locations to remain entire.55 
The first Lieutenant-Governor of Natal, Martin West, arrived in December 1845, and by 
the end of March 1846 he had appointed the Natal Native Commission of 1846 - 47 to 
report on 'Native Affairs' and the possibility of establishing locations for the African 
people who had returned to Natal. This commission's most important instructions were 
to locate the 'natives,' divide the Natal territory into districts and fix sites for European 
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to the Native Tribes'; Dr William Stanger, the Surveyor-General; and Dr Newton Adams, 
an American missionary. They were joined, in December 1846, by the Reverend D. 
Lindley, an American missionary, and Lieutenant C.l. Gibb, R.E. It would be 
Shepstone's task to carry out the placement of the African people in these locations; 
Stanger would define the position and boundaries of the locations; and the missionaries 
would be expected to supervise them, since West recommended that each location be 
'under the pastoral care of one or two missionaries .. ,57 In establishing towns, the 
commissioners were instructed to 'secure occupation of the country intervening between 
the several locations', I.e. to intersperse the locations among European settlements. 
Lieutenant Gibb was to give his 'professional opinion with regard to situations [of towns] 
in a military point of view, as susceptible of defence .. ,58 
The 1846 - 47 Commission's recommendations for the organisation and control of the 
locations included a superintendent or resident agent for the government, with assistants; 
a police force; a 'model mechanical school'; and agricultural instruction. The commission 
originally planned ten locations. The allocation of land would take into account the nature 
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different. Earl Grey, Secretary of State for the Colonies, turned down most of the 
Commission's recommendations on the grounds of expense.60 
The first location, proclaimed in November 1846, was the Zwartkops location (later, the 
spelling 'Swartkop' came into use), in which 8 000 people were settled, 3 000 of them 
under chiefs originally settled there . This indicates that even those people who were 
accepted as aboriginal inhabitants of Natal , were placed in locations. In March 1847, the 
Umlazi, Umvoti and Inanda locations were proclaimed. The Land Commission of 1848, 
which replaced the so-called Location Commission, made an unsuccessful attempt to 
reduce the size of these four locations . In April 1849, three more locations were 
established: the Umzinyati , the Impafana and the Kahlamba. 61 With regard to the 
quality of the land granted to location-dwellers, much of it was unusable for stock-farmers 
and crop-farmers. Lindley, in 1854, voiced his misgivings about the location system when 
he wrote, 'I did not think this way of settling the Natives the wisest that might have been 
adopted,'62 and when he first visited the Inanda location in March 1847, he was appalled 
at the quality of the land, and stated, 'A more broken, worthless region could hardly be 
found. ,63 
Increasing population, added to the unsuitable and insufficient land, soon caused the 
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were forced to look for a livelihood elsewhere, seeking work in the towns or with white 
farmers. Those who remained on the land were not all settled on location land with secure 
communal tenure, but little prospect of prosperity; some lived on occupied farms where 
they were bound to give their labour to the owner for at least part of the year, while 
others occupied Crown Lands from which they could be summarily evicted; and some 
were illegal tenants on farms unoccupied by their owners; while others lived on mission 
reserves. 64 
In the 1890s, John Bird attempted to explain why the locations were in broken country . 
He wrote that not only had the Boers taken most of the open ground, but the returning 
African people preferred to 'remain as much as possible unseen and unnoticed' because 
of their earlier persecution, and therefore chose 'the very broken tracts, almost fastnesses, 
that still form the great part of the kafir locations. ,65 There may have been some truth 
in this before the defeat and death of Dingane, but not to the same extent after 1846, when 
the locations were selected. However, Holden did find, as late as 1850, that the Thuli 
people under Chief Mnini KaMabone were still inclined to seek the safety of dense bush 
about six miles (10,6 km) from Durban Bay. 66 
John Robinson, writing in 1872, while admitting to the rugged nature of the location land, 
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Fully 2,000 ,000 acres of Natal are taken up by Native locations ... These are 
mostly situated in broken and bushy country , which the kafir seems to prefer to 
more open ground.67 
He became lyrical about this supposed choice when he wrote, in 1900: 
Natal offers .. , regions of picturesque beauty and grandeur, whose depths of 
craggy bushland and rock-bound mountain and shadowy valley seem made to be 
the happy abiding-place of untutored savages. 68 
Russell, in 1911, was more realistic in taking into account the fact that the location-
dwellers were pastoralists and crop-farmers, when he wrote: 
The native locations are generally the most barren, wild and broken parts of the 
country. Only small portions here and there are adapted for cultivation, and much 
of the land is not fitted for pasturage but only for the habitation of the eagle and 
the baboon. 69 
By the time the location commissioners established the first locations in 1846, land had 
already been claimed by those Trekkers who had remained in Natal, although only those 
claimants who could prove twelve months' continuous occupation were permitted to 
remain on their farms. 7o Many Trekkers sold their land to Cape land speculators,71 
such as F. Collison, E. Chiappini and J.C. Zeederberg, who promoted emigration from 
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who was in partnership with the shipping firm of Marshall and Edridge. Byrne bought 
more land, and set up his Natal Emigration and Colonisation Office in London, offering 
assisted passages for emigrants to Natal. 72 His land in Natal was surveyed in May 1849 
to provide twenty-acre (eight-hectare) plots to settlers. Before the first Byrne settlers 
arrived in 1849, other settlers, in groups or as individuals, had increased the settler 
population to about 2000. 73 From January 1849 until June 1852 some 4 806 immigrants 
came to Natal, most of them under the Byrne scheme.74 
Some of the allotments granted to the British settlers were not much better in quality or 
situation than the land allotted to location-dwellers, and their early struggles as commercial 
farmers were comparable. 75 However, this problem was soon alleviated, in theory, for 
those settlers who were financially able to take advantage of Lieutenant-Governor Pine's 
increase in the potential size of the settlers' allotments so that each adult could claim forty-
five acres (eighteen hectares) with twelve and a half acres (five hectares) for each child. 
In practice, there were considerable difficulties and much dissatisfaction.76 
Nevertheless, the settlers had some room for manoeuvre and some political advantages, 
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continue farming. One option, open to and exercised by both groups, was to move to the 
towns and seek work. 
Unlike the land allotted to British settlers, which does not appear to have been deliberately 
chosen for any reason other than that it was available for purchase, location land does 
seem to have been chosen for specific reasons advantageous to the colonial state. A map 
published in 185977 indicates that an important motivation in the choice of the 
Umzinyati, Impafana and Tugela locations was to provide a buffer area against Zulu raids 
from over the Thukela. This motivation was expressed in January 1854 when Theophilus 
Shepstone described those residing in the northern and north-western border locations as 
being 'useful bulwarks to Natal against invasion.'78 The Kahlamba location was 
deliberately placed below the Drakensberg to ward off San raids. 79 The selection of 
Swartkop, Umlazi, Umvoti and Inanda suggests that the availability of labour in reasonable 
proximity to towns and farms was probably a factor. Nevertheless, in the eyes of the 
disgruntled commissioners of 1852 - 53, twenty of whom were land-owning colonists 
while only five were officials,80 this aspect had not been considered, since they 
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labourers, was such that they 'dried up the source whence an abundant and continuous 
supply of Kafir labour for wages might have been procured. ,81 
The commissioners complained bitterly, too, of the 
suicidal illiberality in respect of land towards the white inhabitants, British subjects 
.. and the reckless extravagance of the projected grants, amounting to two millions 
of acres, to the Kafirs .. 82 
Since, in 1852, the settler population, with five-sixths of Natal available to them or to the 
colonial government, amounted to about 7 000, while the African population of some 80 
000 to 100 000 or more was confined to one-sixth of the land, this statement is widely 
prejudiced. The desire for land and labour is further shown by the commissioners when 
they deplored the fact that 'no settler of experience or possessed of landed property' had 
been on the Location Commission, and the commissioners, 'failed to give general 
satisfaction,' because the locations were so large that they trespassed on 'the private rights 
of proprietors of farms .. ,83 
Already the conflict between officialdom and the settlers was evident: the officials 
concerned with a potential source of labour from the locations which they could tap for 
public works and military service - both isibhalo labourers and military levies had been 
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the Natal government and the settlers were increasingly to lose labour to other areas as 
time went on, especially after the discovery of diamonds and then gold. This is made 
clear by returns showing the rising number of African men from Natal who obtained 
passes to leave the colony. In 1889, 3 667 African men left Natal in search of work,84 
and between April 1893 and March 1894, 21 499 African men were granted passes to 
leave Nata1.85 By 1908, nearly 31 000 African men from Natal took outward passes to 
look for work in adjacent territories, while some 8 465 left 'for other purposes' bringing 
the total to 39 397.86 The loophole in the compulsion to provide labour and military 
service was being exploited by African men from Natal in search of free and more 
remunerative labour, giving rise to a pattern of migrant labour, with all its social 
disruption and economic drawbacks. 
In confining the African people in Natal to limited and, eventually, unprofitable and 
exhausted locations, the Natal government was not providing the limitless labour pool it 
had hoped for, but was producing an impoverished people, many of whom sought the 
opportunity to escape. The land originally assigned to location-dwellers, even in 1847, 
was insufficient for much more than subsistence farming unless it was close enough to the 
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When the recommendations of the 1846 - 47 Commission, with regard to the 
administration of the locations, were not accepted, and no funds were made available to 
administer them, Shepstone, as Diplomatic Agent, turned to the Zulu pattern of chiefs to 
provide the lack. Where 'tribes' were well established in Natal under hereditary chiefs, 
and were regarded as indigenous, these leaders and their followers were allowed to remain 
as distinct groups. Where no recognised chief over a consolidated group existed, 
Shepstone appointed a chief over this 'tribe'. 87 The' unborn' chief thus appointed was 
given authority but, initially, no remuneration for the office, which provided the Natal 
authorities with indirect control over the Natal Africans at little or no cost. 'Unborn' 
chiefs, since they owed their position to the Natal government, were more likely to be 
amenable than the original hereditary chiefs. Later, this distinction blurred and' unborn' 
chiefs or their descendants who had succeeded them were, on occasion, hostile to the 
Natal government. All the chiefs formed part of the chain of command in raising levies 
and isibhalo labourers. 
As early as 1854, Shepstone was uneasy about the efficacy of the location system in Natal, 
since he proposed that he should take those 'Natives', residing in Natal, who were willing 
to follow him to the country south of the Mzimkhulu. These would exclude those from 
the northern and north-western border locations who were required for defence. He gave 
his reasons for this migration, but realised the difficulties attendant upon forced removal 
and the fact that the African people were less compliant than they had been: 
87 Brookes and Webb, History of Natal, p. 59. 
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Natal requires a population outlet to her ever increasing Black Populati?n, this ~i~l 
furnish it, to attain the same by a forced removal would be as unjust as It IS 
physically impracticable. 88 
The migration did not take place. 
Shepstone's plan to give legal security and some political power within the locations to the 
location-dwellers by granting separate titles for each location to a Board of Trustees, led 
only to the establishment of the Umnini Trust, in May 1858. This comprised the SNA ex 
officio, the chief of the Thuli people also ex officio, and one non-official member. The 
scheme was not pursued, as the Natal government would have lost its power to re-allocate 
land and to manoeuvre within the system. Instead, the Natal Native Trust was created 
which, from June 1864, held all other location land in Natal in trust for the African 
population as a whole. The Trust was the Natal Executive Council acting in a particular 
capacity.89 As no chiefs or location-dwellers were members of this Trust, any possible 
autonomy or part in decision-making by them was precluded, as was individual ownership 
of land. 
The acquiescence of the African people in the tyranny of the Natal government can be 
partly explained by the fact that grants of land were vitally necessary for their livelihood 
as pastoral and crop-farmers. They were accustomed to the authority of their own chiefs 
on whom they depended for the apportioning of land, and the position of the Natal 
government in this regard seemed at first no different. Some, like Mpande, Phakade and 
88 
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Mawa, who were formerly under the sway of the Zulu king, detached themselves only 
when their lives were in jeopardy. These then transferred their allegiance to the power 
base of the Boers and then the British. When, in later years, demands for taxes and 
isibhalo labour became excessive, and employment in towns, on farms, in the transport 
business and on mines offered an alternative to pastoral farming and agriculture, many 
African men from Natal left the locations. This led to the weakening of the mesh of 
dependency of young men on their fathers and their chiefs; and traditional respect and 
indebtedness broke down. 
The Natal government had defined and limited the land occupation of African people in 
Natal. In administering these areas, this government exploited them by drawing from 
them labour for public works, and military service. To ensure and justify compulsion in 
these matters, an elaborate fabrication was devised to vindicate this levy. However, since 
the British Colonial Office was not fully aware of the system until the beginning of 1876, 
no explanation was offered or demanded until 31 May 1876.90 
Having confined the homes and farming operations of the African people in Natal to the 
locations, Shepstone exploited these location-dwellers as a source of labour and military 
service, as an obligation in supposed gratitude for their being granted land. It was left to 
later officials in 1876, and Shepstone himself, who by this time had left Natal, to attempt 
90 
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to justify the linked levy of isibhalo and military service as being in accordance with Zulu 
custom, although the parallel which they drew between the two systems was inaccurate. 
63 
CHAPTER III 
Attempts to justify the isibhalo system as being derived from the Zulu king's labour 
demands. 
By the time that the Natal officials were required, in 1876, to explain on what basis the 
exaction of isibhalo labour on public works rested, the linked isibhalo and military levy 
system had been in operation for almost thirty years. It had been applied arbitrarily by 
Theophilus Shepstone in 1847 and 1848; with marginally more legality from 1849 and 
1850; and was to be applied with official clarity only in 1891. Military levies were first 
required in 1847, and isibhalo labour on public roads was first used in 1848.1 
Shepstone's actions were on a firmer footing from June 1849 when Native Customary Law 
superseded Roman-Dutch Law in ruling the African people in Natal;2 and in 1850 when 
the Lieutenant-Governor of Natal was recognised as the Supreme Chief of the 'Natives' 
in the Colony. 3 This gave some legality to the calling up of levies and labourers, 
although precisely what the powers of the Supreme Chief were, was not explained. Until 




NCP 8/5/14 Papers relating to the supply by native chiefs of native labour 
on public works, 1875 (hereafter cited as PNNL). Enclosure in No. 16. 
Report of J. W. Shepstone, Acting Secretary for Native Affairs (hereafter 
cited as SNA), 5 June 1877; J.B. Wright, Bushman Raiders of the 
Drakensberg 1840 - 1870 (Pietermaritzburg, University of Natal Press, 
1971), p. 64. 
Brookes, White Rule, p. 50. 
NCP 4/1/2/21 LC No.4, 17 February 1892. 
64 
basis of custom, which in practice was, to a large extent, arbitrary. As late as 1870 it was 
stated that 
.. the right of the Supreme Chief, in other words, of the Government under Native 
Law to order out, through the Magistrat~s, Natives to labour on public works has 
always been recognised and acted upon. 
In the Natal Legislative Council meeting of 17 February 1892, the SNA, attempting to 
give the established system retrospective legality, stated that the officer administering the 
Government of Natal (the Lieutenant-Governor or Governor) had 'exercised the powers 
of a Supreme Chief over the Native Population' since 1845,5 but it was only when 
Lieutenant-Governor Martin West's proclamation was embodied in Ordinance No.3 of 
1849, ratified by the Queen-in-Council in 1850, that it was formally stated that the 
Lieutenant-Governor held all the power and authority enjoyed by 'any Supreme or 
paramount Native Chief. ,6 This was reiterated in Law No. 44, 1887;7 but only in the 
passing of Law No. 19 of 1891 was this power unequivocally defined to include the 
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The Supreme Chief has power to call upon all Natives to supply labour for public 
works or for the general needs of the Colony.8 
The Supreme Chief's power with regard to calling up military levies and labourers was 
thus legalised forty-four and forty-three years respectively after it was first applied. The 
persons authorised to call up levies and labourers were designated in the same law as: 
.. the Secretary for Native Affairs, or .. the Administrators of Native Law, or .. . 
other officers authorised for the purpose .. as the deputies or representatives of the 
Supreme Chief, or of the Supreme Chief in Counci1..9 
This authority, on the local level , descended to chiefs, as 'minor' deputies of the Supreme 
Chief, who were responsible for supplying military levies, and labourers on public 
works. 10 
The supposed powers of the Supreme Chief in Natal were, therefore, vaguely defined until 
1891, and the lack of a statutory foundation for the call-up for isibhalo and military 
service provided the Natal government with room for discretionary and even arbitrary 
powers on an ad hoc basis, whether this was the intention or not. In 1876 it was not 
difficult for the Natal officials to persuade the Colonial Office in London into accepting 
their explanations, emanating as they did from the supposed experts on the spot. The 
basis on which these explanations rested was that, just as the Zulu king had the authority 
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Lieutenant-Governor of Natal, as Supreme Chief of the Africans in Natal, had the right 
to do the same. There were numerous inaccuracies in this analogy, which would not have 
been evident to the British Colonial Office. What the Natal colonial officials presented 
was a static Zulu system which was inaccurate in many respects and which did not take 
into account the fact that Zulu society had undergone dynamic changes in response to 
altered circumstances from pre-Shakan times, and to the existence of first the Boer and 
then the British colonial power on its border. The officials extracted only those aspects 
which were advantageous to the Natal government and took little account of changes. 
On 31 May 1876, Lord Carnarvon, the Secretary of State for the Colonies, requested Sir 
Henry Bulwer, the Lieutenant-Governor of Natal, to supply him with information 
regarding the isibhalo system of labour on public works in Natal. 11 Bulwer used reports 
from l. Ayliff, the Acting SNA; l.W. Shepstone, his successor; and Sir Theophilus 
Shepstone, the former SNA, to compile his own report. Ay liff , in his report, considered 
to what extent the isibhalo system and the linked calling up of levies were in accordance 
with the traditional Zulu practice. 12 
Ayliff's minute failed to give any indication that the Zulu military and labour exactions 
were inextricably part of the political, social and economic order, and not simply 
occasional and arbitrary impositions. Early observers and later apologists for the system 
of forced labour and military service in Natal, of whom Ayliff was an example, distorted 
11 
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this reality. Some later writers such as Bryant and Orner-Cooper, in describing Zulu 
society, relied heavily on earlier, possibly inaccurate descriptions, while more recent 
analysts have been able to comprehend the whole intertwined nature of Zulu society, 
which changed in many respects over the years. Enough has not, however, been made 
of the dynamic nature of Zulu society which responded to the demands made upon it by 
successive leaders in reaction to their own circumstances. To state that the Natal system 
was based on the Zulu model takes little account of these changes. 
Shaka's militarisation of the amabutho came about not only as a result of his pursuit of 
power, but also, no doubt, as a defence against external pressures. It was the Zulu society 
of Shaka's day which Henry Francis Fynn described. On his first visit to Shaka, he was 
reluctantly impressed by the sight of ordered ranks of gesticulating and dancing warriors 
and women; and multitudes of cattle, and remarked, 'It was a most exciting scene, 
surprising to us, who could not have imagined that a nation termed "savages" could be so 
disciplined . .'13 Later, Fynn, describing Zulu society in Dingane's day, was more 
analytical, recognising that regimental headquarters, which housed the king's regiments, 
were also royal residences, presided over by prominent members of the king's family. 
From a military point of view, a general was in command of the regiment accommodated 
there. The regiment was divided into battalions led by captains. Fynn touched on the 
economic importance of the numerous regimental centres since the men there also took 
care of the king's cattle taken as plunder in warfare,14cattle being of paramount 
importance as a sign of wealth. The generals from these amakhanda had a political 
13 
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function as well, according to Fynn. They would discuss matters which affected them all, 
taking care not to propose anything in opposition to the king. 
Manual labour for the local chief, on which the isibhalo was supposedly based, consisted, 
wrote Fynn, of people drawn from groups of ten or twenty homesteads, building the 
I · . h' f' ld 15 chief's homestead and, once a year, cu tlvatmg IS Ie s. 
Isaacs, who left Natal in June 1831, confined his attention mainly to the situation in 
Shaka's time. Although he dismissed the Zulu government as 'most incomprehensible', 
he outlined the hierarchy as being led by the autocratic king, who appointed two principal 
chiefs, who in turn appointed minor chiefs 'at all the kraals throughout his dominions'. 
Like Fynn, Isaacs declared that Shaka brooked no opposition. 16 However, in 
considering Dingane's rule, Isaacs maintained that the king was in awe of the power of 
his warriors under the command of their chiefs, so that he 'had merely the shadow of 
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Although Isaacs mentioned Shaka's division of his army into regiments,18 the regimental 
headquarters - the amakhanda - were, to Isaacs, shelters for captured cattle; and the rising 
generation, who took care of them, accompanied the old warriors as servants on 
campaigns, eventually becoming warriors themselves, and being formed into regiments. 
In this description of military matters, Isaacs was chiet1y concerned with providing a 
sensational representation of Shaka as a 'horrible and detestable .. savage.' 19 
Captain A. F. Gardiner, in his account, recognised that Zulu customs changed from pre-
Shakan times to the Dingane era, in respect of the delay which first Shaka and then 
Dingane imposed on the marriages of their soldiers; the power of life and death held by 
every principal councillor - induna - in Shaka's time, reduced to only three councillors -
izinduna - in Dingane's day; and Shaka's abolition of circumcision. Gardiner also took 
cognisance of the different grades of men in the Zulu regimental system, viz. headringed 
and without headrings, although his naming of the different ranks is confused. He stated 
that the men were called up for half a year 'principally for the practice of dancing, which 
is considered as a military exercise. ,20 None of Gardiner's statements provided any firm 
basis on which to rest the system of calling up isibhalo labour and military levies in the 
form applied by the Natal government. 
Both Fynn and Isaacs stated that Shaka's power was absolute, in spite of the devolution 
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recognised this modifying effect, stating that the assembly of district heads - the umphakati 
_ had the authority to sustain or control the power of the chiefs,21 indicating that, at that 
level, there were checks on the power of superiors. 
Theophilus Shepstone, as Diplomatic Agent to the Native Tribes in Natal from 1845, was 
concerned with adopting the Zulu military system, as he perceived it, and adapting it to 
serve the Natal colonial interests. In a draft letter of August 1848, Shepstone outlined the 
'Zulu organization and the customs that are considered necessary to uphold and consolidate 
the military power of the Zulu .. ,' describing the periodic formation and naming of age-set 
regiments, with appointed leaders from older regiments; the building of military 
settlements; the apportioning of cattle from the king to the regiments; the provision of 
shields and assegais; and the organisation of these regiments into a body available to the 
king for military service for three to six years. Even after the men were allowed to 
marry, they retained their regimental home, and might be called up again. Although 
Shepstone maintained that elements of this model could well be adopted by the Natal 
government, he warned that in Natal the power of compulsion was absent and would be 
dissipated by the fact that men could enter the employ of the colonists, earn money and 
escape the draft. 22 
Shepstone's outline of the enrolment of recruits by the Zulu king and his military 
organisation included labour for the king in building military settlements as well as the 
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availability of the regiments in warfare. These two aspects alone were to be extracted by 
the colonial government from the complex Zulu system. In 1851 Shepstone repeated his 
recommendation of a military levy in Natal , based on the Zulu model, and continuing in 
this vein, referred to his earlier letter: 
The Zulu organization is of a much more perfect nature and in describing it .. I 
have recommended the adoption of that part of it which I think would tend to 
remind the Natives periodically of their duties of allegiance and obedience.
23 
A Zulu custom which Shepstone, in 1848, described and regarded as being another model 
worthy of adoption to strengthen the Natal government's position vis-a-vis the Africans, 
was the umkhosi , the major ceremony of the First Fruits, when all male subjects gathered 
to dance before the king and renew their vows to defend and die for him. These 
protestations, wrote Shepstone, produced a spirit of rivalry and emulation between the 
different regiments which could be turned to advantage in warfare. The umkhosi fostered 
unity and loyalty to the king. Shepstone declared that this annual muster was of major 
political importance, and' .. its adoption in a modified form would be productive of much 
good .. ' as it would excite feelings of unity and nationality. 24 
Shepstone's proposal no doubt stemmed from his knowledge that Shaka had used the 
umkhosi as a method of centralising power in himself; and other chiefs within his 
hegemony were not permitted to hold their own imikhosi for fear of detracting from his 
position as leader. Shepstone's August 1848 suggestion was not pursued. In the unsettled 
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state of the country, if all Natal Africans were involved, it would have been more likely 
to produce a riotous assembly than a demonstration of loyalty . 
Before 1875, the Natal colonial authorities were content to allow Shepstone to conduct the 
affairs of his office as Diplomatic Agent to the Native Tribes from 1845 to 1853, and as 
SNA from 1853 to 1875, without any particular curiosity about the original basis on which 
the isibhalo and military levy system operated. The 1849 adoption of Native Customary 
Law, and the 1850 recognition of the Lieutenant-Governor as Supreme Chief provided the 
only statutory basis for these demands. Shepstone' s organisation of the Natal Africans 
from 1850, when magistrates were first appointed in Natal, rested on a hierarchy which 
devolved power from the Supreme Chief to the SNA, and from him to the magistrates. 
In calling up levies and labourers from the locations, responsibility but not power 
descended upon the district chiefs and from them to homestead heads who were required 
to select men for these tasks. 
At the end of 1875 the first serious investigation initiated by the British Colonial Office, 
was set in motion to inquire into the isibhalo system of forced labour on public works. 
The investigation gave details of its application, and revealed attempts to rationalise the 
system. By that time there were seri~us Haws in the system of obtaining labourers and 
also military levies, which had been applied since 1848 and 1847 respectively, on an ad 
hoc basis. 
In December 1875, A. Browning, engineer to Wythes and Jackson, contractors to the 
Natal Government Railways, informed the SNA of the intention to commence work on the 
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proposed new railway line on or about 1 January 1876, and applied for fifty Natal 
'Kaffirs' to be employed near Congella. They would be paid at a rate of wage to be 
determined by the SNA.25 The SNA accordingly notified the Resident Magistrates of 
Umlazi and Inanda, requesting 'the Chiefs under your jurisdiction to induce men' to enter 
the service of the Natal Government Railways.26 Umlazi and Inanda were populous 
locations conveniently near Durban. As late as 1888 they were able to supply their own 
labour requirements,27 and certainly in 1876 the request for labourers for this railway 
work would have placed no strain on their resources. 
Lord Carnarvon, the Secretary of State for the Colonies, was informed of the request of 
the SNA, for labourers for the railway, in a letter from J. F. Clark of Natal. 28 This 
stated that 'orders have been given to the Chiefs to send in Kafirs to work on the Railway 
whether they will or not. ,29 As a result of this letter, which drew his attention to a 
matter about which he felt he had been ill informed, Lord Carnarvon requested the 
Lieutenant-Governor of Natal, Sir Henry Bulwer, in a Confidential Despatch of 31 May 
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works, i.e. the isibhalo. He expressed his grave misgivings. He instructed the Natal 
government to proceed with the utmost caution, to define strictly the principle of requiring 
labour, and to specify distinctly cases in which it might be applied. He also wished to 
know how this obligation was regarded by the 'black' people. Did they accept it as an 
ordinary incident of the relation in which they stood to the government and to the 
Governor as Supreme Chief; and did they comply cheerfully? 
Because Carnarvon had had no report from Bulwer on the subject of the forced labour 
system, and Bulwer's predecessors had referred to it on only one or two occasions, he was 
unaware of how entrenched the system had become after thirty years of colonial rule. 'I 
can hardly suppose, however' he wrote, 'that the system can have had more than a very 
limited trial.' He was particularly concerned about the provision of labour to the railway 
which was being built by contractors, although, from 1874, the railways in Natal had 
become a state and not a private enterprise. 31 Carnarvon continued: 
You will not fail to perceive that it would be impossible for Her Majesty's 
Government to sanction the saving of the expense to the Contractors by their 
procuring cheap labour, if in any way compulsory, on terms not distinctly 
beneficial to the workers, as might easily be done by making arrangements with 
the Chiefs. 32 . 
Bulwer reassured Carnarvon33 that this supply of labour to the railways was an interim 
arrangement at the commencement of the railway works, as five to six months would 
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of workers had been supplied through the Colonial Engineer for this purpose: twenty-five 
men each from Umlazi district and Inanda district at 15/- per month, with rations, for six 
months. 
After obtaining a requested minute from J. Ayliff, Acting SNA, Bulwer again wrote to 
Carnarvon,34forwarding the minute and stating that men had been employed on public 
works from 1850. The system had fallen into disuse for a while but had been resumed 
in 1858. Further investigation revealed that in 1872 the pay for isibhalo workers was 7/6 
per month in the counties of Pietermaritzburg, Weenen and part of Klip River i.e. near 
the areas where road works were in progress, while in other counties it was 10/- per 
month. In 1875 Lieutenant-Colonel A.W. Durnford, the Colonial Engineer, 
recommended35 that there should be two rates of pay and one scale of rations, viz. 15/-
per month in the counties of Victoria, Durban, Alexandra and Pietermaritzburg, and 10/-
per month in other counties. Rations were at that time 3 lbs (1,4 kg) maize meal per day, 
salt at discretion and 10 Ibs (4,54 kg) beef per month, this being distributed on the hoof 
when, twice a month, on Saturdays, a beast was killed by the work-party. 'The natives,' 
wrote Durnford patronisingly, 'like this. They eat up every bit, except the hide and the 
horns, and this little feast tends to keep them in good humour.' This rate of pay and scale 
of rations was officially approved on 9 August 1875. 
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Pursuing the matter further, Bulwer then required certain officials to report on the isibhalo 
system. Information on the subject had already been received from J. Ayliff, Acting 
SNA,36 and was now provided by his successor, J.W. Shepstone,37 and by Sir 
Theophilus Shepstone, former SNA.38 Sir Henry Bulwer compiled his minute
39 
from 
these reports in which the officials set out their perceptions of the isibhalo system of 
forced labour as it had evolved, and their opinions of its justification and efficacy. 
J. Ayliff was at pains to defend the system, declaring that 
in the demand we thus make upon them for labour, we are not innuenced by 
caprice or mercenary inducements, but are engrafting, upon a recognised system, 
a higher one in which their social education, and moral elevation is regarded, while 
we endeavour to ensure, by the maintenance of wholesome restraints, the 
attainment of peace and good order among native races .. 
Ayliff wrote that Zulu refugees 'from the despotic tyranny of an irresponsible chief, on 
entering Natal, find themselves at once transformed into freed men, in the occupation of 
land.' All that was required of them, he wrote, was a fixed amount in direct taxation, the 
payment of duty on luxury goods, and 'the limited supply of labour for public works .. ' 
In a norid paragraph (No.7) Ayliff compared life under the supposed reign of terror in 
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rendered reckless by danger, he makes the desperate resolve, and, if successf~l, 
as the morning light Hashes on the broad waters of the Tugela, ~hey roll behmd 
him, tyranny and oppression are past, and he stands at last a treed man upon 
British soil.. 
However, wrote Ayliff, after the first Hush of gratitude is past, the man, obliged to 
perform isibhalo labour 'forgets the lesson .. that the State which protects him has some 
claim upon him.' 
Ayliff went on to consider to what extent the isibhalo system was in accordance with 
traditional Zulu practice. Describing the system he wrote of 'troops garrisoning the royal 
residences ... the erection of new residences, of barracks and cattle folds,' and maintained 
that 
no food is implemented or clothing supplied them, and the probability is, that after 
a hard day's work, they retire to sleep without ever having broken their fast, or the 
cravings of their hunger are cruelly mocked by a minute distribution of beef from 
their Chief, and the revolting spectacle may be observed of two warriors, who 
have shoulder to shoulder dared death in many a hard fought fight, now quarrelling 
over a fragment of bone .. 
Having drifted into the realms of fantasy in describing the Zulu regimental system, Ayliff 
contrasted that system with the isibhalo arrangements, with a similar departure from 
reality. He wrote: ' .. we accord them liberal wages, while ample rations, and comfortable 
quarters are assigned them.' Ayliff saw further advantages for the African men in the 
isibhalo system . . He maintained (paragraphs 10 and 11) that it was the duty of 'a highly 
refined and civilized Government' to 'benefit and civilise' ~) and to 'elevate and 
restrain.' This could be done, he declared, by creating and supplying artificial wants and 
a craving for luxuries, to pay for which the isibhalo system would provide the men with 
cash. 
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Ayliff deplored the fact that the wants of the Natal Africans were few and could easily be 
supplied, and therefore they were reluctant to offer themselves as labourers. The labour 
of the women on the land around the homesteads produced grain for food and beer; the 
production of milk and meat was the domain of the men. The sale of surplus poultry and 
crops provided cash to buy blankets and ornaments and to pay their Hut Tax. A young 
man could easily earn enough in a month, Ayliff maintained, for his annual needs. In 
order to acquire lobolo for a wife, he would have to work for longer. Isibhalo could well 
provide this work. 
In tracing the history of the forced labour system, Ayliff stated that the first recorded call-
up appeared to have been dated 16 November 1850 when labour was required to work 
upon the high road between Durban and Pietermaritzburg; and that the practice lapsed for 
a while in disturbed times. 401t was resumed, Ayliff wrote, in 1858,41being described 




The making and repair of the Public Roads and other works of the Government are 
done by the Natives. Whatever number may be required for these purposes, is 
obtained by an order from myself as Paramount Chief. This order is obeyed 
cheerfully, and is a matter of duty. 42 
J. Stuart states that this troubled period was 'after 1854.' J. Stuart, History 
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J. W. Shepstone, in his report,43 gave the date of 1848 for the first demand for isibhalo 
labour for public works, i.e. for the repair of the road between Pietermaritzburg and 
Durban. As traffic increased, so did the demand for labour to work on the roads. 
Difficulties arose as many African men from the locations, from which they could be 
summoned by the chief or headman, moved to private farms under contract to work for 
the owner or occupier at a slightly better rate of pay. Here they were exempt from 
isibhalo demands. The labour supply for the isibhalo was further diminished, wrote 
Shepstone, when more remunerative employment became available on the diamond-fields, 
the gold-fields44 and at Algoa Bay. J . W. Shepstone pointed out further that 'as they are 
at liberty to choose their own employers, they cannot be compelled to work for the 
Government. ' 
The memorandum from Sir Theophilus Shepstone was written in September 1877.45 It 
was during his term of office as Diplomatic Agent to the Native Tribes, from 1845 to 
1853, that the isibhalo system was first applied. As SNA from 1853 to 1875, Shepstone 
was closely involved in the development of the system, but he did not support his 
statement that 'the Natives of Natal have always recognised the right of the Government 
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even any specific decisions of the Natal government on the subject. Such legislation 
would have given the system some legitimacy , and Lord Carnarvon would not have stated, 
underlining his continuing concern: 
.. very little information, or rather none at all, has ever been afforded to this 
Department upon a system which, whatever its merits, is clearly one open to abuse 
. . h f ·1· f d b 46 in itself, and to mIsapprehensIOn on t e part 0 scant! y m orme 0 servers. 
Shepstone could have countered this statement by citing Clause 4 of Ordinance No.3 of 
1849, which embodied the proclamation by Lieutenant-Governor Martin West. This 
stated: 
.. that the Lieutenant-Governor of this District, shall hold and enjoy over all the 
Chiefs and Natives in this District, all the power and authority which, according 
to the Laws, Customs, and Usages of the Natives, are held and enjoyed by any 
Supreme or paramount Native Chief..47 
In this proclamation, it could be argued, the power to call up men for labour and military 
service was implicit. However, the British Colonial Secretary may not have been aware 
of this, nor of the arbitrary and unwritten powers which the Zulu king might wield. 
It should be emphasised that the two dates - 1848 and 1850 - given for the inception of 
the isibhalo system were nearly thirty years before Lord Carnarvon's enquiry requesting 
clarity. In all these years, Carnarvon claimed, the Colonial Office had received no exact 
official information on the system which provided the labour for public works in the 
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48 49· h b . . 
colony. The system was to continue until 1910 or 1911 WIt a stronger asIS In 
legislation, but it was breaking down, and there was a need to look to other sources of 
labour. 
Sir Theophilus Shepstone's memorandum recognised this weakening. He pointed out that 
changing circumstances in the country as well as changing social conditions and ideas 
about the obligations to labour on public works had made the enforcement of the isibhalo 
increasingly difficult. He suggested that legislation be passed to give the chiefs authority 
over all their people, even those no longer living in the locations but on private farms. 
He emphatically recommended that no change should be made in the principle that the 
government had the right to call up labour. 
Sir Henry Bulwer, in his minute on the supply of isibhalo labour, 50 referred to and 
commented upon the reports of J. Ayliff, J.W. Shepstone and Sir Theophilus Shepstone. 
Bulwer outlined the conditions of isibhalo employment: young, unmarried men were 
chosen; the wages were 7/- per month from 1848, increasing in 1854 to 10/- per month; 
and the period of service was six months. Since 1875, he wrote, wages had been 
increased to 15/- per month, with rations' .. upon a very liberal scale .. 3 lbs [1,4 kg] of 
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Bulwer pointed out that the obligations exacted from the African men in locations were 
military service and labour on certain public works. The ordinary laws of supply and 
demand did not apply in this case, and compliance with the exactions was obligatory. 
Bulwer did not agree that the system was implemented because it taught 'the advantages 
of labour and of regular habits.' He recognised that this labour was exacted 'for our own 
benefit.' He deplored the fact that the obligation fell 'unequally upon the Native 
population .. ' since it drew labour only from men living in the locations. Even of these, 
he wrote, many had left the locations for several months at a time to seek more 
advantageous employment on sugar plantations and other farms, in trade, transport and 
domestic service as well as on the diamond-fields, the gold-fields and the railway. The 
system, reported Bulwer, was breaking down and should be abandoned in its present form. 
The Public Works Department should go into the labour market where labour was 
dependent on 'the ordinary rules of demand and supply.' Nevertheless, the Supreme 
Chief, he maintained, should retain and reserve the right to call up men 'in cases of great 
public necessity or emergency. ' 
In March 1878, His Excellency-in-Council commanded that all the papers reporting on the 
isibhalo system, including Bulwer's own report, be sent to each member of the Natal 
Executive Council in turn for his opinion on the system. 51 Reports were returned from 
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B.P. Lloyd, Acting Colonial Secretary;54 J. Bird, the Colonial Treasurer (this included 
an enclosure dated 6 March 1873 , expressing Bird's unease about the system in a minute 
to the SNA, written when Bird was Resident Magistrate of Pietermaritzburg);55 from 
A.C. Hawkins, the Acting SNA;56 A.H. Hime, the Colonial Engineer;57 and M.H. 
Gallwey, the Attorney-General. 58 
The Chief Justice advised that the system should be continued, with some alterations, viz. 
that the area from which labourers could be requisitioned should include all huts liable to 
Hut Tax; that the magistrates, not the chiefs , be responsible for the supply of labourers , 
having been informed before the Hut Tax collection how many labourers would be 
required from their districts; the period of service should be no longer than six months in 
two years, and no more than three periods in all ; the men could offer substitutes if these 
were willing; wages should be the same as those prevailing in the neighbourhood, but 
rations be better; and that tents or huts be provided. The Chief Justice favoured the 
retention of the principle that the Supreme Chief could summon labourers. 
Colonel Pearson considered that the system should be continued. He maintained that if 
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would be regarded as an act of weakness, and the 'black' people of Natal would lose 
respect for the government. He recommended that 'no unmarried Native should be 
exempt,' whether living on a location or not, unless he could prove other permanent 
employment. He regarded the obligation to provide labour as 'a most fair and just one' 
because, he wrote, the 'black people contributed little towards the revenue of the colony, 
and they were British subjects.' Pearson's statement, about the Africans producing little 
revenue, was untrue. By 1875, 75% of all revenue in Natal came from them.59 
B.P. Lloyd, the Acting Colonial Secretary, differed in his views. He regarded the system 
as 'full of evil', and advocated its discontinuance in anticipation of 'the complete 
breakdown of the system.' Although the right of the Supreme Chief to call out men 
should be retained in principle, he wrote, it should be allowed to lapse, and labour should 
be obtained in the general labour market. 
J. Bird pointed out in his submission that if Natal had been a settlement for 'N ati ves' only 
there would have been no difficulty in raising labour at the bidding of the chief, but since 
others in the colony could 'choose their own masters and their own modes of earning 
wages,' those called up for isibhalo labour wished to evade it. He was of the opinion that 
the government should obtain labour in the public market. 60 
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In Bird's encIosure,61 written five years before, he pointed out the difficulties in 
procuring isibhalo labourers to work on the roads. He then described, more realistically 
than the other respondents who had been required by Bulwer to report on the system, the 
conditions under which these labourers worked. It was, he wrote, 'the hardest labour 
performed in the Colony.' The men were lodged in tents which let in continuous rain 
even when new, and, he wrote, the rains had been especially heavy in the previous six 
months. The men were provided with no planks or stretchers on which to sleep, but only 
mats. The 10 lbs (4,54 kg) of meat per month provided was quite inadequate considering 
their hard work, even though the meal ration was plentiful. They were exposed to 
constant damp and discomfort and liable to rheumatism. For this they were paid 7/6 a 
month, little more than the wages of a herd boy whose duties were light. Men in the 
towns, in domestic work or caring for horses, could earn 10/- to 15/- per month, and be 
comfortably housed and adequately fed, while a waggon-driver could earn £2.10/-. Ox-
leaders employed on ox-waggon journeys into the interior faced discomfort and exposure 
similar to that endured by isibhalo labourers, but their labour was lighter, the period of 
employment was two to three months, and the pay was 25/- per month. 
Bird suggested that isibhalo wages should be from 15/- to £1 per month, with rations of 
1 lb (453,6 grams) of meat per day. Sound tents with plank flooring should be provided. 
In addition, the road superintendents who supervised the labourers should be 'of high 
character. ' 
61 Ibid., Enclosure in No. 24. J. Bird to SNA, 6 March 1873. 
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A. C. Hawkins, the Acting SNA, was of the opinion that the system should be 
discontinued, otherwise it would collapse. In the earlier colonial days, the system was not 
felt by the 'black' people to be a hardship and was' cheerfully and readily complied with,' 
declared Hawkins. As conditions and circumstances in the colony changed, it was 
considered an irritation, particularly as the obligation to provide labour fell only on those 
living in locations. The difficulties, Hawkins suggested, could be overcome if the 
government offered wages which could compete with those paid by sugar planters and 
railway contractors, or the problems of a labour shortage could be overcome by employing 
Tsonga or Zulu men. 62 
Captain A.H. Hime, the Colonial Engineer , whose task it was to organise the building and 
repair of roads, could be expected to present a forceful case for whatever system would 
provide an adequate supply of labour for this purpose. He disagreed with the statements 
that the difficulties with regard to forced labour were so great that the system would break 
down. He asserted that only about three or four magistrates, one of whom was notably 
the magistrate of Upper Umgeni , had been unable to supply their full quota. Judging by 
the number of men available in the Upper Umgeni magistracy (taken from the Blue Book 
of 1876) he believed that there should be no difficulty in obtaining labour. However, he 
declared, magistrates had insufficient power to force the chiefs to supply this labour. He 
suggested that chiefs probably accepted bribes from those men who were unwilling to 
work. 
62 
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The solution, Hime maintained, would be to invest the magistrates with more power. 
Having estimated that there was ample labour available, Hime conceded that even in the 
free labour market, this was difficult to obtain. The railways were employing men from 
Zululand, and labour was also being obtained from Delagoa Bay and India. Hime 
suggested that new legislation should be passed to give more power to the magistrates and 
chiefs, determine clearly who should be liable, and the period of work required, and lay 
down set wages. He was, therefore, not willing to question, in the broader framework of 
changed conditions, ~ the greater availability of alternative, more remunerative work 
in towns and on mines, why it was difficult to obtain labour, but proposed that the existing 
system be more firmly enforced. 63 
M.H. Gallwey, the Attorney-General, was, like Hime, in favour of the exercise of greater 
compulsion. He, however, made some cogent observations about flaws in the system. 
He pointed out that the traditional unpaid labour for the chief was for that chief's personal 
benefit, not on public works. He also pointed out that the white inhabitants of Natal did 
not have to provide forced labour; that the road overseers were harsh; and that chiefs often 
selected men as a punishment for offending them or the labourers' white employers. 
Gallwey recalled that this punitive aspect seemed evident when, in 1863, a Bill was 
introduced (but not passed) to employ convicts on public works alongside the isibhalo 
labourers. Gallwey warned that, if the system continued, stronger compulsion would have 
to be exercised and heavy penalties imposed for disobedience. 64 Gallwey, of all the 
63 
64 
Ibid., Opinion of the Colonial Engineer. No. 26, 4 May 1878. For 
discussion of labour practices in other contemporary British colonies see 
conclusion. ' 
Ibid., Opinion of the Attorney-General. No. 27, 9 May 1878. 
88 
respondents, was the only one who did not equate Mrican people automatically with 
workers; a principle accepted by the others, although many criticised the details of the 
application of the isibhalo system. 
The members of the Executive Council thus, in giving their opinions, highlighted what 
they perceived as the problems in the application of the isibhalo system, and suggested 
solutions. Most of them regarded the system as unfair, since labourers were drawn only 
from locations and only from among the Mrican people. Wages, rations and living 
conditions were · regarded by some as inferior to those prevailing in other employment; 
road superintendents were often not of good character; the work was regarded as 
degrading and in some cases even punitive; and other men outside the locations could 
choose more advantageous employment. It was generally agreed by most respondents that 
the system was near breakdown and should be allowed to fall into abeyance; nevertheless, 
the principle that the Supreme Chief had the right to call up labour should be retained. 
In spite of these recommendations and criticisms, the isibhalo system was not substantially 
altered or improved at this time. It provided relatively cheap, if not plentiful labour , and 
the more expensive alternative of using only free or imported indentured labour, was 
therefore avoided. 
The documentary evidence on the military levy and isibhalo systems, in some instances, 
supports the perceptions voiced by these reports, that the Zulu king exacted labour and 
military service, but other evidence refutes them, especially with regard to the 
circumstances under which the Zulu king's traditional authority was exercised. 
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In 1878, F. Fynney, concerned with informing Lord Chelmsford of the pattern of 
organisation in the army of the Zulu king, Cetshwayo, and not withdrawing any parallel 
between the levy system and that of the Zulu, did not indicate what measures of 
. d 't 65 compulsion, if any, were exerCIse on new recrUl s. C. Vyn, in his journal first 
published in 1880, did consider the matter of compulsion. He described the recruitment 
system in Cetshwayo's day: boys voluntarily presenting themselves to be called up to form 
a new regiment or be incorporated into one already formed, with only social pressure 
exerted on them to join; their building of a new military settlement; their being allowed 
to come and go freely; and their periodic call-up for special duties. 66 
Cetshwayo himself, however, indicated that compulsion was exercised when he required 
men to renovate settlements that had become 'old and dilapidated.' If men did not come 
he would 'send men to stir them up' and on such occasions there had been killings.67 
To justify compulsion in calling up levies and labourers, by comparing the Natal system 
with that of the Zulu, it would have been necessary to prove this compulsion in the Zulu 
system. It would seem that compulsion was not consistently applied and whether it was 
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that it was usually social pressure which activated the young men to serve him, and he 
declared that they 'can go to the king and serve as they please, and return home as they 
, d bId' ,68 like. The young men are not force to e so lers. 
It was on the broad basis of the Zulu king's authority that the frequently repeated 
justification of the isibhalo and levy systems rested. The analogy between work for the 
Zulu king and the practice in colonial Natal, of calling out labourers, can be seen to be 
false. In the Zulu polity the king was indeed most powerful and had a right to call up 
men for labour and military service; but the rights and privileges and, especially the 
participation of the Zulu people in decision-making, an integral part of the Zulu traditional 
system, had no parallel in the colony of Natal. In Natal, surplus labour in the form of 
isibhalo service was not 'drawn from every homestead in the land,'69 but only from the 
homes of African men in locations. Not one chief in Natal was consulted nor his 
agreement sought in imposing the isibhalo system; hence there were no izikhulu without 
whose agreement the Supreme Chief could make no decisions of national importance.70 
There was no devolution of state power in any significant form through the chiefs and 
headmen to the resident homestead heads. The Supreme Chief, vis-a-vis the location-
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were willing .. , ,71 nor would he consent to abolish laws 'because the whole nation agreed 
to it;,72 which Cetshwayo declared was the position in the Zulu kingdom. 
It can be seen, therefore, that the Natal system of raising levies and labourers from the 
location Mrican men had been removed from the context in which it might have been 
acceptable to those on whom it was imposed. In addition, as with the general acceptance 
of the system, by colonial administrators and observers of colonialism in the colony of 
Natal, although some voiced their disquiet about its application, it was nevertheless 
accepted that Mrican people were naturally of a lower class and should therefore be 
proletarianised. Where there Were protests, they were about the application of this 
principle and not the principle itself. 
71 
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CHAPTER IV 
The increasing difficulty in obtaining sufficient 
isibhalo labour for public works 
At the beginning of the colonial era in Natal , potential labour appeared to be plentiful. 
The arrival , from the end of the 1840s, of British settlers who required labourers on their 
allotted farms had not, by the early 1850s, had a significant effect on the availability of 
labour. In a statement made before the Native Commission of 1852, J.H.M. Struben, 
Resident Magistrate (hereafter cited as RM) of Klip River division, suggested on 2 
November 1852: 
.. that a list of unmarried people of each Location shall be in the hands of the 
Resident Magistrate; that the Resident Magistrate shall have the power to call on 
the Chiefs for these unmarried men, to send them out to service, either as 
apprentices or otherwise, under the guarantee that they shall be while on such 
service, properly treated, fed and paid . . 1 
There seemed to be no desire to reserve these labourers for isibhalo service, but to 
regulate their employment generally; nor was there a suggestion of an acute shortage of 
labour at this time. 
As the network of roads was extended throughout Natal, and work on the Durban harbour 
went ahead, increased numbers of labourers were required for these public works, while, 
at the same time, men were becoming less readily available. The colonial economy was 
1 SNA 2/1/2 Papers relative to the Commission Appointed to Inquire into the 
Past and Present State of the Kafirs in the District of Natal, 1852 - 53. 
Evidence of J.H .M. Struben, 2 November 1852. 
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expanding, and work more remunerative than isibhalo labour presented itself, both within 
:the colony and beyond its borders. The difficulties experienced by the Secretary for 
Native Affairs (hereafter cited as SNA) in supplying labour to the Colonial Engineer for 
public works steadily increased. As the settlers became better established and increased 
their commercial farming activities , they vied with the public sector for labour. 
Resistance to labour demands arose as early as the 1860s, affecting the supply when the 
need for labour was becoming greater. In 1861 Chief LangaJibalele kaMthimkhulu of the 
Hlubi people failed to supply required labour. However, this may well have been part of 
that chief's defiant attitude towards the government and his desire to build up his own 
power base, rather than his inability to raise the men.2 Public works continued apace in 
the 1860s. In February 1863, Weenen required men to repair roads. 3 In January 1864, 
replacements were requested for labourers working on the harbour;4 and again in 
February,5 April,6 May? and June .8 The June request was repeated9 when no men 
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party labourers were sent in during 1864 for the Inchanga Cutting,l1 the Zwartkop 
Valley road,12 the road between Durban and Pietermaritzburg at Parson's Farm,13 and 
between Pinetown and Durban. 14 The road between the harbour town of Durban and 
the capital, Pietermaritzburg, was an important route for trade and colonial administration. 
In June 1864, chiefs in the populous Inanda district, where there were numerous huts on 
location land, were experiencing real difficulty in meeting the demand for labour. In July, 
the Colonial Engineer complained to the SNA15 that, of the seventy men applied for in 
April from the RM, Inanda, for road works in Victoria county 'not one half have been 
supplied.' These men were urgently needed for the road at Lower Umgeni Bridge. He 
added that some men who had reported for duty had subsequently deserted. The RM, 
Inanda confirmed that he had ' .. the utmost difficulty in this Division of getting native 
labour for public works.'16 No doubt potential labourers from Inanda were finding more 
lucrative employment in Pietermaritzburg and Durban, their location being conveniently 
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During 1864 further road works needed labourers: at New Guelderland,17 Upper 
Umkomazi18 (§k), Newcastle,19 Umvoti between Mapumulo and Grey town and Fort 
Buckingham ,20 Victoria county,21 Pietermaritzburg,22 and Umvoti on the road 
between Pietermaritzburg and Grey town. 23 These requests are an indication of the 
direction in which roads were being built; along the north and south coasts; from 
Pietermaritzburg to Grey town; and from Pietermaritzburg to the Transvaal border. In 
May and June 1864 two requests for labour for public works other than roads were 
received: in May, twenty men were required to work on the construction of a military post 
at Fort Buckingham;24 and in June, thirty men were called up to assist in constructing 
a harbour at the mouth of the Mzimkhulu river. 25 The Colonial Engineer was thus 
concerned with the defence of the Zulu border and the further extension of 
communications in Natal. The use of isibhalo labourers for tasks other than road-building 
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The isibhalo system, with doubtful specific legislation to support it, was unsatisfactory 
long before the 1870s, and was to become more so during the rest of the colonial period. 
When the chiefs were unable to obtain the required labour from the locations, they looked 
outside for men formerly under their authority but now in other employment to supply the 
need. These men would still be expected to khonza, i.e. pay their respects to the chief. 
When employers complained that their servants were being taken, the official response was 
inconsistent because there seemed to be no clear policy,26 as the following examples 
show. In the case of Umcana and his nephew Macheba, both regarded themselves as no 
longer under the authority of Chief Makula as they were both privately employed. In June 
1864, Makula called up Macheba. Umcana, his homestead head, refused to give him up. 
The Durban magistrate ordered Umcana to produce Macheba for service, or go on the 
roads himself, or find a substitute. Umcana petitioned the Supreme Chief for exemption. 
Makula was himself in a difficult position as the RM, Durban had reported that only five 
of the ten men required of him had been sent; the rest were in the employ of white 
masters. In July 1864, Theophilus Shepstone, the SNA, in commenting on this case, 
suggested that homestead heads be fined 60/- if they failed to produce men for the road 
parties. 27 Only a month later, when E.A. Horton applied for the release of his servant 
who had been on sick leave when summoned by the chief, the SNA gave instructions for 
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In October 1864, when C.P.F. Lotter applied for the release of three of his servants from 
road work, the SNA made no decision but referred the matter to the Attorney-General for 
his opinion.29 In March 1865, W.L. Hester requested the release of his servant who 
had been put to work on the roads. Mter enquiries were made, the RM, Verulam pointed 
out that if all house servants were exempted the magistrates would not be able to provide 
isibhalo labour;30 and presumably he was not released. 
In his report on the public works of the colony, 1 January 1864 - 1 June 1865, the 
Colonial Engineer, P. Paterson, pointed out weaknesses in the isibhalo system. He made 
suggestions for improvement, especially in the light of the pressing need for roads to 
develop colonial trade, particularly to the Transvaal and from Richmond to Umzimkulu. 
He suggested the construction of huts every 6 - 8 miles (9,6 - 12,8 kms), of sods or loose 
stones, roofed with galvanised iron, instead of tents. The whole system, he declared, 
needed revising. The roads should be repaired by contractors, not 'hired road parties 
under salaried overseers,' with punishment meted out to those who refused to work or 
were lazy or insolent. 31 
It became increasingly evident in the 1870s that there was a general shortage of labour, 
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of 1872, P.e. Sutherland, the Surveyor-General, despairing of finding sufficient labour 
for public works, made a special plea through the Natal Colonial Secretary, D. Erskine, 
to the Lieutenant-Governor. 32 Sutherland complained that he could get no labourers 
from the RM, Pietermaritzburg, as the magistrate could only intimate that labourers were 
required, not demand them. Here again, the locations were well populated, but their 
proximity to the town of Pietermaritzburg allowed potential labourers to seek work in the 
town, or make a living from market-gardening, without their having to make themselves 
available for isibhalo labour. 
Sutherland tried to persuade the Lieutenant-Governor to restore the magistrates' power to 
command men to work. He wrote: 
His Excellency is too well aware of the fact that the barbarous tribes of South and 
Eastern Africa do not of their own spontaneity enter upon steady employment. .. 
But it is well known that when ordered out in proper numbers, treated with 
humanity, fed, sheltered and worked, under measures which have the sanction of 
the highest sanitary authorities, they not only do not suffer from this change in 
their circumstances, but are found to improve physically as well as morally. 
Referring to those men who sought work voluntarily with white employers, Sutherland 
extolled the virtue of this work: 'In thus learning to work they have acquired such habits 
of subordination as render them amenable to paternal or feudal authority.' Not only was 
work good for them, it seemed, but it would tame them into usefulness and proletarianise 
them. Sutherland continued his plea with the argument that, by not commanding African 
labour for public works 
32 
.. the Government is virtually withdrawing no small share of the power by which 
barbarism may be materially repressed, and the violent energies of the young men 
NCP 4/1/1/2 Surveyor-General to Colonial Secretary, Natal, 14 December 
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of many tribes may be subdued and conducted into channels of usefulness ... On 
the one hand the natives are growing up in voluntary idleness, on the other the 
roads and publi~ works of the Colony are falling hopelessly into arrear. 
The Surveyor-General needed labour urgently to rebuild the weir at Uys Dooms (between 
Durban and Pietermaritzburg) which had been washed away. So urgent was this 
requirement that, on 23 December 1872, the Colonial Secretary authorised him to employ 
whatever labour he could procure, 'white or black' ;33 and a few days later, informing 
Sutherland that he had instructed the RM, Pietermaritzburg to provide the labourers, the 
Colonial Secretary added a comment on the treatment meted out to isibhalo labourers: 
.. the Lieutenant-Governor directs that you shall be acquainted that his attention 
has been directed to the gross brutality with which kafirs are in many cases treated 
by the road overseers, from which His Excellency has no doubt this difficulty 
arises. 34 
The poor treatment of isibhalo labourers was certainly a factor which made it difficult to 
recruit willing labourers, but it is noteworthy that it was the RM, Pietermaritzburg, who 
was having most trouble, and this was a centre where informal trading and market-
gardening provided alternative sources of income. 
While the events which led to the enquiry, requested by Lord Carnarvon in May 1876, 
were unfolding, and subsequent to them, it was evident that the difficulties in providing 
isibhalo labour were increasing. In response to the Colonial Engineer's Departmental 
requisitions for labour through the SNA, magistrates frequently reported their inability to 
meet the demands in full or in part and gave reasons for their failure. These mainly 
33 
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revolved around their not being permitted to draw labour tenants from private farms; they 
did not have the authority to enforce obedience; and potential labourers were drained away 
to other, more lucrative employment. The magistrates suggested remedies for the 
situation. The magnitude of the problem can be seen in the following examples. In 
January 1876, Colonel A. W. Durnford of the Colonial Engineer's Department, complained 
that only five of the twelve men requisitioned for Pietermaritzburg in November 1875 had 
been received;35 on 15 January 1876 he noted that not one of the twenty-five men 
requisitioned in December 1875 for road works near Estcourt had been supplied.36 On 
19 January 1876, the Colonial Engineer, A.H. Hime, sent in a general return stating that, 
since 26 October 1875, of the 537 men applied for, only 255 had been provided;37 and 
on 31 January 1876,38 he reported that the twenty-five men for the Isipingo road works, 
requested on 13 January 1876, had not been supplied.39 
In January 1877, the difficulty in obtaining labour from the Klip River division was 
ascribed to the fact that most of the able-bodied African men lived on private farms. 40 
According to the Attorney-General's report of 22 May 1877, this problem could not easily 
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sanctioned by Law 15, 1871, sections 20 - 29, and penalties could be imposed on African 
tenants who neglected to work for their landlords. Not only did this preclude the men 
from being called up for isibhalo labour, but Ordinance 2, 1850 CV sections 1 and 2 
imposed penalties for interference with servants and for inducing them to leave their 
masters. However, those living on private farms but not under contract to work, were 
subject to the Supreme Chief's order. 41 
In September 1877 the Colonial Engineer reported that over fifty men required for road 
works in the Umgeni division had not been supplied.42 The Acting RM, Umgeni , 
accounting for his difficulty in obtaining labour, declared that the order was simply 
disobeyed, and the magistrate was powerless to enforce obedience. Under Law 26 of 
1875, the Lieutenant-Governor had the power to command the chiefs to supply labour. 
On the matter of non-supply the Attorney-General's opinion, stated on 6 November 1876, 
had been that His Excellency as Supreme Chief could punish disobedience of this order 
'by fine or otherwise. ,43 
From January 1878, the RM, Estcourt was again having trouble in supplying men for the 
road works. His sources of supply were limited to men from the locations and Crown 
Lands, mainly from the chiefdoms of the Mchunu (Chief Phakade), the Thembu (Chief 
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men from these chiefdoms were going to the diamond-fields , the towns, the railway works 
and coastal districts where the wages were much higher, the magistrate told the chiefs they 
must send amakhehla (men who had assumed the head ring of marriage and were 
homestead heads). The chiefs did not comply. The magistrate asked for permission for 
the chiefs to fine the men who refused the call-up; and if the chief himself refused to fine 
the men, he should be fined .44 
The Anglo-Zulu War of 1879, although of short duration, affected the isibhalo labour 
supply for road works. Many men were diverted into the Natal Native Contingent and the 
Natal Native Pioneers. In January 1879, Umvoti was unable to supply thirty men for road 
works in the county as there were only old men in the homesteads, all the others being 
with the Natal Native Contingent. 45 Military service did not, however, exempt men 
from later isibhalo service, as is shown by the case of Buja, who lived on the farm of 
T.A. Harmsworth, and who was called up for the road party after serving with the Natal 
Native Pioneers for six months during the Anglo-Zulu War. 46 
In the first invasion of Zululand in 1879, according to Norris-Newman, a total of 9 000 
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.. Kafirs were called out from farms who were working as servants, whereas there 
were over 200 000 other natives living on locations in the colony under o~~ 
protection, from whom the entire number necessary ought to have been drawn .. 
This suggests that most of the men who fought were farm-workers who were not liable 
to be called up for isibhalo labour or, presumably, military service. However, there is 
abundant evidence, which will be dealt with later, that most of the men drawn for military 
service as levies were from the locations. 
Mter the Anglo-Zulu War, difficulties in supplying isibhalo labour continued, although 
military levies would have been released by this time and were, no doubt, enjoying the 
higher pay which they had earned while employed by the British army. In December 
1879, the RM , Upper Tugela, was unable to provide the thirty men called up in 
November, as too many men formerly under the authority of the chief to whom he had 
applied, lived and worked on private farms. 48 In May 1880, the Colonial Engineer 
reported that the RM, Umsinga, had provided only four of the forty men requested.49 
In April 1881, the RM, Weenen, could not supply the men required of him because many 
were away at work or were in employment on private farms. He suggested that it should 
be made a condition of residence in locations that each homestead provide one man or 
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He reiterated this suggestion in October 1881 when he was able to supply only eighteen 
of the thirty men required for the Ween en road party, and explained the difficulties 
magistrates and chiefs faced: 
I am doing all I can to get men, but you are aware how Magistrates' hands are tied 
nowadays - we are forbidden to force men to turn out and it requires considerable 
care to put sufficient pressure upon the Chiefs to induce them to try to get men . . 
as their authority is very vague and indefinite. If as I have recommended it was 
made a condition of occupancy of locations that each kraal should in rotation 
furnish labor (sic) there would be no difficulty.51 
The evidence on the isibhalo system, collected by the 1881 - 2 Natal Native Commission, 
shed no new light on the problems experienced by the chiefs and the magistrates. 52 W. 
Macfarlane gave evidence on 5 January 1882.53 He had been elected to the Legislative 
Council of 1857 and had later succeeded Donald Moodie as Speaker. His brother, J. 
Macfarlane, had been the Estcourt magistrate since 1855. He would therefore have been 
familiar with official deliberations and decisions concerning the isibhalo system, as well 
as colonial opinion. He stated that the isibhalo labourers did not like road work because 
they worked in gangs under an overseer, and the work was harder than farm work. W. 
Macfarlane stated that they were, however, better fed than farm labourers and their wages 
were good. He maintained that petty chiefs had greater demands for labourers made upon 
them because African policemen were snubbed by the 'indunas' (izinduna) of larger groups 
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105 
should be a penal offence for a chief to call out men from private farms, and that the 
government should call out these men only in the event of war. 
Most of the African men who gave evidence regarded isibhalo labour as heavy work which 
was poorly paid, and the chiefs complained of their great difficulty in supplying the 
number of labourers demanded, since many men had evaded their jurisdiction by living 
on private farms. 54 Chief Thetheleku, of the Swartkop location near Pietermaritzburg, 
regarded military service as acceptable, but not isibhalo labour. He stated: 
To go to war is a thing that taxes a man's courage, and they prefer it because they 
go with a savage feeling. They know they may get killed. It is different to 
digging roads. 
The headman of Chief Mafogonyana stated that although in the olden days M. under the 
Zulu kings), men who were called out did not receive wages but only a beast (i.e. food), 
this was generously given: when men were called out by the chiefs 'large troops of cattle 
were given us.' 
Two of the African men who gave evidence were less condemnatory. Capie, of the 
'Uncolosi' (Ngcolosi) people near Verulam, was content with the new coastal rate of 15/-
instead of 10/-, although, he said, pay from private individuals was between 25/- and 30/-
54 
Ibid., Evidence of William Ngidi of Umsinga and Magema Magwaza of 
Bishopstowe; Teteleku, Umgeni Division; Mawele, Zipuku and Homoi, 
chiefs, Umvoti County; headman of Chief Mafogonyana, Lower Tugela 
Division; Kukulela, Chief of Makuza tribe, Ixopo District; Godide, Induna 
at City Magistracy; Umneli of Zwasi tribe; Umganu, Chief of Abatembu 
tribe. 
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per month.55 Umgakama, regent of the late Chief Chaka Ogle of Alexandra county, 
stated that he had no difficulty in raising the men required for road-party work.
56 
The easy availability of African labour in Alexandra county, in or near which sugar 
growing was well established, can perhaps be explained by various factors. African men 
regarded the hoeing and weeding required in sugar production as women's work. The 
demand for African labour on sugar farms was seasonal, depending on the planting and 
cutting requirements of the farms. Permanent workers were generally indentured Indians, 
while African workers were employed in small numbers at busy times. The sugar industry 
was at a low ebb between 1878 and 1885 because of over-production in the world market. 
In addition, the Anglo-Zulu War caused disruption in farming because waggons and 
animals were requisitioned to move supplies for the army. 57 
Most of the colonists, from Klip River (where there were no locations) and Weenen, who 
gave evidence, saw no injustice in the isibhalo system, and made suggestions about 
obtaining labour from areas other than locations. They also maintained that the 
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J.e. Adendorff of Newcastle (where there were no locations) maintained that landowners 
should release men for road work if they were not in service, and all should be liable for 
military call-up. J. C Donovan wanted those on private farms called up for military 
service only if they were not currently employed. M. Adendorff agreed with regard to 
military service, but disapproved of drawing isibhalo labour from private farms. James 
Ralfe of Estcourt, unlike the others who gave evidence, reported on the labourers' 
dissatisfaction with road work at the inland rate of 10/- per month, which was not the 
market rate of wages. 58 
Umvoti county farmers reported that they were unaware of discontent among isibhalo 
labourers. However, W.D. Wheelwright, the RM, declared that labourers did not like 
road party work. In addition, he reported, white men complained if workers were taken 
from their farms. He regarded the wage of 10/- per month as inadequate.59 
It was clear by the 1880s that the availability of more lucrative employment for Natal 
Africans had led to a hardening of the attitude of resistance. The Natal government had 
abundant evidence available that the isibhalo labour system was unsatisfactory, but was 
unwilling to take radical steps to rectify the position. Subsequent events indicated that the 
reiteration, before the 1881-2 Commission, of grievances and problems similar to those 
existing earlier, was largely disregarded, and the difficulties in raising isibhalo labour 
58 
59 
NCP 8/3/20 Evidence before the sub-committee for Ween en and Klip River 
counties, 20 January 1882. 
NCP 8/3/21 Natal Native Commission 1881 - 2. Sub-commission for 
Umvoti County, March 1882. Evidence of A.L. Pretorius, J. T. Martens, 
T. Varty, G. Van Rooyen, E.W. Newmarch and W.D. Wheelwright. 
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continued. It would seem that for all its inadequacies the system provided cheap, if not 
plentiful, labour. Poor pay and living conditions, and the exaction of hard physical labour 
were ignored by a government apparently unwilling to impose unwelcome taxes on the 
white population. 6O The extra revenue which would have resulted from these taxes 
might have been used to attract African labourers in the open market with better pay and 
improved conditions. 
Even the use of labour-saving devices, which would initially have been expensive, was 
ignored. George Loveday had written to Lieutenant-Governor Musgrave as early as 
September 1872,61 enclosing a catalogue referring to stoI)e-crushing machinery and a 
traction engine to be used for crushing stone and for rolling and consolidating metal 
roading. This machine, Blake's Patent Stone Breaker, could crush 192 cubic yards (151 
cubic metres) of fine stone metalling in twenty-four hours. This kind of device was not 
considered by the Natal government until 1889 when, as a result of enquiries instituted by 
the Executive Council into the increasing difficulty in obtaining isibhalo labour, Acting 
Colonial Engineer Barnes informed the Colonial Secretary that he had ordered two 
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In 1880, there was an amelioration in the harsh conditions of the labourers when each man 
was issued with a blanket which was discarded after two years and given to its last owner. 
In 1889, greatcoats were issued in lieu of blankets. Presumably these would be used as 
blankets at night. R. Paterson, a road party overseer, suggested that each man be given 
both a blanket and an overcoat, with or without an increase in pay. Only the increase in 
pay was granted, to 12/6 per month.63 
While the Natal Native Commission of 1881-2 was collecting evidence on the isibhalo 
system, the RM, Umgeni, was having difficulty in raising men from Chief Mahoiza of the 
Qamga people, who complained that he had too few men living in his location at Table 
Mountain, and that he was not allowed to call them up off private farms where many of 
them lived, nor was he allowed to fine those who disobeyed him. 
The Acting SNA sidestepped this issue by recommending that Mahoiza's two headmen, 
Manyosi and Mbobo, who were unsuccessful in finding labourers but who had willingly 
supplied levies during the Anglo-Zulu War, should be allowed to separate from the chief, 
so that he would be in charge only of men living on private farms. This should have 
relieved him from being called upon for road party labourers,64 although, at that time, 
it seemed that men on private farms were not exempt. However, in August 1882, the 
63 
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Acting SNA laid down that a man who was a regular employee on a farm should be 
released from the isibhalo obligation. 65 
The question of the low wages paid to isibhalo labourers frequently appeared. This was 
again discussed in March 1884 when the Colonial Engineer, A.H. Hime, informed the 
SNA that he would have to discharge road overseers if he could not get more labour. The 
SNA, H.C. Shepstone, as a result, informed the Governor that in his opinion the time had 
come for the question of the calling out of labour to be reconsidered.66 He pointed out 
that the wages for this labour were still the same as they had been in 1876 ~. 10/- per 
month inland and 15/- per month at the coast and near the principal towns),67 whereas 
in private employment men could earn double that or more. Shepstone was not sure that 
raising the wages of isibhalo labourers would solve the problem, as the repugnance felt 
for this type of labour was strong. After some enquiries, Shepstone reported that raising 
the monthly wage to 20/- would improve the position. 68 
65 
SNA 1/1/55, 1882/342 Acting SNA's statement, 29 August 1882. 
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SNA 1/1/109, 1884/176 SNA to Bulwer, 20 July 1884. 
111 
The call to duty, 69 and gratitude for the 'social education' and 'moral education'; the 
'liberal wages', 'ample rations' and 'comfortable quarters,;70 the rations 'upon a very 
liberal scale'; 71 being 'treated with humanity, fed, sheltered and worked under measures 
which have the sanction of the highest sanitary authorities,' 72 spuriously claimed by J. 
Ayliff, Sir Henry Bulwer and P.C. Sutherland, the Surveyor-General, did not induce men 
to offer themselves willingly for exploitation as isibhalo labourers. The Natal government 
was therefore compelled to consider more practical strategies to ensure the supply of 
labour needed by the Colonial Engineer for public works. 
The imposition of fines on chiefs·who failed to produce the required number of men was, 
as we have seen, a possible line of action. Under Law 26 of 1875, the Lieutenant-
Governor had the power to direct that the chiefs supply men, and the Attorney-General 
was of the opinion that this allowed him , as Supreme Chief, to fine disobedient chiefs,?3 
In 1880, the Acting RM, Umlazi, pointed out that, according to the judgement in the case 
of Supreme Chief versus Chief G. Ogle, no magistrate was empowered to carry out a 
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h G 74 In 1882, the Acting SNA declared that 'natives' could confirmed by t e overnor, 
. Ch' f 75 be punished by the magistrates for disobeying the orders of the Supreme Ie , 
presumably after confirmation of the sentence. This is borne out by the suggestion, put 
forward by the RM, Lions River, that recalcitrant chiefs be fined; 76 the threats of a fine 
made by the Administrator of Native Law, Mapumulo, to ensure obedience;77 the 
request by the RM, Lower Umkomanzi , for authority from the Governor to fine 
chiefs;78 and the query about fining directed by the RM , Umlazi , to the SNA, who 
refused to allow the chiefs to be fined.79 
The reasons for the lack of consistent and forceful action against chiefs who failed to 
supply men required for isibhalo service may be found in the memorandum written by the 
SNA, H.C. Shepstone, in 1888.80 He was of the opinion that the isibhalo system was 
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men living on private farms and Crown Lands were exempt. He pointed out that the 
demand for labour for public works had more than doubled, which made the government's 
position, as regards labour, more critical. Men were, however, less available as they 
preferred to offer their labour on the diamond-fields, the Transvaal gold-fields and the 
government Railway Extension Works where wages were more than double those paid by 
the Colonial Engineer. Because of the men's strong aversion to isibhalo labour, Shepstone 
had not insisted that the magistrates give 'any positive orders for the men required' 
because their order might be disregarded or disobeyed. A situation of confrontation was 
to be avoided at all costs because there was no sufficient force in the colony to compel 
obedience. This fear of violent opposition from the chiefs was repeated in 1880 when the 
RM, Umsinga, required to send in twenty-five men to work on the Botha's Pass road to 
the Orange Free State, reported that he could not do so, and he added, 'It is dangerous 
to try to force so many in this way .. ,81 
Continuing his memorandum, H.C. Shepstone compared the old Zulu system of calling 
up young men for labour with the Natal government isibhalo system, which was being 
justified as supposedly based on the Zulu tradition. He pointed out that under the old 
system the 'Supreme Native Chief,' when calling out men, required them to be away from 
home for one to two months a year. The Colonial Engineer required them for six months 
at a time. The government demands far exceeded those of the 'Supreme Native Chief.' 
In addition, the isibhalo system caused friction between the chiefs and their people, and 
81 
SNA 1/1/122, 1890/177 RM, Umsinga to SNA, 6 February 1890 and 18 
February 1890. 
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between the chiefs and the magistrates. In view of all these factors, the SNA suggested 
· ·d d 82 that the system be reconSl ere . 
The authority of the chiefs was severely undermined by their inability to compel 
obedience. A situation, unknown in traditional society, had arisen, where men had access 
to wage-earning employment and could therefore defy their chiefs who were no longer in 
a position of power as the givers of cattle for lobolo or to be sisa'd. The colonial 
authorities treated some chiefs with disdain, which seriously affected their prestige in the 
eyes of their followers, and reduced their own self-respect. 
Law 19 of 189183 clarified the position and powers of the Supreme Chief and his 
deputies and representatives, and their power to punish disobedience. This, rather 
belatedly, strengthened the chiefs' authority . This law laid down the Supreme Chief's and 
the local chiefs' powers of punishment for disobedience. According to part II, chapter II, 
clause 39: 
The Supreme Chief .. has authority to punish by fine or imprisonment or both, for 
disobedience of his orders or for disregard of his authority. 
The local chiefs' punitive power, laid down in part I, chapter IV, clause 52 was more 
closely defined and less discretionary: 
82 
83 
In carrying out or causing to be carried out, any order or request of the Supreme 
Chief, all Chiefs act as his minor deputies, and when so acting may impose a fine 
not exceeding Two Pounds Sterling for any act of disobedience. 
SNA 1/1/109, 1888/876 H.C. Shepstone, 10 December 1888. 
R.L. Hitchins, Statutes, vol. II Native Law, pp. 14 - 19. 
115 
The execution of the provisions of Law 19, 1891 revealed a margin for interpretation. In 
October 1898, the SNA declared that chiefs were not to be punished for failure to supply 
labour. Only the men who refused to comply were to be punished. The disobedient chief 
was to be reported by the magistrate.84 In 1905 the old, infirm Chief Mqawe, 
Ndwedwe division, was to be fined again for failing to supply men for public works. 85 
Chief Kula, Umsinga division, was also fined, as was his district headman for failing to 
supply men for the Public Works Department. 86 Yet the magistrate of the Ndwedwe 
division, early in the next year, suggested that headmen be punished as well as the 
chief,87 indicating that this was not a generally accepted procedure. 
The power to fine or otherwise punish appears to have remained the prerogative of the 
Supreme Chief. In July 1905, the magistrate of Ndwedwe dealt with the case of Dikwayo 
who was to be removed from location lands for troublesome behaviour, including the 
refusal to do road work. His removal was finally effected in September by order of the 
Supreme Chief in terms of Section 39 of the Code of Native Law (Law 19, 1891) and 
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1906, when Chief Mbedula was fined £5 by his order for being in arrear with one 
man;89 and, in August, Chief Mabuna was informed that he would be reported to the 
. 1 . 90 Supreme Chief for not supp ymg men. In November , Chief Luvalo asked the 
magistrate of Umvoti to arrest and punish disobedient men, whom he had already fined 
the £2 maximum. An anomaly arose because these men could now also be punished by 
the magistrate who could fine them up to £20 or impose six months' hard labour,91 
presumably with the Supreme Chief's sanction . In August 1907, the magistrate, 
Ndwedwe, reported two chiefs, Mbedula and Kamanga, for failing to supply their full 
quota. 92 It would appear that he could not summarily fine them. 
While the Natal government was attempting to impose its authority in the matter of the 
isibhalo, Natal chiefs were marshalling their own forces to employ a counter-strategy to 
resist the power of the government and increase their own might by holding imikhosi for 
their people. Before this build-up of power could be fully effective, opposition to the 
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From the 1880s, the Native Affairs Department increasingly dealt with requests from 
chiefs to hold their own imikhosi. This in turn was thwarted by strict controls on these 
festive gatherings, as is shown by the refusal of permission to chiefs to involve any but 
their own homesteads. Permission had to be sought, through the magistrates, from the 
SNA as deputy of the Supreme Chief, according to the Code of Native Law (Law 19, 
1891).93 In March 1889, before this law was passed, the RM, Ixopo, pointed out that 
imikhosi might not be held without permission, to prevent large gatherings without 
government knowledge.94 In 1902, a later RM, Ixopo, disapproved of the holding of 
an umkhosi because it gave the chief the opportunity to assemble his 'tribe' and, possibly, 
if of hostile intent, to mobilise military forces; and it interfered with the labour supply.95 
There is no doubt that some chiefs did use the holding of the imikhosi to strengthen their 
power bases. In January 1898, the RM, Umsinga, reported that Chief Kula of the Qamu 
people had, without permission, called up all male members of his people to form new 
regiments. He was rebuked but not punished for being in contravention of section 260 of 
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Chief Msikofeli of the Ixopo district, who in 1906 was fined for the suspected involvement 
of some of his people in Bambatha's 'rebellion', was reported to have held an umkhosi 
without permission in February 1907, but no action was taken as there was insufficient 
evidence against him.97 He repeated this in 1908.98 Again, in 1909, he celebrated 
the umkhosi, but with permission.99 It was regarded as bad policy, as early as 1889, 
to refuse permission to hold an umkhosi unless the chief had behaved disloyally in the 
past. 100 This suggests that the Natal government did not feel secure enough to be 
dictatorial in refusing permission. It would appear that, in the case of Chief Msikofeli, 
the authorities were acting most circumspectly. 
The Natal officials' inconsistent handling of resistance to the raising of isibhalo labour and 
their vacillating approach to the granting or withholding of permission for the imikhosi 
celebrations showed not only a desire to leave room for arbitrary action, but also a fear 
of being so harsh as to evoke a violent response. Their inconsistency with regard to the 
calling up of labour left the magistrates and chiefs uncertain of their powers and rights; 
while their hesitancy regarding the imikhosi as rallying points for resistance was vindicated 
by the outbreak of Bambatha's 'rebellion' in 1906. It was clear, however, that despite 
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public works, was determined to explore every avenue within the isibhalo system as well 
as turning to external sources of labour. 
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CHAPTER V 
The further search for isibhalo labour from categories 
not included in the original system 
The Natal magistrates' hands were tied by the lack of clear and unequivocal regulations 
which could be applied to all problem cases. They were expected to analyse the reasons 
for the inadequate supply of labour, and in some cases, apply ad hoc solutions. They put 
forward, from time to time, suggestions to ensure the labour supply; to make the chiefs 
more willing to cooperate; to make the labourers more contented; and to prevent men from 
leaving Natal for more remunerative employment. Not all these suggestions were 
implemented. For instance, in 1884, the Resident Magistrate (hereafter cited as RM) , 
Weenen county, unsuccessfully reiterated his suggestion, first made in 1881 , that it should 
be made a condition of residence in a location that each homestead provide one man or 
more for road works. If this were not done , the homestead would be fined. 1 
Increased wages had been suggested many times, and this question was again addressed 
in February 1889, when Klip River was required to send in seventy-six men. This proved 
difficult as forty of these were called up from a private farm , and when this fact was 
reported to the SNA, he ordered them to be sent back. The RM, Klip River, complained 
that many men from his district had been given passes to work on the gold-fields at 10/-
per week. The SNA discussed this matter with the Colonial Engineer and reported to the 
1 SNA 1/1/73, 1884/386 RM, Weenen to Secretary for Native Affairs 
(hereafter cited as SNA), 20 June 1884. 
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Governor that the isibhalo wage should be at least 15/- per month. Although this was only 
half the usual wage in private employment prevailing in the district, it might lead to less 
competition from private employers.2 
Again, in April 1889, the SNA advised the Acting Colonial Engineer to increase wages 
offered to Chief Thetheleku's men. Chief Thetheleku, who testified against the Hlubi 
chief, Langalibalele, in his trial early in 1874, and was responsible for him on his return 
to Natal, was much favoured by the Natal government, hence the suggested pay 
concessions to his men. This chief, along with Ncwadi of the Ngwane and Mqawe of the 
Qadi, identified themselves with white interests and gained power in this way.3 As we 
have seen, this chief's people, from the Swartkop location near Pietermaritzburg, had little 
incentive to seek work away from their location where they were able to engage in 
profitable market-gardening. 
In September 1889, a committee of the Executive Council was appointed to discuss the 
isibhalo system of labour on public works,4 and some improvements were suggested. 
The committee recommended that the rate of wages be raised from 10/- and 12/- per 
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addition, a bonus should be paid to those men working in divisions other than their own. 
Five years later, in 1894, the question of the issue of clothing for isibhalo workers was 
raised again, not from any humanitarian motive, to improve their conditions, but because 
four men had been arrested for being insufficiently clothed. The Roads Superintendent, 
Umvoti county, declared that even sackcloth was better than nothing 'as Europeans object 
to seeing nude natives on the Public roads of the Colony. ,5 
In order to stem the tide of labourers leaving Natal, it was recommended that no more 
passes should be issued. Passes were usually issued by the magistrates to men leaving for 
the diamond-fields and gold-fields. This exodus of men from Natal made the chiefs' task 
more difficult, as they had fewer men to call upon for labour. In November 1889, the 
RM, Weenen, wrote that he had stopped the issue of passes to the gold-fields in an attempt 
to solve this problem in his district;6 and in March 1891, he suggested the implementation 
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In order to maintain, from within the colony, a supply of labour for public works, those 
men owing some allegiance to chiefs but not living in the locations and therefore not liable 
for isibhalo service, or others not usually liable, attracted the attention of the colonial 
authorities. These were men living on mission reserves; Kholwa (Christians) living 
elsewhere; men on Crown Lands; under-age boys; married men; and those living on 
private farms, all of whose numbers attracted attention. In 1894, the return (Appendix II) 
showing the number of huts in all divisions in Natal listed separately those men on 
location lands, mission reserves, Crown Lands and private farms. 8 Excluding Umvoti, 
which sent in no return, the location lands, at the rate of one man for every thirteen huts9 
(the rate as from 1894), should have yielded 2833 men, while the other categories could 
have provided 4577 men. Had these latter numbers been readily available they would 
have gone a long way towards easing the Colonial Engineer's task. 
In 1885, the RM, Umsinga, (H.F. Fynn) suggested that those men living on Crown Lands 
or farms along the foot of the Drakensberg, who paid rent in lieu of labour, 10 should 
be called out. Four years later, in 1889, J.F.E. Barnes of the Colonial Engineer's 
Department suggested that labour be raised from grazing lease lands in the north; from 




SNA 1/1/180, 1894/70 Return showing number of huts. This excluded 
U~voti, a ~opulous division, which inexplicably, 'Could not compile return 
wIthout assIstance' (Appendix II). 
Vide NCP 8/3/75 Natal Native Commission, 1906-07, Annexure p. 1008. 
SNA 1/1/80, 1885/17 RM, Umsinga to Colonial Engineer, 21 May 1885. 
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owners, especially those belonging to the Natal Land and Colonization Company; 11 all 
hitherto not liable. However, those who were settled on private or Crown Lands were 
not, according to the SNA in January 1894, available for call-up. He informed the 
Colonial Secretary: 'The tribes occupying private or Crown Lands are not called upon for 
Public Works .. ' 12 
When, in 1891, the supervisor of Inanda Location reported that Chief Hodoba (Rodoba) 
had called out young Kholwa men to serve on the roads, the SNA declared that Kholwa 
living in a location or on mission reserves (but not glebe land) were subject to call-up. 
The Governor agreed.13 In 1893, another case involving a Kholwa was put to the 
Governor for his ruling. Peter Butelezi, a Kholwa of the Gordon Memorial Mission, living 
in a location, was summoned for road party labour. The Rev. Dr J. Dalzell objected. 
The RM, Umsinga, requested the SNA to present to the Governor the question of the 
liability of Kholwa men to be called up. The SNA pointed out that men could be called 
out not only from locations but also from mission reserves and, with the consent of the 





SNA 1/1/112, 1889/104 J.F.E. Barnes to Colonial Engineer, 11 February 
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SNA 1/1/142,1891/637 Minute paper, 6 June 1891, including Supervisor's 
diary, 6 June 1891, SNA to Governor, 10 June 1891 and Governor to 
SNA, 10 June 1891. 
SNA 1/1/166, 1893/122 Rev. Dr Dalzell to RM, Umsinga, 27 January 
1893; RM, Umsinga to SNA, 30 January 1893; RM, Umsinga to Rev. Dr 
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This ruling appeared again in 1897 when an enquiry from the Chief Native Commissioner, 
Bulawayo, received the reply from the Under SNA, Natal, that isibhalo labour could be 
called up not only from locations but also from mission reserves. 1S Again, in 1901, 
when Chief Mtambo called out Kholwa for service, they petitioned against this and the 
SNA's ruling was that Christians were liable for isibhalo service.16 
The regulations with regard to mission reserves, as presented in evidence before the 
Native Mfairs Commission 1903-5, seemed quite clear: the Supreme Chief had the power 
to call on all 'natives' on locations and mission reserves to supply labour for public works, 
and this was done systematically at the rate per annum of one man for every eleven huts. 
This new rate had been established in 1898. The order was served on the chief who then 
named the men. Refusal to serve was punishable under section 262 of the Code (Law 19 
of 1891). The fine for refusing to turn out was £1 or £2.17 
In April 1906, men on the Tafamasi Mission Reserve were under the impression that they 
were not liable for service. The chief was told to turn out those men from this reserve 





SNA 1/1/263 ,1897/2439 Telegram: Chief Native Commissioner, Bulawayo, 
to SNA, 31 October 1897; Under SNA to Chief Native Commissioner , 
Bulawayo, 2 November 1897. 
SNA 1/1/293, 1901/1971 and SNA 1901/1577 filed with it. Minute paper, 
26 August 1901. Petition from Amakholwa; SNA to R.D. Goulding, 21 
August 1901. 
SNA 2/4/1 Minutes, correspondence, etc., 1903 - 1905. Evidence of Natal 
Witnesses before Native Mfairs Commission. Evidence of S. Harrison. 
SNA 1/1/340, 1906/1291 Magistrate, Ndwedwe to Minister for Native 
Mfairs, 23 April 1906; reply, 16 May 1906. 
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September 1906, when A.C. Varty, Superintendent of Mission Reserves, raised the 
question of whether residents on mission reserves were exempt from isibhalo labour, as 
Chief Rodoba had asked for permission for residents to work on the roads. On 27 
September 1906, the RM, Ndwedwe, informed the Secretary, Natal Native Trust, 
Pietermaritzburg, that he had sent a message to Chief Rodoba that he could not legally 
order men residing on mission reserves to render isibhalo service. 19 The question 
should not have been at issue, since 'Authority was granted in 1902, rendering Natives 
resident on Mission Reserves liable to be ordered out. This authority was cancelled when 
the Mission Reserve Regulations came into force, on 26th September, 1904. ,20 
On a few occasions chiefs tried to meet the isibhalo requirements by sending under-age 
boys. In 1888, when Klip River was required to supply men to replace time-expired 
workers, the RM, Klip River, reported that he could not provide these as the chiefs were 
sending him young boys unfit for the work required. 21 In 1905, a circular was sent 
from the SNA's office informing magistrates that an increasing number of boys were being 
received by the Colonial Engineer, Public Works Department, and that the Supreme Chief 
had specified that only men be sent.22 Nevertheless, in 1906, the Under SNA rebuked 





SNA 1/1/352, 1906/3427 Weekly report from Superintendent, Mission 
Reserves to Under SNA, 15 September 1906; Magistrate, Ndwedwe to 
Secretary, Natal Native Trust, 27 September 1906. 
NCP 813175 Natal Native Commission 1906-07 Annexure p. 1008. 
SNA 1/1/110, 1888/918 RM, Klip River to SNA, 26 October 1888. 
NCP 8/4/58 Circular No. 4/1905, 25 January 1905. 
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SNA No. 4/1905. The Weenen magistrate excused himself by stating that they were 
'young men somewhat under the build of men. ,23 
It became customary for chiefs and magistrates to waive the original criteria for an 
isibhalo labourer, i.e. that he should be a young and unmarried man. As early as 1878, 
the RM, Estcourt, reported that, because of the chiefs' difficulties in supplying the men 
required, he had instructed them to send 'kehlas' (sic)24 M. amakhehla: married men 
or old men). In 1894 Mzumeni kaSikunyana requested his release from service on public 
works as he had to build two more huts to house his two junior wives. He was exempted, 
but not because he was married.25 In the same year, Mchitwe, a married man, was 
exempted because his employer vouched for his being in regular employ; again, not 
because he was married.26 
Earlier, in 1894, Undhlumhlope, a 'kraal head' and therefore a married man, applied for 
his release from isibhalo labour on these grounds. The RM, Estcourt, declared, 'It is not 
correct that there is any rule exempting heads of kraals from service on public roads .. ,' 





SNA 1/1/337, 1906/771 Under SNA to RM, Weenen Division, 10 March 
1906; RM, Ween en to Under SNA, 14 March 1906. 
SNA 1/1/31, 1878/1251 RM, Estcourt to Acting SNA, 20 September 1878. 
SNA 1/1/189, 1894/963 Minute paper, 4 August 1894. Petition of 
Mzumeni ka Sikunyana praying for release from service on public work 
during 1894, 4 August 1894. 
SNA 1/1/193, 1894/1309 Minute paper, 13 October 1894. J. Harwin to 
SNA, 13 October 1894. 
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Lower Tugela division, were 'kraal heads. ,27 Again, in 1907, this question arose when 
Nobekwa claimed exemption on the grounds that he was a 'kraal head'. The RM, 
Krantzkop, wrote: 'I presume Kraalheads are not exempt from serving on public 
works. ,28 
From time to time, as we have seen, chiefs called up men who owed allegiance to them, 
for isibhalo service, from private farms or from other private employment. Two factors 
determined a man's liability to be called up in this situation: one was whether he was in 
fact employed or merely claimed to be so, but was on leave from work; and the other was 
whether the employer objected strongly enough to have the call-up cancelled. As early 
as 1878, the RM, Newcastle, reported that taking men from private farms was 
'objectionable to the owners. ,29 In 1879, when an employee of Ireland and Co., 
Pietermaritzburg, was called up and the company objected, the Acting SNA informed the 
Colonial Engineer that the man could not be taken as he was actually working.30 In 
1885, when John Haynes objected to having men from his farm called out by the RM, 
Estcourt, the principle was established that the chiefs could call out men from private 
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concerning men living on private farms was sought by the RM, Estcourt, in April 1885, 
when he requested the SNA to give definite instructions as to the position of men residing 
on private land 'with regard to their obligations to the Supreme Chief. ,32 
In 1891, the Governor laid down that even if a man was on contract to an employer but 
was on leave, he could be called out as he was not actually working.33 This principle 
was applied when J. Culverwell requested the release of his servant, home on leave,34 
and also when H.J. Compton did the same.35 In 1894, Mrs J. Barnes, whose servant 
was on a visit to his home, failed to have him released,36 nor was H. Pennefather ' s 
servant, home on leave, released in 1896.37 In 1897, however, R. Acutt was informed 
that his servant, home on leave, would be released if a substitute was found. 38 
It appears, from these cases, that private employers were competing for labour with the 








SNA 1/1/82, 1885/276 RM , Estcourt to SNA, 15 April 1885. 
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SNA 1/1/157, 1892/601 J. Culverwell to SNA, 6 June 1892. 
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SNA to his office, 26 June 1892. 
SNA 1/1/181, 1894/117 A Barnes for Mrs Barnes, to SNA (undated; 
received 30 January 1894); Under SNA to his office instructing letter to 
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SNA 1/1/235, 1896/2104 H. Pennefather to RM , Polela, 3 December 1896; 
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PublIc Works Department to Minister of Lands and Works, 18 June 1897. 
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conditions of work, was to prove so strong a magnet that by 1901, at anyone time, there 
were 31 569 domestic servants employed in Durban, Pietermaritzburg and the rural 
districts. Among these were 13 068 farm labourers, while only 2 000 men were employed 
by the Public Works Department.39 
Men living permanently as tenants on farms unoccupied by their owners could not claim 
that they were in employment, and this group attracted the attention of the SNA. In 1888, 
he suggested that these men be called out. 40 This was reiterated by J. F. E. Barnes of 
the Colonial Engineer's office in 1889,41 and by the Commission of the Executive 
Council. 42 
In 1902, applications for exemption on the grounds of private service were formalised and 
had to be submitted to the SNA's office.43 The power to call out men from private 
farms was retained by the Supreme Chief but not used, according to the evidence of S. 
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The numerous requests, over the years, for rulings on particular cases concerning isibhalo 
labour, with sometimes contradictory responses, suggest that the authorities may well have 
desired to leave the way open for discretionary powers. Even when the call-up was 
confined to the locations, the chief was informed of the numbers required, but it was left 
to his discretion whom he selected. 
This power of the chiefs was often misused and the call-up in some instances became a 
punitive measure. In 1890, the RM, Inanda, stated: 
Often the chief exercises his power to turn out men for work as a weapon with 
which to punish anyone who may have come into contlict with him in any way, 
judicially or privately. 45 . 
This echoed a similar statement made by the Attorney-General in 1878.46 When, in 
1892, Chief Manyosi ordered his Upahla regiment to thunga, i.e. to don headrings, those 
who refused to do so or to pay certain fees to him, were called out to work on the 
roads. 47 In 1894, when Undhlumhlope applied for his release from road-party service, 
he claimed that he had been called up by his chief as a punishment. 48 Ukoko, in 1895, 
made a similar accusation, which was that his chief, Tshutshutshu, had summoned him 
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kaMbila also accused his chief, Zungu, of paying off a grudge by sending him to the 
roads. 50 Periodically, too, farmers used road work as a punishment for labourers who 
had displeased them.51 On occasion, isibhalo labour was known to have been used as 
a punishment by magistrates,52 by the Administrator of Native Law, New Hanover,53 
and by the Native High Court. 54 
Lieutenant-Governor Martin West's proclamation in 1849 had laid down that the 
Lieutenant-Governor's powers and authority over 'all the Chiefs and Natives' in Natal 
were those 'enjoyed by any Supreme or paramount Native Chief.. ,55 This was vague 
enough to allow considerable latitude in interpretation, since the powers of 'any Supreme 
or paramount Native Chief' were neither static nor statutory. Although it might have been 
tacitly understood that the isibhalo labour raised by any chief should have been used in his 
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In pursuing the analogy of Zulu king and Lieutenant-Governor of Natal, the Attorney-
General M.H. Gallwey pointed out, in 1878, that the traditional labour for a chief was for 
that chief's personal benefit, not on public works;56 and this would preclude the use of 
isibhalo labourers beyond their own districts. Nonetheless, it became increasingly 
common for labourers to be drawn from districts where there were populous locations, to 
work in districts where labour was scarce and the need was great because of the extension 
of the networks of roads in Natal. These roads served as arteries of trade not only within 
Natal but also to link Natal with the Transvaal, the eastern Cape and the Orange Free 
State. 
From the 1870s, the main areas of difficulty, where this measure of transfer was applied, 
were in the north in the Newcastle and Klip River divisions of Klip River county where 
a road was necessary to reach the Transvaal; in the Upper Umkomanzi division of the 
Pietermaritzburg county to link Pietermaritzburg with Richmond and beyond; and in the 
Lions River division of the Pietermaritzburg county where road works were necessary to 
construct the Pietermaritzburg-Howick (and Karkloof) - Estcourt road. It is clear from 
the table from 1894 (Appendix II),57 showing the number of huts in the Natal districts, 
that there were no locations in the Klip River and Newcastle divisions of the Klip River 
county; and those in the Lions River and Upper Umkomanzi divisions of the 
Pietermaritzburg county were not densely populated. In 1878 Africans in the northern 
Natal counties of Klip River and Ween en owned some 73% of the total area of land owned 
by African people in Natal. By 1890 there was an increase in African land-owning in these 
56 
57 
NCP 8/5/14 PNNL Opinion of Attorney-General, 9 May 1878, No. 27. 
Based on SNA 1/1/180, 1894/70 and SNA 1/1/161, 1892/1013. 
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counties, and after the Anglo-Boer War, Africans purchased over 14% of the land 
available for sale in the Newcastle and Dundee divisions. Many of these farms were later 
to be termed 'black spots' and forced removals from them took place.
58 
The Umlazi division of Durban county had problems peculiar to itself, and did not fit into 
the pattern described above. It had a large location population, but the rapidly developing 
town and port of Durban provided so many more lucrative work opportunities to the men 
from the location that in 1883 the RM, Umlazi, complained that he had difficulty in 
supplying men in his own district, when he was required to do so. The Acting SNA 
passed on the request to the RM, Alexandra, who pointed out that Umlazi, according to 
the Hut Tax returns, had only one third less in population than Alexandra. The request 
went back to the RM, Umlazi, who declared that his difficulties arose from the poor pay 
offered to isibhalo labourers.59 The Zulu pattern of a chief's calling up men for his own 
district had clearly been abandoned, unless one argues that the Supreme Chief's district 
was the whole of Natal. 
As early as May 1878, the RM, Newcastle, found it difficult to obtain labourers as most 
of the African people in that division were on private farms, and those on Crown Lands 
had duties to perform in return for the privilege of living there. Those men who did turn 
58 
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out, he wrote, did so 'reluctantly and unwillingly. ,60 In 1880, when Newcastle was 
unable to supply thirty-two men required,61 and then ten men for the Newcastle road 
party,62 the Colonial Engineer asked that these requisitions be transferred to Umsinga, 
for forty men urgently required. 63 Although the Umsinga location was very large, the 
magistrate found it difficult to provide thirty-two men for the Newcastle road party 
because so many men had gone to the railway works and diamond-fields,64 where they 
were better paid. 
Poor pay for isibhalo workers was a factor which was often discussed. In March 1884, 
as we have seen, this was regarded as critical. 65 However, in July of the same year, 
when it was suggested to the Acting Colonial Engineer, G. Nicholls, that the monthly 
wage be increased, he, anxious not to increase the expenditure of his department, hastened 
to point out that only Newcastle, Lions River and Upper Umkomanzi divisions had 
difficulty in raising isibhalo labour because few location 'natives' resided in these 
divisions. Umsinga, he wrote, had been providing labour for Newcastle, whereas Lions 
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reluctance to accept the true situation arose from the expected consequences of increased 
wages, since he stated that the payment of wages at 20/- per month would increase 
expenditure on the roads by £6 000 or £7 000. 66 These sums could have been met by 
taxing the white people in Natal. 
The three magistracies which Nicholls mentioned were not alone in their difficulty. 
Ladysmith, in the Klip River division of the Klip River county, like Newcastle division, 
which was also in the Klip River county, had encountered a further difficulty in raising 
labour in 1883, not only because they had no locations, but also because of the poor pay 
offered. 67 Nor was Umsinga the only division from which Newcastle drew isibhalo 
labour. 
Umsinga was able to supply fifteen men to Newcastle in 1885,68 perhaps because this 
was a small number. However, when, in 1888, the SNA directed the RM, Umsinga, to 
supply fifty men for Newcastle, the magistrate called on Chief Mawele69 to supply half 
of these, and requested the RM, Umvoti, to provide the remaining twenty-five. Umvoti, 
although well populated, was quite unable to supply these. Again, the RM, Umsinga, 
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and elsewhere. The SNA then sent to Weenen for seventy-five men, and advised the 
Colonial Engineer that higher wages would make supply easier. Again, the Colonial 
Engineer opposed an increase in pay for men working in the Klip River and Newcastle 
divisions, from 15/- to 20/- per month, as this would cost his department £5 000 more per 
annum, and in any case the railway extension works offered even higher wages.
70 
Umvoti, in spite of its difficulties in 1888, supplied forty-eight men to Newcastle between 
April and July 1889.71 
Just how far afield the SNA was forced to go to find labourers for Newcastle and Klip 
River divisions became evident later in 1889. In October, the Acting Colonial Engineer 
suggested that, because of the long distance to be travelled, men being sent from the coast 
to these areas should be transported by rail. 72 When these men, from Lower 
Umzimkulu, were told that they would be sent by rail from Durban to Klip River, they 
informed the RM, Umzimkulu, that they refused to go unless promised 30/- per month . 
Some asked for 35/- per month. In spite of warnings of punishment they 'steadily refused' 
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employed, for this period of penal servitude, by Mr Bazley on the Harbour Works at 
Umzimkulu. 
This incident evoked a request from the Governor to inform him how many men were 
called out for duty in districts other than their own, and the Governor directed that the 
SNA restrict expatriations as much as possible. Clearly, the opposition, from the men 
called up for transfer, was very strong. The Acting Attorney-General gave as his opinion 
that prisoners could be employed on the Umzimkulu harbour works when sentenced to 
hard labour. However, he added that it was undesirable for the Supreme Chief to call 
men out of one division to work in another, 73 which action had led to the sentencing of 
the prisoners. As a result, the SNA refused to accede to the Acting Colonial Engineer's 
request, in the following month, that fifteen men supplied by the RM, Alfred, be sent to 
Newcastle. 74 
The Klip River division of Klip River county, as we have seen, had difficulties similar to 
those of Newcastle as regards the availability of local labour, since neither had locations, 
although Klip River had a larger population. 75 Klip River division obtained most of its 
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and Upper Tugela district; 76 but not without complaint. The RM, Weenen, pointed out, 
in 1884, that the large amaNgwe group in his county was reserved solely for Klip River 
labour.77 In October 1888, he declared that he was unable to supply more men as the 
diamond-fields, the gold-fields and the railways had claimed large numbers,78 and since 
he had already supplied Klip River with seventy men, he was unable to provide men for 
his own Ween en county road party. 79 
By early 1889, the SNA was forced to cast his net more widely to provide the Klip River 
, 
road party with enough men. In February, the SNA, having been supplied with thirteen 
men by Chief Ncwadi kaZikhali of Upper Tugela, Weenen county, for road service in the 
Ladysmith division, reported to the RM, Estcourt, (Ween en county) that the men had 
deserted and gone to the gold-fields. Chief Ncwadi sent replacements. When the 
Administrator of Native Law, Upper Tugela, was required to send twenty-five more men, 
Chief Ncwadi could send no more, and men were sought from Zikhali's location, from 
which 148 men had been sent in 1888. Most of the men were out working to be able to 






SNA 1/1/59, 1883/96 SNA to RM, Klip River, 16 March 1883. 
SNA 1/1/73, 1884/386 RM, Ween en to SNA, 20 June 1884. 
SNA 1/1/110, 1888/918 RM, Ween en to SNA, 23 October 1888. 
SNA 1/1/111, 1888/1067 RM, Ween en to SNA, 5 December 1888. 
SNA 1/1/112, 1889/177 SNA to RM, Weenen county, Estcourt, 17 
February 1889; Administrator of Native Law, Upper Tugela to Acting RM, 
Weenen County, 25 February 1889. 
140 
When Klip River division itself, Weenen and Umsinga were unable, in February 1889, 
to provide men for the Klip River road party, Polela, Ixopo and Richmond were 
approached, but could not accede to the requests. 81 By March, Umvoti was able to send 
men to Ladysmith.82 In April, when the SNA requisitioned for 105 men from Umsinga, 
the RM, H.F. Fynn, declared emphatically that he could not supply them, because, when 
the chief called upon them, 'they flee escaping to other parts of the Colony, Gold and 
Diamond Fields' [Fynn's underlining] 'whence large numbers - nearly all young, able-
bodied men - have gone.' The SNA then called upon Umvoti again to send the men. 83 
In June, when the Colonial Engineer requested the SNA to provide fifty men, he protested 
that Weenen, Umsinga and Umvoti had, since April 1889, already provided large numbers 
of labourers for Newcastle and Klip River. The RM, Weenen, pleaded his inability to 
provide more men because of a ' . . very large exodus of native laborers~) to the 
Goldfields .. ' By October, none of the fifty men had been sent forward. 84 Umsinga, 





SNA 1/1/112, 1889/40 SNA to Colonial Engineer, 13 February 1889. 
SNA 1/1/113, 1889/325 Colonial Engineer's Department, Ladysmith, to 
Acting Colonial Engineer, 26 March 1889. 
SNA 1/1/114, 1889/368 SNA to RM, Umsinga, 17 April 1889; RM , 
Umsinga to SNA, 29 April 1889; SNA to Colonial Engineer , 8 May 1889. 
SNA 1/1/116, 1889/672 Colonial Engineer to SNA, 27 June 1889; SNA to 
Colonial Engineer, 1 july 1889; RM, Ween en to SNA, 16 August 1889; 
Colonial Engineer's Department to Colonial Engineer, 30 October 1889. 
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success: all three areas in 1890;85 Weenen and Umvoti in 1891;86 Umsinga in 
1892;87 and Umsinga again in 1906.88 
Clearly the problem experienced by chiefs in sending forward isibhalo labourers was due 
not to intransigence on their part but to the relentless pressure of the alternative, more 
lucrative employment readily available to men on mines and in the private sector. 
The difficulties experienced by magistrates in sending forward men, especially to divisions 
other than their own, were exacerbated by the fact that the increased activities of the 
Public Works Department, in its efforts to provide an infrastructure of roads, led to a 
marked increase in the overall number of labourers required. As A.H. Hime, the Colonial 
Engineer, reported to the Governor in August 1889, the system of calling up men outside 
their own districts was a necessity. He pointed out that the Ixopo, Alexandra, Umvoti and 
Umsinga areas needed relatively few labourers, while the African population in their 
locations was large, whereas, in the Klip River and Newcastle divisions, with small 
numbers of men available, the Public Works Department required large numbers of 





SNA 1/1/122, 1890/35 Colonial Engineer to SNA, 8 January 1890; SNA 
1/1/126, 1890/654 Colonial Engineer to SNA, 2 June 1890; RM, Ween en 
to SNA, 7 August 1890; SNA 1/129, 1890/944 SNA to his office (undated; 
circa August 1890). 
SNA 1/1/130, 1891/130 Acting RM, Ween en to Administrator of Native 
Law, Pakade's location, 24 January 1891; SNA 1111146,1891/991 SNA to 
RM, Weenen, 17 August 1891; SNA to his office, 11 September 1891. 
SNA 111/168, 1893/314 RM, Umsinga to RM, Ladysmith (copy; undated; 
circa February - March 1893). 
SNA 1/1/343, 1906/1883 SNA to RM, Umsinga, 27 June 1906. 
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details from the returns for 1887 and for June 1888 - June 1889. In 1887, Umvoti and 
Umsinga were required to send in 116 and 237 men respectively, while, in 1888 - 1889, 
1890 and 714 men respectively, were required of them. Klip River needed 155 labourers 
in 1887, and 3043 in 1888 - 1889.89 
Memorandum B (Appendix III) on native labour, 1889, shows the heavy demands made 
on most magistracies. Only one, Lower Tugela, was required to supply fewer men than 
the 9% which would indicate a call-up of one man for every eleven huts yo 
Memorandum C (Appendix IV) may have been true for most districts in 1888,91 but 
certainly after that men were sent to districts much farther afield than those indicated and 
even before 1888, Umvoti had been called upon twice (in 1884) to supply Lions River. 92 
In supplying the Newcastle and Klip River divisions of Klip River county, most of the 
transfers of labour took place from the adjacent division of Umsinga and the county of 
Weenen. A.H. Hime, the Colonial Engineer, pointed out, in 1888, that Umsinga had once 
been part of Klip River division, and the isibhalo labourers, therefore, could not complain 
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Engineer, 19 November 1888, 
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attention from the relatively close Umsinga and Ween en to magistracies at a greater 
distance from Klip River county. M we have seen, Umvoti, beyond Weenen, was 
required to supply Newcastle in 1888 and 1889, and Klip River in 1889, 1890 and 1891, 
and in 1889, men were to be sent by rail from the coastal districts to Newcastle and 
Ladysmith. 
The Howick road party (Lions River division), like Klip River and Newcastle, also 
experienced difficulty in raising isibhalo labourers locally, but for a different reason: 
Howick was so close to Pietermaritzburg that men sought better work opportunities there. 
From 1884, therefore, it became necessary to call up men for Howick from Umvoti;94 
in 1888, from the Impendle location (Lions River division), which promised ten men of 
the twenty-three required and sent five;95 again in 1894;96 and from Ween en in 1889. 
Ween en passed on the requisition to Phakade' s location in the Weenen district. 97 





SNA 1/1/71, 1884/189 Colonial Engineer to SNA, 19 March 1884; 
SNA 1/1/72, 1884/266 Msistant Colonial Engineer to SNA, 1 April 1884; 
SNA 1/1/72, 1884/262 Colonial Engineer to SNA, 28 April 1884; 
SNA 1/1/73, 1884/399 SNA to RM, Lions River, 4 June 1884; RM to 
SNA, 20 June 1884; 
SNA 1/1/75, 1884/536 Colonial Engineer to SNA, 4 August 1884. 
SNA 1/1/111, 1888/1097 Administrator Native Law, Impendle to RM, 
Howick, 22 February 1889 and RM, Lions River to SNA, 14 March 1889. 
SNA 1/1/183, 1894/390 SNA to Administrator Native Law, Impendle, 2 
April 1894. 
SN~ 1/1/112,1889/25 SNA to Acting RM, Weenen, 26 February 1889 and 
Actmg RM, Ween en to Administrator Native Law, Pakade's location, 27 
February 1889. 
144 
River, Umgeni, Weenen, Umsinga, Umvoti , Lower Tugela, Inanda, Alexandra and Ixopo 
. h . d 98 all declared they could not raIse t e ten men reqUIre . 
Polela, with the Impendle location situated between it and Lions River, was called upon 
to send men to Howick in 1890. The RM , Polela, complained that he had to supply his 
own road party, and had the greatest difficulty in supplying other districts as well. In the 
subsequent correspondence, it appeared that an incentive had been offered to men working 
away from their own locations, but without marked effect. Authority had been given for 
men who had satisfactorily completed their service at a distance from their own location 
or division to be given an extra allowance: 2/- per month served, for Umvoti men and for 
men from Polela working in the Lions River division.99 In 1891, the Administrator 
Native Law, Impendle, could not supply men for Lions River, nor could the RM, Umgeni, 
as their men were out earning Hut Tax; nor could the Acting RM, Polela, supply men for 
Lions River because of the increased demand for labour on the Dronk Vlei road. 100 
Upper Umkomanzi drew men from the adjacent Ixopo division in 1880,101 but in 1891, 





SNA 1/1/110, 1888/992 Colonial Engineer to SNA, 7 November 1888 and 
papers to be laid before the Governor; Colonial Engineer to SNA, 6 
December 1888. 
SNA 1/1/127, 1890/848 RM , Polela to SNA, 17 August 1890; Assistant 
Colonial Engineer to Colonial Engineer, 22 August 1890. 
SNA 1/1/137, 1891/60 Administrator Native Law, Impendle to SNA, 3 
March 1891; RM, Umgeni to SNA, 9 March 1891; Acting RM, Polela to 
SNA (undated). 
SNA 1/1/41, 1880/533 Colonial Engineer to SNA, 16 September 1880. 
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Umkomanzi. The RM, Umlazi, eventually supplied the men without demur, in spite of 
the distance. 102 The Colonial Engineer's department continued to have difficulty in 
raising men for the Richmond road party, and the SNA took the RM, Upper Umkomanzi, 
to task for his inaction when his demands were met with contempt by the chiefs, and for 
accepting their lame excuses. This rebuke led to the supply of five men.
103 
When the 
Colonial Engineer, in January 1893, required more men for Upper Umkomanzi (thirty 
from Ixopo and ten from Upper Umkomanzi), five men were still due in February.104 
From time to time, when isibhalo labourers were required, men were called up for a 
general pool, and not for any specific division. In March 1884, when Umsinga could not 
supply thirty-five men 'for public service' (no destination given) the requisition was passed 
on to Umvoti. 105 By April 1884, there were still too few men forthcoming, and the 
Colonial Engineer urged the SNA to try to obtain them from Lions River or Umgeni. 
When neither of these districts could supply the men, the requisition was to be sent on to 
Umvoti or 'any other magistracy.'106 By July, the Colonial Engineer needed ninety 
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SNA 1/1/165, 1893/30 Colonial Engineer to SNA, 7 January 1893; SNA 
to office, 18 January 1893, telegram: Wallace, Colonial Engineer's 
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SNA 1/1/71, 1884/166 SNA to RM, Umsinga, 10 March 1884; RM, 
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SNA 1/1/72, 1884/262 Colonial Engineer to SNA, 28 April 1884; RM, 
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more men from Lions River or Umvoti. 107 In order to supply only eighteen men in 
1885, the SNA called on three divisions: Lions River, Umvoti and Upper 
Umkomanzi. 108 In 1893, when Umvoti could not send men for the general pool of 
labourers, the requisition was transferred to Inanda.
109 
Whatever expedients the SNA turned to in order to raise enough isibhalo labourers for 
road party work, resistance was common in the form of leaving the location for other 
employment. Being sent beyond one's own district was especially resented, and the small 
extra remuneration (2/- per month for Umvoti and Polela men working in Lions 
RiverllO and a suggested 1/6 per month extra for all men drafted from a distance)111 
was not persuasive. 
In his evidence before the Natal Native Commission 1906 - 1907, the Rev. J.D. Taylor 
stated that he did not think 'the present system would be so unfavourably regarded if men 







SNA 1/1/74, 1884/430 Colonial Engineer to SNA, 3 July 1884. 
SNA 1/1/84, 1885/494 SNA to RM, Lions River, 5 August 1885; RM, 
Lions River to SNA, 6 August 1885; SNA to Acting RM, Upper 
Umkomanzi, 8 September 1885. 
SNA 1/1/177, 1893/1312 SNA to RM, Umvoti, 8 November 1893; RM, 
Umvoti to SNA, 10 November 1893; SNA to his office, 12 November 
1893. 
SNA 1/1/127, 1890/848 Assistant Colonial Engineer to Colonial Engineer, 
22 August 1890. 
SNA 1/1/150, 1891/1452 J.F.E. Barnes, Colonial Engineer's Department , 
Ixopo to Colonial Engineer , 8 January 1892. 
NCP 8/3/75 Evidence before the Natal Native Commission 1906 - 1907 
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Kholwa, in his evidence, stated that he did not favour forced labour as the men were torn 
from their homes, leaving families unprotected and unprovided for.
113 
This situation 
was much worse if they were far from home. 
The calling out of isibhalo labour for public works from the locations in the early years, 
showed Theophilus Shepstone at his most enigmatic and arbitrary. A convenient 
vagueness allowed for an ad hoc application of procedures which were not clearly 
formulated until 1895. There was, however, a need felt for a more systematic call-up. 
In evidence taken before the Natal Native Commission, 1881, Chief Thetheleku, in reply 
to a question put to him, stated that the registration of potentially available labour in 
locations would be helpful when chiefs were called upon to supply men for isibhalo 
service. 114 In 1890, the SNA, Henrique Shepstone, pursuing this idea, suggested to 
the Colonial Engineer that, at the beginning of each year, his department should furnish 
the SNA with a statement showing the probable number of isibhalo labourers required for 
that year. This was done. 
The suggestion arose as a result of reports from magistrates and administrators of Native 
Law. The RM, Inanda, W.H. Beaumont, suggested that each magistrate should state the 
number of huts and the total number of men available in his district. This information 
would make a more systematic call-up possible. The magistrates took this opportunity to 
point out the difficulties which they encountered in calling out men, as many left for the 
113 Ibid., Evidence of Stephen Mini, 4 December 1906. 
114 
NCP 8/3/20 Evidence taken before the Natal Native Commission 1881 . ' 
appomted 5 December 1881. Evidence of Chief Teteleku, Umgeni district, 
14 February 1882. 
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gold-fields and Durban to earn higher wages. When the Hut Tax was pending, all the 
available working population, Beaumont wrote, went off to earn money to pay it. Also, 
at planting and harvest-time, it was difficult to obtain labour. Parental and tribal authority 
was breaking down; and chiefs used the isibhalo call-up as a punishment for those who 
offended them. 115 
In March 1891, the RM, Weenen, declared he could supply no more men for the Colonial 
Engineer's Department, Weenen. Correspondence followed which led to a suggestion 
from Mr Logan of this department, that the RM inform chiefs in his area that, say, 200 
men would be required on a certain date. Each chief would have to contribute men, 
according to the size of his 'tribe'. These men would work for six months, after which 
200 more would be in readiness. 116 In August of the same year, Law No. 19, 1891 
made clear the chiefs' obligation to provide isibhalo labour.!17 
Nevertheless, the calling up of men continued to be arbitrary, as when the SNA, on 22 
June 1892, requested the RM, Inanda, to supply fourteen men for the Inanda division road 
party. The RM reminded the SNA of a promise made to him, on 14 June,not to call out 
men from Inanda for some time. He was still, he stated, trying to find the twenty men 




SNA 1/1/123, 1890/209 SNA to Colonial Engineer, 19 April 1890; Acting 
Colonial Engineer to SNA, 21 April 1890; containing excerpts from reports 
from magistrates and Administrators of Native Law. 
SNA 1/1/139, 1891/262 SNA to RM, Weenen, 3 March 1891; Mr Logan, 
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Hitchins, Statutes, vol. II, Native Law, part I, chapter IV, clause 46(b). 
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supplied but removed the obligation for the twenty men to Lower Tugela. By this time, 
however, the RM, Inanda, had already supplied eighteen of them.1
18 
Some organised system was emerging by February 1894, after Responsible Government 
became effective from July 1893, when the SNA called for the approximate number of 
men each chief could supply annually in order to 'establish some definite scheme of 
demand and supply' which would facilitate the process of obtaining the men when 
I 
required. 119 In March 1894, the SNA called for a return from each magistracy, of the 
number of huts situated on location land, on which Hut Tax was paid. 120 By 1895 the 
principle on which men could be called up was firmly established at one man for every 
thirteen huts shown on the return. 121 
Circulars continued to be issued to regularise and clarify the isibhalo system . SNA 
circular No.3, 1895, 8 May 1895, approved payment to messengers who brought in men 
called out for public works. 122 SNA circular No. 27, 1898, 6 December 1898, 








SNA circular No. 21, 1899, 2 August 1899, disallowed the issue of an 
SNA 1/1/157, 1892/667 SNA to RM , Inanda, 22 June 1892; RM, Inanda 
to SNA, 23 June 1892; SNA to RM, Inanda, 24 June 1892; RM, Inanda to 
SNA, 25 June 1892. 
SNA 1/1/194, 1894/1450 SNA Circular No.5, 1894, 6 February 1894. 
Ibid., SNA Circular No.8, 1894, 17 March 1894. 
SNA 1/1/209, 1895/1223 Minute paper, 9 October 1895. SNA requests 
return respecting native labour supply for 1896. 
NCP 8/4/58 Extant circulars to magistrates, pp. 16 - 17. 
Ibid., p. 23. 
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outward pass to any man who failed to satisfy the magistrate that he was not in 
service,124 thus ensuring that he was available for isibhalo service. SNA circular No. 
14, 1902, 21 April 1902, directed that applications for release from the obligation to 
render isibhalo because a man was already in regular employment, were to be submitted 
first to the SNA's office. 125 According to SNA circular No. 33, 1904, 24 October 
1904, the order of the Supreme Chief for the supply of labour was to be communicated 
to the chief personally.126 Lists of 'tribes' or sections of 'tribes' in each division were 
to be provided, and also the number of huts occupied by each 'tribe' .127 Circular No. 
4, 1905, 25 January 1905, laid down that men and not abafana (boys) were to be supplied 
to the Public Works Department. 128 
While the SNA's office was attempting to make a success of the system of calling up men 
from the locations for labour on public works, suggestions were made for strategies to 
obtain willing labour from within Natal. In 1885, the Acting RM , Newcastle, fatuously 
suggested that he would try to obtain men who would voluntarily agree to work as isibhalo 
labourers, rather than be ordered out. 129 In 1888, J.F.E. Barnes, Acting Colonial 
Engineer, was of the opinion that the solution to the problem lay not in better wages, as 
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of the chiefs with the RMs, and the RMs with the SNA and the Supreme Chief.
130 
Law 19 of 1891131 addressed this problem. In 1889, J.F.E Barnes made a further 
suggestion which, he felt, would circumvent the demand for higher wages by appealing 
to the labourers' altruism: 'As regards wages, I hold to the principle that the natives 
should realize, that they work for the Government as a duty and not for personal 
gain .. ,132 
In 1894, the SNA reiterated the recommendation, made in 1878 by Sir Henry Bulwer, that 
the Public Works Department should go into the public market for their labour supply. 
The labourers should be paid improved wages and the extra funds needed should be raised 
by increasing the Hut Tax to 24/- per hut per annum.133 A circular was issued to 
magistrates in pursuance of this idea and to sound them out on their opinion of the isibhalo 
system at this juncture. 134 
The magistrates were more or less evenly divided between acceptance and rejection of the 
system at that time. More than half of them stated that the 'natives' in their divisions, 
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from chiefs and headmen revealed that those which did arise were concerned with the 
difficulties of implementing the system rather than with the system per se. The acceptance 
of the isibhalo obligation as a return to Government for benefits such as protection and 
land was to be found among the chiefs and the older men, while the mass of the people, 
and the young men in particular (who would personally have borne the main burden of the 
system), rejected it. 
Many magistrates were doubtful about the acceptance by the 'natives' of the substitution 
of an increase in the Hut Tax for the isibhalo system, i.e. increased revenue to attract free 
labour. Their rejection was based on the grounds that the increase would also affect those 
not liable for isibhalo service. 
When the twenty-one magistrates gave their personal views on the isibhalo system in 
general and on the proposed increase in Hut Tax, ten favoured the retention of the system; 
six approved of an increased Hut Tax; and four advised the abandonment of the isibhalo 
system and the employment of free labour at current rates, with road work put out to 
contractors. Two magistrates suggested that, in order to raise more revenue, the Marriage 
Tax should also be raised, and one of these advocated the imposition of a Poll Tax as 






the white population, who were the main beneficiaries of the construction and maintenance 
of roads. 135 
Although two magistrates suggested harsher measures of compulsion by advocating that 
men be obliged to obtain permission to leave a location, others did suggest improvements. 
Two magistrates suggested an increase of the isibhalo monthly wage to £1, and one of 
these advocated better tents for the workers. Another suggested that men should not be 
sent more than 50 miles (80 km) from home, and that checks be placed on possible 
favouritism shown by chiefs in selecting labourers. 
In most of these responses, the main problems associated with the isibhalo system, which 
had been apparent almost from its inception, were not squarely addressed. These 
problems were the compulsory nature of the service and its application to location-dwellers 
only, low wages, very hard work, poor working and living conditions, the chiefs' arbitrary 
and sometimes punitive choice of individual labourers, the sending of men beyond their 
own areas and far from home, and the fact that the original attempted justification had 
worn so thin as to be almost non-existent. 
135 
The 1891 census revealed that the white population numbered 46 788. 
They paid no direct taxes. 37% were gainfully employed. Vide Z.A. 
Konczacki, Public Finance and Economic Development of Natal, 1893 -
1910 (Durham, Duke University Press, 1967), pp. 5, 61. Had the wage-
earners paid even a limited direct tax, more money could have been 
devoted to paying better wages to the isibhalo labourers. 
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Although most of the isibhalo workers were employed on road work, some worked for a 
short period on railway works in the mid-colonial period; on military building (Fort 
Buckingham and the Bluff fortifications) ;136 and for a while on harbour works.
137 
Some tasks assigned to a relatively small number were less arduous than those requiring 
heavy manual labour. In 1888, under the supervision of the Colonial Veterinary Surgeon, 
some worked at the government sheep-dip station at Van Reenen's Pass. 138 When the 
rinderpest struck in 1896, isibhalo men were employed as quarantine guards, but there 
seemed some doubt about whether this use was legitimate.139 In 1902, however, men 
were requisitioned for rinderpest control using the same official form as that for isibhalo 
labour,140 and this continued. 141 From 1901 to 1905, 354 men were sent to the 
Agricultural Department to be employed by them; 104 to the Postal Department and thirty-
seven to the Railway Department142 (this last may have involved heavy manual labour) . 
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guards; 143 and, by 1907, postal runners (at 35/- per month), mapping parties and game 
guards were drawn from the ranks of isibhalo labourers.
144 
In the report of the Native Affairs Commission 1906 - 1907,145 the isibhalo system was 
again compared to the Zulu traditional system, and the incorrectness of this comparison 
was pointed out; as was the comparison with the eighteenth century French corvee. The 
arbitrary nature of the chief's choice of individuals called up to serve was at last squarely 
addressed in Clause 118: 
Chiefs are requisitioned to supply men according to the size of their tribes ... There 
is no proper system of rotation or limitation of calls, much being left in the way 
of selection to the whim, caprice and partiality of the Chief and his indunas, who 
are known to call out the same men over and over again, while favourites and 
those who bribe them (often substantially) escape altogether. 
The recommendation of the Native Affairs Commission was that the system be abandoned 
and its place taken by more efficient taxation to pay for free labour. However the powers 
of the Supreme Chief to call men out 'in times of emergency or for service in the public 
weal. .' remained intact. 
In spite of all the recommendations against the isibhalo system of raising labour for public 
works in Natal, it limped on throughout the colonial period. Not only that, but the Acting 
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Zululand as well. 146 However, its abolition was effected early in the Union period, 
before this could be fully implemented. 
In considering the extant records of the isibhalo system of forced labour in colonial Natal, 
a dark picture emerges of a repressive, inefficient practice. Nevertheless, the roads were 
built, so from the colonial point of view the system was not entirely unsuccessful. 
Although this dissertation has focused on the use of isibhalo labour, it was not in fact a 
major portion of the entire work force in 1901. Appendix I (to the original of which have 
been added ordinal numerals) indicates this. A comparison with the numbers of men who 
worked as ricksha pullers in Durban and Pietermaritzburg is revealing. In 1901, the total 
number of men who entered isibhalo service in Natal was 4112, while in the same year, 
there were 5500 ricksha pullers in Durban and 2000 in Pietermaritzburg. 
The problem of raising enough labour for public works in an expanding economy was a 
very real one for the Natal government. From early colonial times, use had been made 
of labourers who owed no allegiance to the chiefs in the Natal locations at the time of their 
employment. These were refugees, convicts, political prisoners, and contract labourers. 
In addition, the colonial authorities took measures to regulate the eftlux of men to work 
on mines outside Natal. One such measure was the passing of the 1896 Labour Tout 
Regulation Act which prohibited agents from recruiting labour without permission of the 
magistrate or, on a private farm, the owner's consent. This was followed in 1901, by the 
146 
Vide NCP 8/3/75 Natal Native Commission 1906 - 1907, Annexure p. 
1008. 
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stricter Labour Touts Act which prohibited touting for labour to be used outside the 
colony. 147 
As the settler population of Natal expanded their commercial farming and industrial 
enterprises, so their need for abundant and reasonably cheap labour increased. At first 
they competed with the state for labour , but when this source became insufficient, they 
looked to alternative sources of labour. The railway and mines employed contract labour 
not called up from the locations. 
As early as October 1851, colonists who found African labour unreliable were considering 
importing labour from the East Indies for the sugar industry. Two prominent sugar 
farmers, Edmund Morewood and William Campbell opposed this, declaring that plentiful 
African labour was easily available. Morewood, in January 1853, wrote to The Natal 
Times to point out that those planters who found difficulty in attracting labour did not 
'treat the natives properly', and provided ' small pay and cheap food.'148 By 1854, the 
colonists' labour needs were being met when refugees from Zululand began entering Natal 
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Although at first this refugee labour was not intended for employment by the Natal 
government on public works, it was officially regulated. A Zulu refugee entering a 
district with the intention of remaining there, was to appear before the magistrate and 
submit to being bound to serve a farmer or other 'respectable' person for three years at 
a monthly wage fixed by the magistrate. 150 
By 1855, Dr. W.H.I. Bleek declared that these refugees had to work for the government 
, .. f f >151 for three years or on government InstructIOn or a armer .. This statement 
followed a discussion about Ngoza kaLudaba, Theophilus Shepstone's induna,152 who 
became an 'unborn' chief of the Qamu people, most of whom were Zulu refugees. The 
men from this chiefdom and others near the Zulu border eventually became subject to the 
isibhalo levy. Chief Ngoza's son, Chief Kula, defied the Natal government between 1898 
and 1906 in the matter of raising isibhalo labour,153 but he was certainly subject to this 
obligation. 
In 1873, Major A. Durnford proposed a project which envisaged the utilisation of Zulu 
clans within the colonial borders. This was the formation of a Corps of Pioneers of 500 
men for a two-year period of service, for employment in the construction and upkeep of 
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secure the services of an organised force for employment on public works, 'gradually 
trained in the habits of order and industry , ' and the men would also be available for 
offensive and defensive military operations,154 i.e. as both labourers and military 
levies. This project was not put into practice as Durnford planned, possibly because the 
Langalibalele affair followed shortly afterwards. During the later phase of the Anglo-Zulu 
War, a Pioneer Corps was raised for labour. 
Many Zulu refugees were indentured to farmers for the required three years, and some 
were drafted into railway work,155 but by 1885 a significant number were being sent 
directly to work on the roads. Correspondence ensued with regard to their clothing. A 
distinction was made between 'all natives working on the roads",.' i.e. the normal 
isibhalo draft, and the refugees, indicating that they were in a different category. A court 
ruling of 1885 laid down that refugees were to be monopolised by the government for 
three years of isibhalo labour. However, the Refugee Regulations were well-nigh 
impossible to implement, and Atkins describes them as 'an abysmal failure. ,156 
Between 1860 and 1866, 6 445 Indian men , women and children were brought to Natal, 
as indentured labour, to work on sugar, indigo and cotton plantations, and as domestic 
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Captain's office, the Durban Corporation and the Natal Railway Company ;157 but not 
on the roads. 
Before 1860 and between 1869 and 1876, when there was a temporary cessation of Indian 
immigration, Tsonga labourers were brought into Natal in considerable numbers. 
Recruiters of Tsonga labourers from the Delagoa Bay hinterland paid Cetshwayo, the Zulu 
king, a capitation fee for their transit through Zululand. This labour was intended for the 
sugar farms and railway construction, not for work on the roads. However, from 1874 
it was regularised by the Natal government when John Dunn was appointed as Protector 
of Immigrants. He was directed to set up feeding and resting places along the way 
through Zululand to Natal. In 1874, nearly 2 500 Tsonga labourers entered Natal, and 
in 1878 this immigration peaked at 5 000.158 In the 1870s the railway contractors, 
Wythes and Jackson, were importing two-thirds of their labourers. 159 
While the settlers were attempting to solve their labour problems by importing labour, the 
Natal government continued to draw labour from local sources. Political prisoners were 
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in the prisoners were employed by Major Durnford in blowing up passes 
Drakensberg. 16O After Bambatha's 'rebellion' in 1906 some political prisoners were 
. h . . 161 
employed on the roads, as were ordmary sort servIce prIsoners. 
Isibhalo labour continued to be drawn mainly from the locations, and difficult though it 
was, it could not have been entirely unsatisfactory, or the Natal government would have 
drawn labour from sources utilised by the colonists. 
The one sure resource left to the Natal Africans was their labour, and this they wished to 
sell in employment of their own choice. Their own social and economic structures had 
to a large extent been destroyed and new adaptations had to be made in order to acquire 
. cash for taxes and new needs. Many young men sought cash wages in the best market in 
order to buy cattle which would allow them to pay lobolo for wives, and release them 
from dependence on their fathers (who traditionally assisted in this obligation.)162 As 
the Natal colonial government continued to request labour for public works, so the 
potential labour from the locations, perhaps more effectively, evaded government demands 
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CHAYfER VI 
Military levies: the period of acguiescence. 
For the first thirty years of the existence of Natal as a British possession, her insignificant 
position within the wider context of the British colonial empire is indicated by the 
appointment, as lieutenant-governors, of officials of relatively minor importance. Martin 
West had been the Resident Magistrate at Grahamstown before his appointment; Benjamin 
Pine had been temporary Governor of Sierra Leone before his first term as Lieutenant-
Governor of Natal; John Scott was transferred from Labuan off the north west coast of 
Borneo; J . Maclean, R.W. Keate and A. Musgrave were mediocrities; and Pine, knighted 
in 1856 after he had left Natal, spent the intervening years before his return for a second 
term, on the Gold Coast and in the Leeward Islands of the West Indies. 
Pine's second term of duty as Lieutenant-Governor of Natal saw him preside over the 
Langalibalele affair. This military crisis brought Natal into focus sufficiently for Major-
General Sir Garnet Wolseley , G.C.M.G., K.C.B, to be sent out to Natal. He had ,gained 
military renown in various theatres of war, and had worked closely with Lord Cardwell, 
the British Secretary for War, in effecting army reforms. 1 As Special Commissioner 
from April to September 1875, Wolseley stifled the development of the colonial legislature 
by postponing the attainment of responsible government. Before his visit, which lent some 
consequence to Natal, the colony had been left to solve its own problems of peace-keeping 
and defence with little assistance or interference from the British Colonial Office. The 
1 Morris, Washing of the Spears, pp. 236-242. 
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colony was not important enough to warrant the deployment of a large Imperial military 
presence. 
The British annexed Natal when African people living there were weakened and in 
disarray. The regrouping of forces and the building up of power by any sections of these 
people were regarded as dangerous tendencies which had to be stamped out, for fear of 
the establishment of power bases which could challenge that of the Natal colonial 
government. 
Defence and the maintenance of peace in this disrupted society were perceived as major 
problems which faced the British colonial authorities after their annexation of Natal. 
Initially these concerns were in the hands of a small British military force which soon 
needed to be augmented. The discredited commando system adopted by the Boers was 
ineffectual when it was tentatively applied in Natal, as widely scattered farmers feared 
leaving their farms and livestock open to raids by the elusive and persistent San. The Natal 
government, with few regular troops available, fell back on the use of African auxiliaries: 
the Natal Native Police, and levies raised by chiefs from among their followers. Although 
from 1855 white volunteer units came forward, the levy system remained, despite rising 
protests from the African population in Natal as increasing opportunities for wage labour 
became available in work for settlers in town and country and, later, on the diamond- and 
gold-fields, and men were reluctant to leave their employment to answer the call for 
levies. 
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In July 1842, only two months after the arrival of the British in Natal, Colonel AJ. Cloete 
reported on his use of African auxiliaries. He wrote to Sir George Napier, the Cape 
Governor, that in order to strengthen his position vis-a-vis the Natal Boers, whose power 
he wished to weaken preparatory to an offensive against them, he had 'required of the 
Kafirs to bring ., in as many horses and cattle as they could get. ,2 The consequence of 
this plunder of the Boers set him against any future use of these forces. He wrote' . . that 
the Kafirs had begun to set upon the Boers, and that three had been killed by them . ,3 He 
advised: 
.. if England will not put down the Boers by her own legitimate means, it were 
better to abandon the project altogether, and submit even to the insult we have 
received, than to adopt the degrading process of enlisting the savage in our cause, 
or call upon the Zulu assagais (sic) to commit all the atrocities of indiscriminate 
bloodshed and spoliation. 4 
Cloete's reservations about the use of African auxiliaries to assist the British in Natal were 
ignored in the colonial period when it was deemed expedient to employ them, although 
white leaders were appointed in the sometimes vain belief that they would act as a guiding 
and restraining influence. 
The levying of military service from allies and subject peoples supposedly under an 
obligation to their rulers is, of course, of ancient origin. European colonial powers, in 
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employment of sepoys in India, and the use of Mfengu levies in the eastern Cape are two 
well known examples. In colonial Natal where the governed vastly outnumbered the 
governors and the white settlers, levies were raised from among the subject African people 
to enlarge, with minimal cost, a paltry military and policing force to keep the peace in 
Natal and to protect her borders when trouble loomed beyond them. 
This raising of levies in colonial Natal was preceded, in the early days of Lieutenant-
Governor Martin West's administration, by reliance upon a small regular military force 
of 508 men, thirty-five of whom were cavalry. Of these, about 200 men were at Port 
Natal and the rest in Pietermaritzburg.5 The farmers living beyond these two towns were 
at times prevented by the British authorities from taking the law into their own hands and 
raising commandos to deal with continual San raids, nor were they always willing to go 
on commando at the bidding of the government. 
Not only did the Natal colonial government have to turn its attention to keeping the peace 
among the African people, but the ousted San, deprived of their hunter-gatherer way of 
life which required access to shifting hunting grounds and sources of plant food, were 
perceived as a dangerous nuisance against whom military action was necessary. The San, 
many of whom had, by the nineteenth century, partly turned to stock-farming, raided 
livestock in Natal, descending unpredictably, albeit in small numbers, upon white farmers 
and African stock-owners alike. Since they were numerically and militarily inferior to the 
African people and the Natal colonial forces who had appropriated their territory, they 
5 J.B. Wright, Bushman Raiders of the Drakensberg 1840 - 1870 
(Pietermaritzburg, University of Natal Press, 1971), p. 49. 
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waged guerilla warfare against them. African levies were employed against the San from 
early Natal colonial days. Those who lived in areas exposed to possible San attacks or who 
had themselves suffered stock losses were interested parties who came forward willingly, 
eager to add their support to punitive measures. 
In January, February, September and December 1846, there were San raids on the Mooi 
River district, on the Mkhomazi river and in the Elandskop and Karkloof areas. 6 It was 
clear that the British troops in Pietennaritzburg and Port Natal could not effectively come 
to the aid of fanners who had lost stock, as they were insufficiently mobile at that distance 
to take swift retaliatory action against the San, especially as only thirty-five of them were 
mounted. Clearly, a military force, in closer proximity and of greater effectiveness, was 
necessary. 
In September the Natal government plan to raise a white commando against the San from 
the two wards of the Umgeni came to nothing.? 
By October, a small military post was planned for the Elandskop district, manned by one 
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launch swift strikes against the San at close range. In 1847 these two possibilities, a 
standing force or a mobile commando, were to be tested. 
A well organised expedition led by Walter Harding, Resident Magistrate of 
Pietermaritzburg, was to be deployed early in 1847, with between forty and fifty white 
burghers called up by the field comets of Pietermaritzburg, Lower Umgeni and Little 
Tugela.9 In January 1847, only six Cape Mounted Rifles horsemen and seventeen 
burghers reported for duty. Clearly, neither the Cape Mounted Rifles nor a commando 
of white burghers could be depended upon to provide an effective force. To bring it up 
to full strength, Harding's commando was to be reinforced by twenty-nine levies from the 
Nxamalala people under Chief Lugaju kaMatomela who joined the force near the Lotheni 
River. Although Lugaju was a chief from the Swartkop-Howick region of the Umgeni 
district,lO some of his people were on the Mkhomazi River near the Lotheni. Shepstone 
regarded it as his right as Diplomatic Agent to call up Lugaju's people, some of whom 
lived in the Swartkop location proclaimed in November 1846. 
The commando was successful in recapturing most of the stolen cattle, but some of the 
African levies returned home before the mission was completed, and the burghers also 
were unwilling to proceed with follow-up operations. It was apparent from the conduct of 
this expedition that the government had little real authority over its surrogate forces, both 
9 
10 
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11 d"· t F d African and white, as Wright has pointed out. The expe ltIon agams 0 0 
kaNombewu was being launched at the same time under Theophilus Shepstone himself, 
a~d the need for a concerted and well organised defence system was clear from these two 
incidents. 
In general, as has been pointed out by Beinart and Bundy, ' .. the maintenance of colonial 
rule across wide tracts of Africa with "a thin white line" of officials was only possible 
because of the extent of collaboration' .12 In particular, the levy system used in colonial 
Natal from 1847 onwards, which rested partly on the supposed gratitude and obligation 
which the location chiefs owed · for being settled on the locations, whether they were 
hereditary chiefs or those who had been appointed by Shepstone, would have been 
impossible without the collaboration of the chiefs and, through them, of their followers. 
'Unborn' chiefs, who owed their position to the Natal government and who might be 
deposed for disloyalty, could be expected to induce the men under their control to serve 
as levies. Inter-group rivalry and enmity were sometimes utilised in quelling disruptive 
behaviour, members of one group being called out 'to correct' another group. 13 Rewards 
were offered as incentives for collaboration, and punishment was threatened for refusal 
to serve. The African people of Natal were frequently reminded that they had a duty to 
support the Natal government. Some or all of these expedients were employed by the 
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forces. Some groups had further motives for supporting the Natal government or for 
opposing the call-up. Lugaju of the Nxamalala provided levies to augment the commandos 
of Harding (1847), Proudfoot (1862), and Allison (1869) against the San. As we have 
seen, his people on the Mkhomazi river near the Lotheni were themselves vulnerable to 
San attacks. Those Nxamalala in the Swartkop location were near enough to 
Pietermaritzburg to engage widely in market-gardening. Tilling was traditionally in the 
hands of women, and men could more easily be released for migrant labour or to act as 
levies, although isibhalo labour was despised. 
In 1869, also against the San, Chief Hlubi ' s people were interested parties as they were 
near the border areas raided by the San. In this encounter, levies from the Mphumuza 
people under Thetheleku from the Swartkop location, took part. Thetheleku's people, like 
the Nxamalala, were near the capital, and their women, similarly, cO,:!ld supply produce 
for the Pietermaritzburg market, leaving some men available as levies. 
The expedition against Chief Fodo kaNombewu of the Nhlangwini, in January-February 
1847, led by Theophilus Shepstone, the Diplomatic Agent to the Native Tribes, was 
successfully carried out. In this action Mrican levies formed part of the force which 
otherwise consisted of white and Cape Mounted Rines horsemen. Fodo was an enemy of 
the Bhaca people who, under Ncaphayi's leadership, had killed his father Nombewu some 
thirty years earlier. In the year of Nombewu's death ~. 1828) Fodo had settled with his 
followers in the Mkhomazi valley and southwards toward the Mzimkhulu. 14 The Natal 
government action against Fodo resulted from his December 1846 attack on and 
14 Bryant, Olden Times, p. 387. 
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plundering of Bhaca people t1eeing from Faku, the Pondo chief,15 with whom Fodo had 
been in alliance for some years. 16 Fodo's action was likely to unsettle the southern Natal 
border which over the years had been a storm centre, and the stability of which could 
again be disturbed. The horsemen and their African allies, in a show of force which lasted 
six weeks,17 overawed Fodo to prevent further attacks on the Bhaca. Ten years later, 
in 1857, the campaign against Sidoyi kaBaleni, also of the Nhlangwini, similarly aimed 
to prevent the destabilisation of the southern border area, especially as Sidoyi's defiance 
suggested that he might be building up his power to the detriment of the Natal 
government. 
The Natal Police Corps (Natal Native Police) was formed in February 1848, to assist in 
defence. The men, drawn as volunteers from various African groups in Natal, were led 
by two lieutenants: John Shepstone (Theophilus Shepstone's brother) and James Melville. 
These police played a prominent role in expeditions against San raiders and against 
African groups in Natal. They were armed with firearms and were regularly drilled. Their 
employment was not periodic as was that of the levies. 18 This police force was quite 
inadequate to deal with all the defence needs of the colony; it did not have the full 
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because it was expensive to maintain,19 being well equipped and organised along 
European military lines on a permanent basis, and partly because of the Natal 
government's and the settlers' fear of arming African people with firearms. Natal would 
have to look elsewhere for defenders sufficiently numerous and bound to her by loyalty 
or duty to provide her military muscle, and these could be found in the locations. 
Between 80000 and 100000 African people were placed in the first Natal locations which 
were proclaimed from 1846 to 1849 under the control of Theophilus Shepstone as 
Diplomatic Agent to the Native Tribes. This increase in the number of locations 
augmented the number of men whom he could call upon to render labour and military 
service to the Natal government in return for their being settled on the land. That the men 
in the locations could be registered so that they might be readily available for call-up as 
levies, was suggested in the report of the Locations Commission in 1847. It was proposed 
that the Superintendent of each location should complete a registration of every man, 
woman and child in his location. It was estimated that the total number in all the locations 
was approximately 100 000. It was pointed out that 'By a careful registration, the male 
population of each location becomes to a certain extent organised; and it would require but 
little exertion to render them as efficient defenders of the district.' It was also, the 
commissioners declared, desirable to register all possessors of firearms and '.. some 
distinguishing costume or other mark would be necessary in time of War to prevent 
19 
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confusion and secure the ready management of the natives when their services in a 
Military capacity would be required. ,20 
Three regions of Natal emerged once the Natal Africans came under British colonial 
control: the southern region; Swartkop near Pietermaritzburg, and Umlazi and Inanda 
near Durban; and the broad border region along the Thukela. The southern region, still 
in disarray, was much influenced by the Bhaca, but its power focus was not yet clearly 
established. The expeditions against Fodo and Sidoyi counteracted the possibility that 
these chiefs might create a new power base and destabilise the frontier area. The locations 
near the major towns found it to their advantage to align themselves with the colonial 
government. In the border region along the Thukela, some groups were antagonistic 
towards the Zulu power, while others had firm links with the Zulu across the river . 
Matshana kaMondise was in the latter category. 
This regionality had an important bearing on the support or hostility which the Natal 
government could expect, and on the government' s attitude to the chiefdoms, from which 
labourers and levies were to be drawn. 
From 1850, when resident magistrates were appointed, Shepstone was able to delegate to 
these magistrates the task of raising levies and isibhalo labourers from the locations but , 
he continued to play an important central role in the conduct of 'Native Affairs'. His 
power was more firmly entrenched after 1853 when he became Secretary for Native 
20 
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Affairs, although it later declined as a result of the Langalibalele affair. Under Lieutenant-
Governor John Scott (1856-64), further locations were proclaimed until by 1864 there 
were forty-two, and Shepstone had the authority to spread his net more widely in 
requesting levies from the magistrates. 
More alarming, to the Natal government, than the prospect of curbing troublesome African 
groups or San raiders, who would have been relatively poorly armed, was the prospect, 
early in 1848, of pitting Natal colonial forces and African levies against well armed and 
mounted Boers. In January 1847 Mpande, the Zulu king, had signed a treaty granting, to 
Klip River Boers, land bounded by the Thukela and the Mzinyathi rivers and the 
Drakensberg. This contradicted the treaty fixing the Mzinyathi as Mpande's western 
boundary. Lieutenant- Governor Martin West, in July 1847, pointed this out to Mpande 
and the Klip River Boers, but they refused to accept West's authority over them.21 
Theophilus Shepstone, deploring the Natal government's lack of military power, reported 
on 1 January 1848: 
21 
22 
The prospects of the opening year are gloomy and unpromising - Rebellion in the 
Subjects and weakness in the Government are very apparent and threaten serious 
consequences - the dreadful alternative of employing the Natives to defend 
themselves and their Government against white men appears inevitable - but may 
God forbid its coming to that.22 
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Messengers from Mpande confirmed Shepstone's fears, as they reported the Boers' plan 
to attack 'the District' (Natal) with Mpande's aid.23 
Shepstone was instructed to prepare to assemble levies to resist the Boers and' .. to warn 
all the Chiefs to be in readiness to march their men provisioned to any given point in the 
event of being called upon - also to assemble all natives who have or can use guns. ,24 
He acted on these instructions by sending off messengers: 
.. to every chief in the district and to Job Pakade and Zikali in particular - to all 
the other chiefs the message was - Reports of invasion are rife we know not 
whether they are true or not - it behoves men to be ready for every emergency -
therefore be ready that when I call upon you, you may assemble provisioned at 
such points as I shall select. Send up all your men that can use firearms to me at 
once - let those who have got them bring them - and those who can use them come 
_25 
Having alerted the chiefs to have their men in readiness, Shepstone, on 20 January, held 
a review of the men in the Swartkop location. 1 200 men turned out, and Shepstone noted 
that 'the Lieutenant Governor and most of the Townspeople out to see it. ,26 The fear of 
arming Mrican levies with firearms does not seem to have been an issue at this time. 
Sir Harry Smith, Governor of the Cape and High Commissioner, travelled overland to 
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1848, where Shepstone met him.27 Smith's attempts to pacify the Klip River Boers and 
reconcile them to the Natal government were unsuccessful and the majority of them had 
moved back across the Drakensberg by April 1848.28 Shepstone had no need to lead his 
levies into action against them, as the situation had been defused by the emigration of the 
Boers. 
Later in 1848 Lieutenant-Governor Martin West, concerned that the defence of Natal 
should be placed on a firmer footing, recommended 'that all the efficient natives be 
organised into bodies similar to the Zulu armies themselves', and the Secretary to 
Government, Donald Moodie, requested Shepstone to report on the measures he thought 
necessary to this end. Shepstone, in response, described the Zulu organisation of the 
amabutho in detail, as he perceived it, as a possible model for employing the Natal 
Africans in colonial defence. It would be necessary to legislate to make a certain period 
of military service obligatory. Until further locations had been established to facilitate this 
proposed military organisation, Shepstone suggested that in an emergency each chief 
should send in a division commanded by a European or 'native' appointed for the purpose 
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In describing the Zulu system of the amabutho, Shepstone omitted any mention, in his 
letters of 2 August and 3 August 1848, of the Zulu king's obligations to his people, other 
than the provision of cattle for their subsistence while on duty as soldiers, and for rewards 
for 'particular services and paying the principal officers'. When, therefore, in June 
1849,Lieutenant-Governor West's Ordinance No.3 was proclaimed, the emphasis was 
placed on the claim that the Lieutenant-Governor should hold all the power and authority 
held and enjoyed by any Supreme or paramount Native Chief,30 and the obligations of 
the 'Supreme Chief' towards his people were not mentioned. 
On 20 August 1848, Theophilus Shepstone was appointed as Captain in Chief over all the 
'native' military forces in Natal. He wrote to the Secretary to Government in September 
that he was to organise them in such a manner as to enable him to carry out any directions 
of the Secretary to Government 'for the concentration upon any point of a sufficient force 
to repel aggression upon our territory'. He estimated that the whole force amounted to 16 
500 men who could be divided into seven divisions or moveable columns. Some 7 000 to 
8 000 men would be excluded as being unfit for active service.31 He proposed the 
appointment of commandants over 'native' forces in these seven divisions. These 
commandants, he wrote, were 'not born chiefs and consequently not liable to the jealousy 
of the hereditary leaders of the various tribes'. They were regarded by the African people 
30 
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'as superior men from their bravery and prudence as evinced on various occasions in 
former times. ,32 
In his memorandum of 6 September 1848,33 included in this correspondence, Shepstone 
listed the chiefs whose followers were to be called upon to provide levies; some groups 
with chiefs unnamed; and the areas from which the levies were to come; the number of 
men in each division; and their commanders. Most of these were traceable with the aid 
of the lists of 'chiefs, 'tribes' and their localities for the years 1849 and 1853, despite 
differences in spelling, as one can see from the accompanying table.34 
On 6 September 1848, when Shepstone presented his memorandum, the only locations 
already proclaimed were those of Zwartkops (Swartkop), Umlazi, Umvoti and Inanda. It 
can clearly be seen from Mann's 1859 map of the locations that the areas from which 
each of the seven divisions of levies was to come did not have the same boundaries as the 
locations, although some men of the First Division came from the Swartkop location; and 
the Second Division area included the Inanda and Umvoti locations but extended beyond 
them; and the Sixth Division included the Umlazi location but extended farther 
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therefore, intending to draw men from areas of Natal other than the proclaimed locations 
of that time. This negated the principle of drawing men into the system because they 
owed the government a debt of gratitude for being settled on locations. Clearly, this 
principle was not to be applied consistently. In April of the following year (1849) the 
Umzinyati, Impafana and 'Kahlamba' locations were proclaimed. It was from these areas 
that Shepstone intended drawing some levies for the Third and Fourth Divisions. 
Shepstone wasted no time in organising the divisions of levies. On 18 September 1848 he 
went to Mr Allison's to organise the First Division. On the following day he installed 
Nobanda as commandant; and on the next day reviewed 'in order of Battle' the division, 
which numbered 1 300 men35 (2 000 were expected). On 11 November he reviewed 1 
000 men of the Second Division (3 500 were expected) and installed Mankayana as 
commandant,36 and two days later reviewed a further 300 or more men under Musi and 
Umkonto of the same division. 37 He reviewed 1 200 men of the Third Division (2 000 
were expected) on 22 November and installed Umkizwana as their commandant.38 The 
number who reported for duty in these three divisions fell far short of Shepstone's 
expectations; instead of 7 500 men, only 3 800 came forward. This must have given him 
some idea of how many men he could rely on in case of emergency: little more than half. 
It might also have indicated that the chiefs in this area, which straddled the Inanda, 
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After Shepstone's 1848 plan for raising levies had been put into practice against the Hlubi 
and amaNgwe (in 1849) and levies had been called up for the Cape eastern frontier, he 
referred, in 1851, to this organisation in his report for the Native Commission. He wrote: 
Their military organization has been on the principle of forming the tribes 
inhabiting any particular locality into divisions under Native commandants, so as 
to form bodies of from 1 500 to 2 000 men in each. The Zulu organization is of 
a much more perfect nature and in describing it .. I have recommended the 
adoption of that part of it which I think would tend to remind the Natives 
periodically of their duties of allegiance and obedience. 39 
In the absence of any real, perceptible power, this arrogated right of the Supreme Chief 
to demand military service and isibhalo labour from African men in Natal whenever they 
might be required, could perhaps be said to provide some means of strengthening the 
tenuous hold of the Natal government over them. In addition, Shepstone's levy system 
made provision for the defence of the state of Natal against rebellious acts of African 
people within its borders, to be undertaken by military levies drawn from the African 
people themselves, under white leaders, in support of regular troops and police. Thus the 
Natal Native Police and military levies were deployed in 1849 in relocating the Hlubi and 
amaNgwe when they were reluctant to move as instructed. 
The Hlubi, once powerful along the Mzinyathi from its source to its confluence with the 
Thukela, were dispersed during the upheavals in the early nineteenth century , leaving a 
small number of their people near the junction of the Mzinyathi and N come (Blood) rivers. 
Here the related amaNgwe, under Phuthini kaMasoba, incurred the wrath of Mpande; and 
39 
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the Hlubi, under Chief Langalibalele kaMthimkulu, also uncomfortable under Mpande's 
regime, fled with them across the Mzinyathi into the district along the upper Mnambithi 
(Klip) River during 1848. The incursion of these two groups who had, after Shaka's time, 
built up their power afresh, posed a threat to the Natal border area into which they had 
moved. Not only might there be friction with the white farmers now settled in this area, 
but Mpande could well have followed up the defectors. The Hlubi, supported by the 
amaNgwe, might also become a new power focus. At this time, however, they had not 
consolidated their power base. The Natal colonial authorities resolved, therefore, to move 
the Hlubi and amaNgwe to new locations, the Hlubi eventually being settled around the 
sources of the Msuluzi (Bloukrans) river, and the amaNgwe on the upper Njasuthi. There 
they would be remote from the Zulu border and could, in addition, act as a barrier against 
the San raiders from the Drakensberg. 
In August 1848, Theophilus Shepstone, as Diplomatic Agent, had been given instructions 
to inform Langalibalele that he was to remove his 'tribe' from the Klip River district to 
the country along the base of the Draakenberg ~) from the source of the 
Umcomaas (sic) to that of the Mooi River, where during the good behaviour of his 
people and upon their always assisting in preventing depredations by Bushmen, 
they will be allowed to remain until further notice. 40 
The Hlubi and amaNgwe at first passively resisted this forced removal, delaying their 
departure. Shepstone therefore called up 2 000 levies from the chiefs lobe of the Sithole 
from the Umsinga district, Phakade of the Mchunu, also of the Umsinga district, Nodada 
of the Thembu of the Klip River district, Ndabankulu of the Baze from the Umzinyathi 
40 
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location, and Zikhali of the Ngwane from the northern foothills of the Natal 
Drakensberg.41 All th~se men were hereditary chiefs from the Fourth Division organised 
by Shepstone in September 1848. These levies were to act in support of some eighty Natal 
Native Police sent forward by Shepstone.42 In effecting the removal, two other chiefs, 
Radarada and Umnangalala, were also to be removed from the Klip River district. 
Shepstone reported on 15 April that he had sent messengers to the chiefs Langalibalele, 
'Putili' (sic), Radarada and Umnangalala to remove without delay to the country under the 
mountains on the sources of the Bushman's, Mooi and Mkhomazi rivers.43 It may well 
be that Jobe, Phakade, Nodada, Ndabankulu and Zikhali viewed the removal of the Hlubi 
and amaNgwe; potentially too powerful as neighbours, with some relief. 
John Bird, then a surveyor, who recalled this action against the Hlubi and the amaNgwe 
over forty years after the event, accompanied Shepstone and the force he had raised. Bird 
recorded that the chiefs 'obeyed the requisition without delay', and he noted the verve and 
enthusiasm shown by their men, and their striking appearance. The amaNgwe were soon 





chief men did not hesitate to submit, and to ask to be forgiven; and their offence 
was pardoned on condition that they were to be obedient to British authority, that 
they were to be located near the Drakensberg and should avoid all encroachment 
on the property of the Europeans. 44 
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This show of force by the police and levies, and Shepstone's presence were at that time 
sufficient to cow the Hlubi and amaNgwe into obedience as their power had not yet 
become entrenched, and thus their possible attraction for local chiefs as a powerful 
rallying point, was nullified. Shepstone's first use of one of his seven divisions as set out 
in his September 1848 memorandum had been successful, and the levies acted willingly. 
The chiefs who responded to Shepstone's call were duly rewarded with gifts of cattle as 
well as having cattle equivalent in number to those provided by them on various forays 
returned to them, according to Shepstone's perception of the Zulu model. He wrote that 
he had sent 
. . 21 head of cattle to Pakade and his Chiefs in acknowledgement of his prompt 
obedience to my summons for a force to join me in the Klip River - I paid also the 
several lots of cattle which have been furnished by the various Chiefs for the 
supply of the Police Corps on different marches such as the pursuit of the Bushmen 
etc and some pressing claimants for payment for services rendered to the Govt (§k) 
and for which no adequate means for payment have been in my hands .. The 
various Chiefs in the District look to such occasions as opportunities for the Govt 
(§k) to express its approbation or otherwise of their past conduct as is customary 
among themselves and I would recommend that when the claimants for actual 
service are satisfied a proportion of the cattle remaining be appropriated towards 
rewarding the most deserving of the Chiefs in the name of the Govt (§k).45 
In this action only Chiefs, not individual levies, were rewarded. Since Chief Langalibalele 
and others who were hesitant in moving or refused to do so, were fined in cattle,46 the 
expedition was self-funding as these cattle could be used as rewards. Some individual 
levies, however, could expect to gain from sisa'd cattle. 
45 
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The settling of the Hlubi and amaNgwe near the Drakensberg was in accordance with a 
plan to establish locations along the foot of the Drakensberg to act as a barrier against San 
attacks. These locations were astride the annual migration routes of the San in pursuit of 
the depleted game, and to harvest plant resources. 47 From 16 April 1849 until 20 April, 
Shepstone noted in his diary that he began his examination of the country near the sources 
of the Mtshezi (Mooi) and Mpofana (Bushman's) rivers with a view to arranging for its 
protection against the inroads of the San by establishing a police force in that area or by 
settling a 'native population' there. He favoured the latter option,48 and wrote to D. 
Moodie: ' .. I have visited the base of the Draakenberg (sic) and find that this part of the 
District may be effectually guarded from the Bushmen by locating natives in places which 
I have selected. ,49 
Once the operation against the Hlubi and amaNgwe had been completed, Shepstone noted 
that: 
All having now submitted and removed .. will place at least one thousand men 
between the Bushmen and the farmers instead of 50 or so [the number of police or 
Cape Mounted Rifles at a post] independent of Lugaju's tribe 400 strong which I 
propose to place between the Spioen Kop and Draakenberg ~) .. 50 
The task of removal was, however, not immediate and was completed only in September 
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location farther south for Chief Lugaju in 1859, according to this plan. After 1849 the 
Natal government could call upon the chiefs, Langalibalele and Phuthini, to provide levies 
to assist in keeping the peace in Natal and protecting its borders, relying partly on their 
self-interest. 
When the Natal Native Police were disbanded in 1851 the need to raise levies from the 
locations became more urgent. By this time more British settlers had entered Natal and 
offered cash wages to African labourers and, as a result, levies came forward with less 
alacrity. This was apparent when levies were requisitioned to fight on the eastern Cape 
frontier in 1851. 
On 24 December 1850 a force of 600 men, sent by Sir Harry Smith to patrol into the 
Amathole mountains against the Ngqika people, was ambushed at the Booma Pass. Two 
days later Sir Harry Smith, the Cape Governor and High Commissioner, wrote to the 
Lieutenant- Governor of Natal to send 'into British Kaffraria to attack the rear of the 
Ngqikas, one, two or three thousand Zoolahs' .51 
The Natal government answered the call by proposing to raise levies for the frontier 
against the Ngqika people. 52 This was outside Natal, and the attitude of the Natal 
government to the use of its armed forces beyond its borders had not been encouraging 
51 
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in 1847 when Shepstone took action against Fodo kaNombewu.53 The white population 
. . 't·' d 54 N d· d in Natal showed 'fear and pamc' at the attempt to raIse a na lve cornman o. or 1 
all the chiefs who were called upon to supply levies respond willingly. Chief Matshana 
kaMondise of the Sithole, from Umsinga, refused to supply men.55 Allegiance to the 
Natal colonial government, the threat of punishment for failure to supply levies and the 
promise to return to the levies the same number of cattle as they had provided for their 
maintenance were all invoked. 
Early in 1851 Chief Somahashe of the Bomvu people and Chief Magedama of the Kabela 
people, both from Shepstone's Third Division, from the Impafana location, were called 
upon to send forward levies to fight on the Cape eastern frontier. Somahashe responded 
loyally to the requirement, reporting that he had 'prepared all he had, informing the 
Magistrate, Mr Peppercorne of his having done so'. He stated that he had received a 
message from Chief Magedama that he and other chiefs would refuse to obey. 
Somahashe's reply to these chiefs was 'that upon no ground whatsoever could they refuse 
to proceed on the Expedition - If military service is ordered by the Great House it must 
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Shepstone reported on the manner of raising this levy, on threatened punishment for 
disobedience, and rewards for compliance: ' ., I proposed to call upon the Chiefs to 
furnish only such a number of men as in their judgement they are of the opinion can be 
spared.' He pointed out that men would have to be provided 'on pain of being "eaten Up" 
should any disobey .. ' Recompense would be offered for cattle supplied: 
.. the Chiefs and headmen as is customary with them furnish cattle for the 
maintenance of the force until it shall arrive at the scene of action and that they 
have the first claim to reimbursement out of the cattle captured in proportion to the 
number furnished by them. 57 
The calling up of some of the levies originally required for the Cape eastern frontier was 
cancelled. On 15 March 1851, D. Moodie, Secretary to Government, informed Shepstone, 
the Diplomatic Agent, that those levies to the north of the Mkhomazi would no longer be 
required, although those to the south of the river 'are to march' .58 One of the chiefs 
south of the Mkhomazi who was called upon was Dumisa of the Duma people, of 
Shepstone's Fifth Division. He was reluctant to provide men for the frontier 
commando. 59 The plan to send levies to the Cape eastern frontier came to nothing. 60 
While the war was in progress on the Cape eastern frontier (1850-1851) Major Warden, 
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of the Sotho who defeated him in battle at Viervoet on 30 June 1851.
61 
It was in the 
interests of Natal to assist Warden and prevent disruption on her western border. J. G . 
Ringler Thomson, the Umzinyathi magistrate, was instructed to act as levy leader of the 
400 - 500 levies to be raised from the Klip River district, being nearest to the 
Sovereignty,62 to join a contingent to oppose Moshweshwe. The response was not 
consistent. 
Nodada of the Thembu, of Shepstone's Fourth Division, who had acted against the Hlubi 
and amaNgwe in 1849, was called upon to send forward levies. Nodada lived on the 
Mnambithi (Klip) river, having returned from Pondoland after the death of his father 
Ngoza who had fled southwards during Shaka's rule. 63 Also required to send levies was 
Ndabankulu of the Baze people from the Umzinyathi location. Both these chiefs responded 
willingly: ' .. Nodada .. immediately prepared to carry out his orders. 150 men belonging 
to him and 50 of Dabankulu marched for Ladismith (§k) .. ,64 
About 200 military levies were reluctantly sent forward from Chief Langalibalele's Hlubi, 
with some men from Chief Phuthini's amaNgwe and Chief Zikhali's Ngwane from the 
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shown by Chief Langalibalele of the Hlubi, and of the related amaNgwe, as well as Chief 
Zikhali, may be attributed to the fact that they were establishing their power bases at this 
time and were not eager to become embroiled in warfare against the Sotho. Certainly, as 
early as 1851, Langalibalele was beginning to assert himself against Shepstone's 
demands. 65 Chief Phuthini's men had originally been excluded from the draft, but 
obeyed a later order to accompany the expedition. Because provisions were short, Ringler 
Thomson asked Phuthini's men to withdraw. They at first refused, but then decided to 
return home as Chief Phuthini's son was ill . Thomson acted against them as deserters and 
followed them with a Cape Corps rifleman. Phuthini's grandson was shot dead by 
Thomson when he raised his assegai to the magistrate in a threatening manner. 66 
After taking no part in hostilities the levies returned home, having received no payment. 
The pay promised to them was 6d per day plus 3 pounds of meat (1.36 kgs). It was 
discovered that Ringler Thomson had embezzled the money allocated for paying the levies. 
He was found to be of unsound mind and was committed to a lunatic asylum in Cape 
Town. 67 By 1854 the levies had still not received any payment. Only after first the 
amaNgwe and then the Hlubi and Ngwane threatened not to pay their taxes unless they 
received their promised reward, did the Natal government, in 1854, agree to settle the 
levies' claims for remuneration. 68 The manner of distributing this payment does not 
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November 1854, asked for suggestions as to a satisfactory way of settling claims, since 
the men had probably dispersed. 69 
Towards the end of 1854, military levies were again required from chiefs in Natal, but 
were not in the end mobilised. Chief Mdushane kaSonyangwe of the Bhaca, for whom his 
father's brother Ncaphayi had acted as regent, moved in 1844 with some of his people into 
Natal above the sources of the Mzumbe river. 70 Ten years later, in November 1854, 
Mdushane was accused of stocktheft, and a burgher force was to be sent out against him 
to fine him and to recover the stolen cattle. Walter Harding was to lead these volunteers. 
The chief was to be reminded that the Natal government had protected him against Faku, 
and he was urged to act loyally. Mdushane's power had waned between 1849 when his 
people had 804 huts, and 1853 when they had only 125.71 
The two magistrates between the Mkhomazi and the Mzimkhulu, Fynn and Steele, were 
to be prepared to bring levies to the assistance of the force. Fynn was to instruct Chief 
Dumisa of the Duma people, and Steele, Chief Sidoyi of the Nhlangwini, to be ready with 
men. These were, however, to be used only if necessary, as Sidoyi's people in particular, 
were 'known to be friendly disposed towards the Amabaca .. ' In addition, a detachment 
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in 'extreme necessity.,n In the event, the levies and the men of the Cape Mounted 
Rifles were not needed. Lieutenant-Governor Pine himself led the expedition of burghers 
and fined Mdushane 700 head of cattle as well as taking 338 head in compensation for the 
stolen cattle. 73 Mdushane was powerless to oppose this force successfully. The pattern 
of cattle fines was well established by this time and where levies were employed these 
cattle provided a substantial source of rewards, without calling on the colony's financial 
resources. 
Sidoyi kaBaleni and his Nhlangwini were next to incur the displeasure of the Natal 
colonial government for attacking another group. This branch of the Nhlangwini joined 
their distant kinsmen under Fodo kaNombewu on the Mkhomazi in about 1843. They had 
been routed by the Natal Trekkers in alliance with Mpande from their territory to the right 
of the upper Thukela, Dingane having given them permission to occupy their original 
lands in that area. 74 
In April 1857, a punitive force of Cape Mounted Rifles and levies was assembled against 
Sidoyi. The levies and Cape Mounted Riflemen considerably outnumbered Sidoyi's 
fighting men. This may have been a deliberate over-reaction to impress the Nhlangwini 
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of witchdoctor in addition to that of chief' .75 A quarrel arose between Sidoyi's people 
and the weaker Memela people under Chief Umshukangubo who lived between the 
Mzimkhulu and the Mkhomazi.76 Chief Umshukangubo was killed in the conflict and 
his body was mutilated. The magistrate, A. C. Hawkins, summoned Sidoyi to appear 
before him. The chief refused to obey. Lieutenant-Governor John Scott instructed the 
SNA, Theophilus Shepstone, to assemble a force of some 800 levies who would be 
accompanied by a small force of Cape Mounted Rifles under Captain McDonnell. They 
were to arrest Sidoyi and seize all his people's cattle; depose him and appoint a new 
chief.77 On the same day the Natal Colonial Secretary instructed Colonel Cooper of the 
45th Regiment of the British military garrison in Natal to direct that the whole available 
force of Cape Mounted Rifles 78 proceed to join the SNA 'who with a force of 500 
Natives has been instructed to carry out the objects of the expedition.' In addition, a small 
party of infantry was to be stationed at the Mkhomazi drift in case of need.79 
Theophilus Shepstone, following the Lieutenant-Governor's instructions, duly assembled 
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respectively. According to Bryant, these levies were 'the warriors of his umTintandaba 
tribe under the generalship of Mfulatelwa, son of Ludaba (of the Majosi clan) .. ,80 
Shepstone's headman, Ngoza, was also a son of Ludaba.81 Presumably the levies 
belonged to a 'tribe' created by Shepstone, since it does not appear in Bryant's list of 800 
clans and sub-clans. 82 The levies and the Cape Mounted Rifles were to meet on the 
Mkhomazi at Saltpans Drift. By 29 April the forces had swept the country, capturing 
cattle, goats and horses, and Theophilus Shepstone met the senior men of the Nhlangwini 
with a view to a settlement. Sidoyi, who had escaped to the Orange River, was deposed 
and replaced by the induna Zatshuke. 83 In follow-up operations, when Shepstone was 
informed that young men were guarding and concealing Nhlangwini cattle, he despatched 
250 men under a 'Native Commander' to disperse them. 
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The levy leader, B. Moodie, however, did not escape Shepstone's censure. In May 1857 
the SNA made enquiries from Moodie about a report that during the Sidoyi affair several 
levies were lost and, wrote Shepstone, 'public rumor Wf) attaches more or less blame to 
,85 d" 1 h' 11 t' you as having unnecessarily caused this. B. Moo Ie, In rep y to t IS a ega lon, 
reported that when his men captured 800 head of cattle from a section of Sidoyi's people 
under a petty chief, Sidoyi's men attempted to retrieve them. Moodie ordered his men to 
charge and two of Sidoyi's men died in the resulting skirmish. On another occasion, when 
Moodie's men captured a large number of cattle, their owners retrieved them during the 
night. When Moodie's men went to the homestead which was holding them 'a scuffle 
ensued' and two of the homestead men were killed. He made no mention of the death of 
levies, only of the Nhlangwini. 86 
That an accurate record was not kept of the details of the Sidoyi expedition is evident from 
the fact that Shepstone relied on 'public rumor' Wf) about the loss of levies in the 
encounter. Also, the rewards given to the levies were explained only some months after 
the affair, when enquiries were made concerning a claim on the Natal government for 
reimbursement of expenses to the Commissariat Department. The Acting Colonial 
Secretary, Natal, in responding to the question about cattle being appropriated to reward 
the levies wrote: 'I am to explain that these were given to the Natives as pay, and 
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Shepstone's commendation of the behaviour of the levies in this action against Sidoyi 
indicates that they acted willingly and their morale was high. Rewards in cattle could be 
expected to be adequate if not liberal considering the scope of the confiscation of livestock 
from Sidoyi's people. In none of the conflicts for which military levies were raised by 
the magistrates up to this time, was their opposition formidable and launched from a 
settled power base with well organised forces. Shepstone's ad hoc arrangements were 
sufficient to subdue any whose actions appeared to threaten peace in Natal and the pre-
eminence of the Natal government. 
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CHAPTER VII 
Military levies : the period of stricter control and harsher 
penalties for supposed intransigence. 
By the 1850s, the Natal government regarded the Hlubi chiefdom of Chief Langalibalele 
kaMthimkhulu and related amaNgwe as potentially dangerous as a possible alternative 
power base. Family ties with the amaNgwe, and Langalibalele's widespread dynastic 
marriages to women from other chiefdoms strengthened his power base, as did the 
possession of unlicensed firearms held by many of his own people. The problem of 
threats to colonial government power within Natal and on its borders remained unsolved 
in the 1850s and the colonial government turned its attention to the possibility of raising 
white colonial volunteer units to retain its ascendancy. In 1848 the Yeomanry Corps of 
volunteers had been established, but was short-lived. 1 There was a possibility that the 
Crimean War, which broke out in 1853, would take British troops away from Natal. 
Volunteer units of colonists were to be encouraged and to this end, in November 1854, 
the Natal government promulgated the enabling Ordinance No. 310 of 21 November 1854. 
The first officially recognised volunteer units, the Durban Volunteer Guards and the Natal 
Carbineers were formed in January 1855, to be followed by others.2 These units served 
in actions against the San and African people such as Matshana kaMondise and 
1 
2 
~. Coghlan and H. Paterson , 'The Natal Carbineers and Pietermaritzburg' 
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Wright, Bushman Raiders , p. 139. 
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Langalibalele kaMthimkhulu; and volunteer units became increasingly important 
throughout the colonial period as Natal took over a larger share in its defence. 
Not long after the Sidoyi affair, the Sithole chief, Matshana kaMondise, living at 
Umsinga, incurred the displeasure of Theophilus Shepstone. Matshana was the grandson 
of Jobe. Jobe had ingratiated himself with the Boers in 18403 and had later provided 
levies for the Natal colony. Like Jobe, Matshana was prepared to act in his own self-
interest by increasing his power in the border regions and, when he fell foul of the Natal 
government, to defect to Zululand. His people were numerous, occupying 1033 huts in 
1849 and 1063 in 1853,4 and he was steadily building up his power base. In 1850 he had 
been fined 500 head of cattle for having his uncle Vela with his two sons put to death in 
a purge of wizards and witches. 5 Later, in November 1850, Shepstone substituted the 
death penalty for cattle fines formerly imposed for murder, declaring, '.. He who 
intentionally kills another, whether for Witchcraft or otherwise, shall die himself.. ,6 
When, therefore, in 1858, Sigatiya of the Cube people was beaten on the orders of 
Matshana and died of his injuries, Shepstone called Matshana to account. A force of 
regular troops, mounted volunteers and mounted levies from Langalibalele's Hlubi 
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summoned to a meeting at which, it was agreed, neither side would be armed, but 
Shepstone and some of his men produced we~pons which they had concealed, and 
attempted to capture Matshana. In the affray which followed there were some casualties, 
including the killing by the Hlubi levies of thirty of Matshana's men. He himself escaped 
across the Mzinyathi,8 where he prospered under Mpande's rule. 9 His chiefdom in 
Umsinga was broken up. Since the Sithole had provided levies in 1849 to support the 
Natal Native Police in removing the Hlubi and amaNgwe from the Klip River district to 
the foothills of the Drakensberg, Langalibalele's levies were no doubt not averse to being 
called up to assist in disciplining the Sithole. 
Although Chief Lugaju's people had been called up in 1847 against the San, they were not 
themselves robbed of stock until 19 January 1856, when some seven or eight San raiders 
stole 300 head of cattle from their herds near the upper Mkhomazi, to which area these 
cattle had been sent to escape the lung-sickness epidemic. lO It is not surprising that in 
1862 Lugaju's men willingly joined William Proudfoot's commando against the San, 11 
although in small numbers. By 1859 Lugaju had been established in a buffer location at 
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On 17 February 1862, San raiders stole sixty-seven cattle and eighteen horses from R. 
Speirs's farm in the upper Mngeni valley .13 The Natal Colonial Secretary sanctioned the 
use of a party of volunteers to set out against the raiders. The expedition was to be led by 
Captain William Proudfoot of the Karkloof Troop of Carbineers. Proudfoot, in describing 
the fortunes of this commando, reported particularly on the high morale of his men under 
difficult circumstances. His party included twenty-six volunteers who assembled at Chief 
Lugaju's homestead on the upper Mkhomazi on 4 March 1862. There they were joined 
by twelve men of Lugaju's people and five of Chief Dumisa's men. 
The spoor of the stolen cattle led the party for eight days through wild country, after their 
ascent of the Drakensberg, but the men failed to track down the stolen cattle. One of the 
colonial volunteers, Hodgson, was accidentally shot and subsequently died, and, to add 
to their troubles, the commando and levies were running out of food. Proudfoot stated in 
his report that they had to prepare to return home as 'The Natives had been without food 
for about two days and several Europeans were little better off.' Since each man had to 
carry his own provisions there was a limit to the period of time which could be spent 
campaigning. Robert Speirs's cattle were not recovered, although the commando returned 
with twenty-nine horses and a San boy captive. In spite of the commando's lack of success 
against the San, Proudfoot praised his men lavishly, reporting to the Acting Colonial 
Secretary: " .. I feel assured His Excellency would be proud to think that at any time 
when required he can command the services of such a body of men as those I have had 
13 Ibid., pp. 157-158. 
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the honor ~) to lead." .14 In all these expeditions for which levies were called up, 
their obedience to the · call was assumed to be a duty, as in the case of the isibhalo 
labourers, because of their obligation to the Natal government for settling them in 
locations. Rewards were haphazardly paid and apart from payments in cattle or perhaps 
the promise of cash received from the sale of plundered cattle, there seemed to have been 
no fixed reward, or clear plans for their organisation or deployment. The Natal Blue 
Books 1852-57 list military expenditure for colonial volunteers, but no separate military 
expenditure is shown for levies. 15 It is clear that cash payment to levies was not 
provided for in the budget, although cash remuneration was given to them after the 
Langalibalele affair. 
In 1867 a proposal was put forward to include a regular force of Mrican men in the 
defence system of Natal. This plan indicates that both the fear of providing Mrican men 
with firearms and the desire to incur minimal expense remained important. The raising of 
'a small body of Troops from the native population of Natal' was to be considered. It was 
stated cautiously that' Arms should be efficient but of a class that would always leave the 
superiority in European hands'. Uniforms were to be 'of a very simple description' and 
barracks were to be 'very simple and inexpensive buildings'. Rates of pay were to be as 
, 
follows: four 'native' lieutenants at 3/- per day; four sergeants at 2/- per day; four 
corporals at 1/- per day; 240 privates at 6d per day. 
14 
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Rations for the 248 'native' non-commissioned officers and men were at the rate of 3d per 
day.16 However, this remained a suggestion and was not implemented. 
The magistrates were not alone in calling for military assistance from the chiefs. In 1869 
the farmer, William Popham, of the farm Mesh1ynn in the Ween en county, successfully 
called upon local chiefs to assist in following up San raiders. On 24 July 1869 Popham 
lost cattle and horses, and the neighbouring Africans lost horses to the San. Chief H1ubi 
and his followers, who lived near the border and were thus vulnerable to San attacks, went 
after the thieves. Popham requested Lokwayo, Dede1eka (Thethe1eku) 'and the minor 
chiefs in the neighbourhood' to follow.!7 Macfarlane's communications with Shepstone 
stated that Popham had lost 118 cattle and fifty horses, and that he had been assisted in 
his foray against the San by Chiefs H1ubi, 'Dide1eko' (Thethe1eku) and the people of 
Lugaju. 18 An official expedition was approved in August to follow up the San into their 
mountain hideouts. 19 
The official expedition set out under A.B. Allison on 1 September and routed the San, 
killing a number of them, including women. 20 The willingness of the levies raised for 
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raids they had suffered in the past. Possibly to direct attention away from their killing of 
non-combatant San, Allison praised them warmly for their courage and endurance. He 
wrote: 
Scantily clothed and exposed at times to severe cold and storms, without cover of 
any kind except such temporary shelter as could only now and then be obtained, 
weary and with their feet cut and bruised by the continual fording of rivers, 
marching by day and watching by night, these men have held on without a murmur 
through a march of more than six hundred miles, through a difficult and all but 
impassable country ., ,22 
The next conflict, in which levies were employed on a vaster scale than before, was 
against the Hlubi and amaNgwe in 1873. Major factors in the crushing of Chief 
l,-angalibalele' s Hlubi people and the amaNgwe were the fear of power in the hands of an 
over-mighty subject whose growing material prosperity was a matter for envy; and the 
ever-present and deep-seated aversion to the possession and use of firearms by African 
people, which was shown by the colonists and colonial government of Natal. 
From 1857 when the first Legislative Council with a majority of elected members met in 
accordance with the provisions of the Charter of 1856, the interests of the colonists came 
increasingly to the fore and they became more vocal in expressing their opinions. Law 3 
of 1875, which lapsed in 1880, evened up the elected and official members of the 
Legislative Council for a time, but thereafter the number of elected members increased 
until , in terms of Law 5 of 1889, there were twenty-four. The Langalibalele affair, 
therefore, occurred at a time when colonist influence was strong. However, until the 
passing of the Constitution Act of 1893 which gave Natal Responsible Government, the 
22 
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lieutenant-governors of Natal were responsible to the British Colonial Office,23 and this 
acted as a check on the colonists. Nevertheless, the views held by Lieutenant-Governor 
Pine and the colonists on the question of the necessity to destroy Langalibalele's power 
by any means appear to have been remarkably congruent. Pine, in justifying the actions 
against Langalibalele wrote to Lord Kimberley, the Colonial Secretary, after the 
Bushman's River Pass clash: 
The Chief of the Tribe fled from the Zulu country years ago for protection in this 
Colony. He had there and he has here always been a contumacious and treacherous 
man. Even during my former administration he gave the Government trouble and 
anxiety.24 
When the Hlubi were removed from the Klip River district and settled around the sources 
of the Msuluzi (Bloukrans) river by October 1849, their location covered an area of about 
350 square kilometres. This included open grasslands, suitable for crop-farming and 
grazing, as well as grazing land in the foothills of the Drakensberg. It was too limited an 
area to support Langalibalele's following of about 7000 people. Since its boundaries were 
not clearly defined, and the Hlubi needed more land, they soon began to encroach on 
unoccupied settler farms (where they would have had to pay rent in cash or in kind) or on 
occupied farms (where rent in labour would have been required) and on state lands. By 
the mid-1860s Langalibalele's people, now about 8 000 in number, occupied nearly 600 
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although Langalibalele's control was dissipated with regard to those living outside his 
location. 
Claiming ultimate authority over them was the Natal government. Langalibalele soon 
began to assert himself, and to clash with successive magistrates appointed from 1850 in 
the Ween en County, and even, in 1851, to test his strength against Shepstone, pointing out 
to him that as leader of the Hlubi people he was 'a great and influential chief.' In 1851, 
too, Langalibalele had shown reluctance in providing levies for the proposed action against 
Moshweshwe. The appointment, in 1855, of John Macfarlane as the new Weenen 
magistrate heightened the tension, as has been pointed out by Wright and Manson.26 
Macfarlane, himself a Ween en landowner, supported the farmers in their opposition to the 
African chiefs. Shortly after his arrival he acted in a high-handed manner against 
Langalibalele's people when the chief disobeyed instructions to enforce the removal of 
cattle affected by lung-sickness. Some of the Hlubi became threatening, and Macfarlane 
led a commando of thirty men against them. The Hlubi were at this time in no position 
to issue any serious challenge to the Natal authorities, weakened as they were by the two 
poor seasons of 1853-54 and the lung-sickness epidemic of 1855. Nevertheless they may 
well have been regarded as a pivot around whom others could coalesce to form a new 
power base. 
After 1855 the Hlubi began to prosper again, not only in their allotted location but beyond 
it. The 1849 Hut Tax was first levied on the Hlubi at a time when surplus cattle which 
could be sold to pay this tax were not available to them, recently settled as they were on 
26 Ibid., pp. 42-43. 
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their location. The alternative was for men to enter the wage-labour force, and this option 
was taken by many of the Hlubi men. Not only would this enable them to pay their Hut 
Tax from their wages, but they had a small surplus with which to buy consumer goods. 
The Hlubi herds were increasing. by the late 1850s and surplus cattle could at that time be 
sold for cash. Manson has shown that the ownership of cattle by African stock-owners in 
the Ween en district, about a third to a half of whom were Hlubi, was steadily increasing 
from the late 1860s to the early 1870s.27 
By the early 1860s crop production had increased and the Hlubi were selling surplus 
maize.28 The arrival among them, in 1863, of J.R. Hansen of the Hermannsburg 
Missionary Society, who encouraged the use of the plough and the development of 
commercial agriculture along European lines, gave a further impetus to Hlubi prosperity. 
This was practised on mission lands first, but spread to other Hlubi lands. The use of 
ploughs in place of hoes would have brought more land under cultivation and increased 
crop production. Hansen recorded in 1873 that the Hlubi were using ploughs instead of 
hoes in three-quarters of their cultivated land.29 Since the use of ploughs involved 
cattle, this task would have been in the hands of men, not women, who traditionally 
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of crops was being produced, more men would have remained at home rather than offer 
their services elsewhere. 
By the early 1870s, Langalibalele's Hlubi had increased in numbers to between 9 000 and 
10 000, and their location covered over 700 square kilometres. Their cattle numbered 
some 15 000. 30 The Hlubi prosperity caused the white farmers in the Weenen and Klip 
River counties to view them with envy, resentment and fear, as Manson has suggested .31 
While the Hlubi prospered, the European sheepfarmers were badly hit by blue tongue 
disease among their sheep. Their losses coincided with the slump of 1865 which made it 
impossible for them to raise adequate loans to assist their economic recovery. 32 White 
farmers, therefore, were likely to favour any action which might reduce the economic 
competition of the Hlubi. 
In other ways the Hlubi and Langalibalele, their chief, had consolidated their power. The 
chief's father, Mthirnkhulu, and Langalibalele after him, adopted the Zulu practice of 
forming amabutho, age-sets of men and women drawn from the whole group. This gave 
the chief tighter control over agricultural and pastoral production by the amabutho, as well 
as over the marriage age of his people, and thus over the setting up of independent 
homesteads. In addition Langalibalele annually held the umkhosi festival of the first fruits, 
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as a rainmaker and his dynastic marriages had further increased his power and 
prestige. 33 
By the 1870s the Hlubi, like many other groups, had acquired considerable numbers of 
firearms, a fact which contributed to the colonists' distrust. Law No.5, 1859 was 
promulgated in June 1859 by the Natal government 'For preventing the Sale of Gunpowder 
and Firearms to, and prohibiting the possession of the same by Natives.' Anyone who 
engaged in this trade in firearms could be fined up to fifty pounds and sentenced to up to 
two years' imprisonment; and the firearms would be confiscated. Nor was any 'native' 
allowed to possess a firearm. Contravention of this clause earned the same penalties. 
However, there were exceptions, if written permission had been obtained from the 
Lieutenant-Governor; and firearms thus legally held were to be marked and registered by 
the Resident Magistrate. 34 
After 1867, when diamonds were discovered, the Hlubi, conveniently near to the diamond-
fields, looked beyond Natal for wage-labour, especially as it became known that firearms 
were to be obtained with wages earned there, and that employers were willing to give 
labourers certificates for the purchase of these desired articles.35 These firearms were 
thus legally acquired beyond the borders of Natal. Within Natal, Law No.5 of 1859, 
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person of the native tribes of this Colony .. without the written permission of the 
Governor .. whether the said gun or pistol be marked and registered or not .. ' It is not 
surprising that firearms acquired from the diamond-fields were, if possible, not brought 
in to be registered, although a circular of 14 February 1872 to Resident Magistrates 
instructed them to register all firearms presented to them as being lawfully acquired on the 
diamond-fields, and the Lieutenant-Governor would, on their recommendation, grant the 
necessary permit.36 A.B. Allison, the Border Agent at Oliviershoek, reported uneasily 
ten days later that African men were eager to obtain firearms on the diamond-fields 'and 
all these arms will eventually be smuggled into the Colony . .37 
The question of the registration of firearms gave the Natal government and Macfarlane a 
firmer pretext for a confrontation with Chief Langalibalele and the Hlubi than had been 
presented by their refusal to move cattle affected by lung-sickness. Guest has suggested 
that Macfarlane, in insisting on the registration of Hlubi guns, may have intended to make 
an example of Langalibalele whose reputation as a rain-doctor and whose family 
connections would have publicised widely the magistrate's action against him38 and, 
presumably, those who were insufficiently submissive would be warned. The Hlubi were 
not alone among the Natal Africans in possessing unregistered firearms, nor was their 
reluctance to register their guns any different from the attitude of other chiefs and their 
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The sequence of events which followed Macfarlane's clash with Langalibalele when he 
failed to send in firearms acquired by the Hlubi, to the Ween en magistrate, and did not 
respond positively to the summons issued on the authority of the Lieutenant-Governor as 
Supreme Chief, to appear before the SNA in Pietermaritzburg, has been described by 
Guest, amongst others. 40 
The original ostensible purpose of the police action against Chief Langalibalele was to 
force him to deliver up unregistered firearms, but the campaign developed far beyond that. 
When Langalibalele dispersed his old men, women and children, as well as some of his 
cattle among the amaNgwe (frequently referred to as the Putini or Putili) preparatory to 
his flight into Lesotho with the younger men and considerable numbers of cattle, the Natal 
government forces swung into action. This was later justified by Lieutenant-Governor Pine 
on the advice of Theophilus Shepstone in these words: 'It is a well-recognised maxim of 
native law that a Chief or tribe cannot leave the jurisdiction of the Supreme Chief without 
his sanction.' Pine enclosed Shepstone's view on the subject. He supported Pine by 
writing: ' .. desertion is looked upon and treated as treason .. according to tribes of South 
Africa. ,41 This contradicts Holden's 1866 statement that dissatisfied adherents of a chief 
were free to leave the chiefdom. 
40 
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In mobilising the colonial forces against the Hlubi chief and his allies, the Natal 
government planned to make use of 6 000 levies. Lieutenant-Governor Pine intended that 
these levies should take the major policing role in the proceedings against the Hlubi, to 
punish them for their intransigence. He wrote to Lord Kimberley, the Colonial Secretary: 
My general design, that the Kafer (sic) Tribes whom I deem it safe and proper to 
employ against this Tribe shall for this purpose be considered as the Civil Police 
who have been entrusted to capture the Chief Langabalele Wf) and bring him to 
justice, and that should they be beaten back the military and Volunteers should take 
action. 
. 
Since the regulars and volunteers would take action only if the levies were 'beaten back', 
Pine did not wish them to initiate any attack. For this reason, he explained, he gave the 
order to Durnford not to fire the first shot in any early encounter. After the disaster to 
Durnford's force (which did not include levies) at the Bushman's River Pass, Pine wrote 
to Kimberley: 
I had .. given orders that the military should not fire the first shot. This order was 
in strict conformity with the spirit of the plan that the military should play the 
secondary part of supporting the Civil force sent to arrest the chief and tribe. 42 
The map of the plan of operations was originally drafted by Macfarlane, presented by 
Colonel Milles, Commandant Natal,43 to Pine, and enclosed in the Lieutenant-
Governor's 13 November 1873 despatch to Kimberley. It shows the cordon which was to 
be placed around the locations of the Hlubi and the amaNgwe and the positions of the 
troops sent out against them. It shows 'Regulars', 'Carbineers' and 'Natives', i.e. levies, 
42 
BPP C1025 Pine to Kimberley, 30 October 1873. 
43 
GH 1218 1871-1874 Lieutenant-Governor Pine to the Earl of Kimberley 
13 November 1873. ' 
210 
in positions linking all these positions, and surrounding the Hlubi and amaNgwe locations. 
Not shown is Captain Hawkins in reserve between the Mkhomazi and the Mzimkhulu, 
with volunteers and levies . Since Pine intended mobilising 6 000 African levies and 
African volunteers, 300 white volunteers and 200 regular British troops, these would have 
been adequate to patrol the approximately 130 kilometre circumference of the cordon. 
The white volunteers were Frontier Guards under Captain Lucas, Resident Magistrate at 
Ladysmith (Klip River county) who were to take up their position at David Gray's farm; 
the Weenen Yeomanry and Weenen Burghers under Captain Macfarlane, Resident 
Magistrate at Estcourt (Weenen county) in position south-west of Estcourt between the 
Little Tugela and Bushman's rivers; and Captain Hawkins, Resident Magistrate of Upper 
Umkomanzi, with the Richmond Mounted Rifles . In addition, Carbineers of the 
Pietermaritzburg Troop and the Karkloof Troop, led by Captain Charles Barter, Officer 
Commanding, Karkloof Troop, were at Meshlynn, Popham's farm, where Pine, in overall 
command of the expedition, set up his headquarters. The British regular troops consisted 
of a force of the 75th Regiment under Captain Boyes, with the Corps of Royal Artillery 
(with two six-pounder guns) . Pine was accompanied to Meshlynn by his private secretary, 
William Beaumont, and Theophilus Shepstone, Chief of Staff to Lieutenant-Colonel 
Milles , Commandant Natal. 44 
The African levies, called up by their various chiefs, were vastly in the majority in the 
force against Chief Langalibalele, and were intended to be the cutting edge of the 
expedition. Lucas and Hawkins were resident magistrates who called up men from Klip 
44 
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River county and Lower Umkomanzi division respectively. The men called up by Lucas 
were those of Chiefs Tinta, Umvungela and Phakade. By the end of 1873, 120 of Tinta's 
men and 100 of Umvungela's were disbanded and sent to Ladysmith. The rest, eighty-one 
of Phakade's men, were handed over to Captain Allison to join his force.
45 
Neither 
Lucas nor Hawkins took an active part in the first encounter with Langalibalele. 
Captain Allison, Border Agent at Oliviershoek, who had a prominent part to play in 
preventing Langalibalele from moving into Lesotho, was expected to call up 500 levies. 
In fact, he had with him 300 men of the Ngwane under Chief Zikhali.46 The Ngwane 
had an old grudge against the Hlubi, whose chief, Mthimkhulu (father of Langalibalele), 
had refused to return cattle which Matiwane, the Ngwane chief and father of Zikhali, had 
entrusted to him. Matiwane, in about 1825, defeated Mthimkhulu.47 
As part of the plan to apprehend Chief Langalibalele before he left Natal, Captain Allison, 
in November 1873, was ordered to take his force of Ngwane up a pass at Champagne 
Castle and, moving southwards along the Drakensberg escarpment, link up with the men 
under Major Durnford (who had been placed in authority over Captain Barter) at the top 
of the Bushman's River Pass, to prevent Langalibalele's escape. This proved to be 
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I find there is no pass at or near Champagne Castle. I had a guide who is well 
acquainted with the country, and marched the men from daylight to sundown in 
. f' d . 48 vam attempts to m an opemng. 
The Ngwane did not, therefore, take any part in the initial action against Langalibalele, 
and Durnford's small party of men bore the brunt of the skirmish which followed their 
attempt to prevent Langalibalele's escape. 
Captain Macfarlane, whose Ween en magistracy included the Hlubi and amaNgwe 
locations, called up levies from other groups such as those from the Impafana location viz. 
Somahashe and Magedama, as had been done before. In 1869 William Popham, a Ween en 
farmer, was assisted by Chiefs Hlubi, 'Dedeleka' (Thetheleku) and Lugaju in tracking 
down San raiders. 49 Lugaju and Thetheleku were chiefs in Shepstone's First Division 
of 1848.50 Although they joined Popham in the Ween en county their people would not 
have been available officially to Macfarlane as they lived in the Pietermaritzburg county. 
Chief Hlubi was a Sotho border chief. When the Hlubi were driven out of their lands by 
Mpande, the Zulu king, some of them settled in Lesotho where they were absorbed into 
the Tlokwa people. Chief Hlubi's people were not subject to being called up as levies by 
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a prominent part in the Bushman's River Pass skirmish. They too would not have been 
available to Macfarlane. 
Levies from Pietermaritzburg were also involved. These would have been drawn from 
Shepstone's 1848 First Division and would have included men from Lugaju's and 
Thetheleku's people. They were to be positioned between Macfarlane's force and 
Meshlynn. F.E. Colenso, in describing the force which set out in October 1873 from 
Pietermaritzburg for the headquarters at Meshlynn, was unflattering to the levies, whom 
she regarded as ' .. an entirely unorganised and useless addition of untrained Natal natives 
,52 
Other Africans who were not levies were mobilised for the action against Langalibalele. 
These were twenty-five mounted Basotho guides from Chief Hlubi ' s people, and Elijah 
Khambule,53 Major Durnford's interpreter, who was a Kholwa from Edendale. These 
men were with Durnford, who took charge of one of the two flying columns (the other 
was a force under Captain Boyes of the 75th Regiment). Durnford's force also included 
fifty-five colonial volunteers of the Pietermaritzburg and Karkloof Troops of the Natal 
Carbineers. Durnford was ordered to ascend the Giant's Castle Pass and then proceed 
northwards along the Drakensberg escarpment to Bushman's River Pass in order to 
reinforce Allison and his levies who would be in position by 3 November. Allison never 
arrived, and Durnford's small force, after a disastrous ascent of the Hlatimba Pass (not, 
as planned, the Giant's Castle Pass) was engaged against the Hlubi at the head of the 
52 
53 
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Bushman's River Pass. This encounter and the rout which ensued is described by several 
eyewitnesses. 54 
On 11 November, after the Bushman's River Pass debacle, when the situation was 
considered to be grave, Martial Law was proclaimed, as a general conflagration was 
feared . Guest has documented the reports of Langalibalele's friendly communications and 
some intrigue with chiefs outside Natal: Cetshwayo in Zululand; chiefs in the Transkei, 
notably Chief Zibe, closely related to Langalibalele; Basotho chiefs, Masopha and Malapo; 
and even the Griqua, Adam Kok. Guest has suggested that Langalibalele may have been 
concerned about escaping from Natal, not about fomenting rebellion in concert with these 
chiefs. 55 Nevertheless, fears of a general uprising led to the mobilising not only of 
forces in Natal, but also beyond its borders . H M S Rattlesnake sailed from the Cape with 
200 men of the 86th Regiment under Lieutenant-General Sir Arthur Cunynghame, Officer 
Commanding Her Majesty's forces in South Africa; and 200 men of the Frontier Armed 
and Mounted Police rode up from King William's Town. 1.M. Orpen, British Resident 
in Nomansland and C.D. Griffith, the Governor's Agent in Basutoland, were ordered to 
take severe steps against Langalibalele or any of his people and those who might shelter 
them, if the rebels sought asylum in their territories. Orpen and Griffith were to assist the 
Natal forces in arresting Langalibalele. Orpen, with Adam Kok's assistance, raised a 
mounted force of more than 600 men. Griffith requested scouts from Paramount Chief 
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situation which Pine had judged could be settled by a show of force, with levies acting 
first , then, if the necessity arose, volunteers and regulars moving up in support, had 
become a major crisis. 
From Natal itself, two flying columns were sent out immediately to apprehend 
Langalibalele in Lesotho if he remained there , or prevent his taking refuge in Transkei. 
One column, under Captain Allison, moved into Lesotho from the Mont-aux-Sources area 
(Zikhali's location) and a second, under Captain Hawkins, was sent to the south towards 
the St John's River. The instructions to Hawkins from Theophilus Shepstone throw some 
light on the later behaviour and motivation of the levies, whose other leaders no doubt 
received similar instructions, in their inexorable pursuit and harrying of Langalibalele and 
his Hlubi people, as well as of the amaNgwe. There were rewards to be gained, as can 
be seen: 
. . Give your men orders to take prisoner every woman and child and bring them 
out - also that 20/- for each able bodied man taken and kept prisoner will be paid, 
every one that resists will be killed - 100 head of cattle to anyone who captures , 
or if he refuses to be captured, kills Langalibalele ... 57 
Hawkins, finding no sign of Langalibalele to the south, returned to Natal, ascended the 
Drakensberg and joined Allison on 7 December, on the east branch of the Orange River , 
with his forty-six men of the Richmond Mounted Rifles, and 350 levies . Some of the latter 
were sent home and Hawkins proceeded with the Europeans and seventy levies. 58 
57 
58 
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Allison's force of fifty mounted men of the Natal Frontier Guard and Weenen Yeomanry 
and over 1 500 levies ascended the Drakensberg at Bushman's River Pass on 29 November 
in pursuit of Langalibalele. The levies, Allison recorded, 'consisted of men from different 
tribes - some of the same tribes were detached for duty in Natal .. (for instance 150 of 
Pakade's men under Mr L. Lloyd at the Bushmans Pass .. ),59 These men were raised 
by Chiefs Zikhali (269), Goza (852), Faku (231) and Phakade (164) and in addition there 
were the seventy men of Hawkins's contingent. 60 
The Hlubi chief and eighty-four of his followers were led by Malapo's son Jonathan to 
Leribe, where they were arrested; on 11 December, by Griffith and Major Bell, the Leribe 
magistrate, with a force of fifty Frontier Armed and Mounted Police under Inspector 
Surmon. 61 
Allison praised his men and those of Hawkins for their behaviour during their arduous 
journey from the Orange River: 
The native force of 1600 men has also behaved loyally and well. They suffered 
much in the mountains from want of proper clothing, but no murmuring reached 
me, and there has only been one case of punishment for neglect of duty.62 
The Natal forces under Allison took charge of the prisoners and captured livestock in 
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people. Allison paid 2 000 head of cattle 'as repayment to the Basutos for their services 
.. ,63 With the prisoners and the rest of the livestock Allison and his men returned to 
Natal, reaching Pietermaritzburg on 31 December 1873. 
Meanwhile, in Natal, Major Durnford was carrying out instructions of a different sort. 
Beaumont records the decision 'To send a party under Major Durnford to re-open the 
Bushman's Pass, to bury the dead and to block up the Pass.'64 On 18 November Major 
Durnford, with sixty men of the 75th Regiment, thirty Basotho and 400 levies, which 
included some of Chief Thetheleku' s men of the Mphumuza people living in the Swartkop 
location, accompanied by William Beaumont and the Reverend George Smith of Weston, 
occupied the Bushman's River Pass and buried those who had died in the engagement of 
4 November. 
Before Allison left on his expedition to Lesotho and while the operation against 
Langalibalele was taking place following the Bushman's River Pass incident, the colonial 
forces in Natal launched a campaign to crush the remaining Hlubi and in this action levies 
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Those Hlubi left behind in Natal after Langalibalele had fled with most of his fighting men 
were 'most of the women and children, the sick and infirm, with a few ablebodied men 
, f' h 1 d ,66 to watch over them .. ' These had taken re uge III 0 es an caves .. 
Not only were these fugitives to be rounded up, but their neighbours the amaNgwe were 
to be punished too, and in this action the colonial volunteers and levies were again 
involved, as they had been against the Hlubi. Pine wrote to the Colonial Secretary to 
justify this measure: . 
The neighbouring tribe of Putili .. had aided in the rebellion of Langalibalele's 
tribe by firing on parties of our forces; by receiving and sheltering some of the 
people and cattle of the tribe, and in other ways .. 
He reported that the Putili (amaNgwe) 'have been by an admirable movement conducted 
by Mr Macfarlane the Resident Magistrate of the County of Weenen, under the order of 
Colonel Milles, surrounded and disarmed without loss of life.' He added: ' .. we have 
earnestly tried to conduct the operation, with as much humanity as possible. ,67 
Frances Colenso gave expression to the outrage which was to be echoed in protests from 
the Anti-Slavery Society, the Peace Society and the Aborigines Protection Society, when 
Hlubi non-combatants were rounded up and taken prisoner. She wrote: 
66 
67 
"The English soldiers will not touch the children", was the expression used. So far, 
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"children" out of their hiding-places and take them prisoner .. 
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Fugitives, she continued, were smoked to death or killed by rockets in caves; women and 
children were killed, men tortured, and prisoners were put to death. She made the 
accusation: 
.. a white commander of native forces is said to have given the significant 
information to his men that he did not wish to see the faces of any prisoners; and 
it is reported that a prisoner was made over to the native force to be put to death 
as the latter chose. 
Frances Colenso also accused Trooper Moodie of shooting an unarmed prisoner. With 
regard to the women who had been sheltering in caves she wrote: 'So many women were 
injured in dislodging them from the caves that Major Durnford, on his second return from 
the mountains, instituted a hospital tent where they might be attended to .. ,68 
'These acts,' she wrote, 'were chiefly committed by the irregular (white) troops and native 
levies ... undisciplined or savage troops ... disorganised masses of "friendly natives" 
.. ,69 She omitted to mention that the bombarding of the cave with artillery fire was 
carried out not by volunteers and levies but by regulars under Lieutenant Clark, Royal 
Artillery,70 with their two field-guns. 
Pine took the side of the colonists and the levies. He praised the 'good conduct of the 
native forces.' 'Not a woman nor a child,' he wrote to Kimberley, 'has been intentionally 
injured, though it used to be a settled maxim with the Zulu tribes that it was just and right 
to kill the women and offspring of a hostile tribe .. ,71 
68 Colenso, History of the Zulu War, p. 33. 
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Neither Pine nor Frances Colenso was present when the Hlubi and amaNgwe were hunted 
down, but Captain G .A. Lucas, Resident Magistrate, Klip River, certainly was, and his 
alleged actions and those of his levies were such that he was required to explain'them. He 
reported that he had initially taken the field on 30 October 1873 against Langalibalele and 
the 'Putili' with the Fourth Division of forces employed (which appears to coincide with 
Shepstone's 1848 Fourth Division who were drawn from the Klip River area). This 
division was made up of 2 000 'loyal Zulus' and the Frontier Guard. He denied the 
atrocities attributed to them, declaring that the 'Putili' cattle were taken with the loss of 
one man to the rebels, and no men, women or children prisoners were killed. He stated 
that injured women were given medical attention, and his men were reminded not to injure 
women and children, nor were they to take prisoner any man who threw down his arms. 
He declared that it was untrue that his men 'ravished and otherwise maltreated' captive 
women.72 
Lord Carnarvon, the Colonial Secretary, was not satisfied with these denials of the actions 
of Captain Lucas and his men. His attention had been drawn to a statement that Lucas had 
handed over a number of women to the 'Native Chiefs' who were serving under him. 
Carnarvon's invitation to Lucas to refute this was met with a further denial. Lucas 
declared that women and children had not been given to chiefs as spoils of war, but had 
b~en placed under their guardianship.73 On the question of suspected slave labour, Pine, 
in the following month, forwarded a petition to Carnarvon signed by 1 683 residents of 
72 BPP C1119 1875 No.5 Captain G.A. Lucas, to Colonial Office 7 June 
1874. ' 
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the Colony of Natal. They denied 'slanders' about apportioning Hlubi prisoners as 
labourers. They declared: ' ., the people of the rebel tribe, including the women and 
children basely deserted and left to their fate by their natural protectors, have been and 
still continue to be, fed and sheltered by the Colonial Government. ,74 Certainly, 
assistance had to be given to the broken Hlubi and amaNgwe, and by April 1875 over £ 
4 700 had been spent on supplies for them, and even small cash advances. 75 This was 
a relatively modest outlay considering that the sales of their captured stock and other 
confiscations realised over £ 25 000. 76 
Concerning captive women, statements subsequently taken from levies contradicted 
Lucas's statements. Sikunyana, a relative of Chief Phakade, declared that two young 
women of the amaNgwe were given by Lucas to Ngabangaye, a son of Phakade, to be his 
wives. One of the women pleaded to be released from this man, first with the Estcourt 
magistrate and then with Theophilus Shepstone himself in Pietermaritzburg, but she was 
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Bishop Colenso collected further allegations against Lucas regarding the treatment of the 
Hlubi. Faku, a Ween en chief who provided levies, stated that the orders from Captain 
Lucas were 'to bring the women but he (Capt. Lucas) did not wish to see the face of any 
of the men.' Faku stated that there was a wounded man who was 'brought out of his 
hiding place and by the order of the officer in command shot' on the plea that 'the man 
was so wounded that it was a mercy to put him out of his misery.' Colenso also alleged 
that attempts were made to smoke fugitives out of a cave, and some of them were 
suffocated. The bishop recorded a statement by Umlanduli that his wife had been given 
to one of Shepstone's men and her sister to Mahoyisa (the Government induna)J8 
Undoubtedly in some instances the volunteers and the levies with them acted with great 
harshness. Letters from colonial volunteers who had taken part in the campaign give 
evidence of this. 79 Guest has suggested that the Natal colonists acted out of a sense of 
insecurity and fear as to the extent of the disaffection, and he cites the offers made and 
assistance given from outside Natal to aid the colony against the Hlubi. This concern 
indicates that the fears were not confined to Natal. The Orange Free State and the South 
African Republic rounded up 'rebels'. President Burgers raised a force to prevent 
Langalibalele from reaching Cetshwayo's territory through the South African Republic; 
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well be ascribed to fear, but the determination to crush the Hlubi may also have been 
motivated, as Wright and Manson have pointed out, by a desire to take over their land and 
force them into farm labour;81 and to reduce their economic competition. 
The levies who took part in the campaign could expect punishment if they did not come 
forward when summoned, but they were also promised rewards for their services. Not 
only were they to be paid in cash, but they could expect a share in the cattle captured from 
the Hlubi and amaNgwe who were wealthy in cattle. When it was resolved by the Council 
of War called by Pine after the Bushman's River Pass engagement that a flying column 
was to be sent over the Drakensberg in pursuit of Langalibalele, it was to consist of a few 
picked European volunteers and 1 500 levies 'who were to be rewarded out of captured 
cattle. ,82 
This obligation to the levies could be easily met, as Allison captured 7 000 Hlubi cattle 
in Lesotho, as well as 260 horses. He left behind 2 000 head of cattle to payoff the 
Basotho and returned to Natal with the rest of the livestock, herded by the levies. In 
September 1874 the Acting Colonial Secretary requested the Acting SNA to provide the 
Legislative Council with a return of the number of cattle given to 'Kafirs' for assisting in 
the suppression of the 'late rebellion. ,83 Some cattle given to the levies merely replaced 
cattle supplied by them for rations. Allison sent in an account for cattle supplied by 
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of the captured amaNgwe herd.84 Of the 5 000 head of cattle which Allison's men 
drove back into Natal, he proposed that 2 000 be distributed to the levies of his pursuing 
column. He suggested that the number of cattle to be assigned to each 'tribe' be handed 
to their chief or headman for distribution to their levies.
85 
Cash was also to be paid to the levies. Ninety men from Zikhali's people, who were told 
that they would be paid, and who were the last to be discharged, were paid £ 117 10/-
(about £ 1 6/- each). 86 Later on, a further payment was made to the full number of 
levies raised by Zikhali, viz. 269. This amount, £ 403 10/- (about £ 1 10/- each) was 
acknowledged by Allison in May 1874.87 He presumed, in a later letter, that the other 
men of the contingent had been paid by their respective magistrates. 88 All told, over 
£ 10 000 was paid out to 'volunteers' (of whom there were about 300) and 'natives' (of 
whom there were between 5 000 and 6 000) out of total expenses of over £ 36 000.89 
The levies were engaged in military service for approximately two months. The cash 
which they received was little more than the 1873 rate for isibhalo labourers, i.e. 7/6 per 
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inadequate for the work performed.90 Cash rewards, therefore, were poor although by 
April 1875 the cash realised from the sale of the Hlubi and amaNgwe property (cattle, 
houses, sheep and goats; mealies and 'Kafir-corn'; hides and other property) and £ 16 5/-
in cash taken from them, amounted to £ 25 525.91 The cattle sold did not include cattle 
taken from the Hlubi and amaNgwe herds to reward the levies. 
The Langalibalele affair was far more costly than the Natal authorities expected it to be, 
and had far wider repercussions than they could have imagined. It was a more extensive 
test of the levy system than any earlier campaigns had been. The levies were called up in 
the same way as the isibhalo labourers, but where there were numerous protests against 
the isibhalo call-up there were fewer objections, on the part of African people, to serving 
as military levies, although the rewards were not great. Theophilus Shepstone maintained 
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In spite of Shepstone's statement, in some instances, as we have seen, chiefs did express 
reluctance, especially when required to go beyond the borders of Natal, and were 
threatened with punishment if they disobeyed. That levies appear to have come forward 
willingly against Langalibalele may be ascribed partly to the hope of a share in the 
expected cattle plunder. Another reason for the willingness of levies to come forward was 
that military service, unlike isibhalo labour, appears not to have been regarded as 
degrading. Chief Thetheleku of the Mphumuza people from the Swartkop location, whose 
men were involved as levies in the campaign against Langalibalele, expressed his views 
on the subject after the Anglo-Zulu War. He declared that, when called upon for military 
service, 'All those who are in a position to leave would join in a day for Government 
military service.' When asked whether they made a distinction between military service 
and compulsory labour, he replied, 'Yes. To go to war is a thing that taxes a man's 
courage, and they prefer it because they go with a savage feeling. ,93 
The Natal government's use of African levies to augment its military forces had not been 
altogether successful in keeping the peace in Natal during the Langalibalele crisis. It had 
been necessary to enlist the aid of military and police forces outside Natal to bring 
Langalibalele and his followers back to Natal. The levies achieved the rounding up of the 
amaNgwe with ease, and the harrying of the Hlubi men, women and children who had 
sheltered in caves provided no difficulty. The treatment of the hapless Hlubi and 
amaNgwe, which provoked an outcry from Britain; and the shock of the Bushman's River 
Pass debacle, cast serious doubts on Natal's ability to handle the keeping of peace within 
93 
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her territories and the defence of her borders. Certainly, without the active collaboration 
of the chiefs and the levies they sent forward, the 200 regular soldiers and 300 white 
volunteers would have been totally inadequate to conduct the campaign. 
The consequences of the Langalibalele crisis, as Guest has pointed out,94 had major 
repercussions throughout South Africa as well as in Natal. Earlier conflicts with African 
people in Natal had had more localised effects. The Langalibalele affair left ·a more 
indelible impression. Goodfellow maintained that the Langalibalele crisis gave Carnarvon 
the opportunity to reduce Natal's ability to obstruct his Confederation policy.95 From 
the Natal government's point of view it was clear that Natal could not defend herself 
unaided but there was no doubt some relief felt at the elimination of the potential power 
base of the Hlubi. As far as the African people in Natal were concerned, not only were 
the Hlubi and amaNgwe disastrously crushed, but levies drawn widely from groups in 
Natal were also profoundly affected. 
Durnford was of the opinion that' .. It will take a long time (perhaps a life time) to restore 
anything like confidence in the native mind in their white rulers ... ,96 
At the beginning of the colonial period, Shepstone had raised levies on an ad hoc basis 
whenever there seemed a possibility that any action on the part of any San or Natal 
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When the Hlubi and amaNgwe were building up what appeared to be an alternative power 
base; when the power of Matshana kaMondise of the Sithole on the Zululand border was 
growing; and when Sidoyi of the Nhlangwini appeared to threaten the southern Natal 
frontier, the Natal government took action, involving their surrogates. Levies raised from 
the locations were cajoled with the promise of rewards or threatened with punishment to 
enlist their aid, in order that the Natal colony could remain in the most powerful position . 
CHAPTER VIII 
The use made of Natal African military levies during the 
first phase of the Anglo-Zulu War of 1879 
229 
When the British and Natal colonial governments embarked on a war against the Zulu 
kingdom in 1879, African levies from Natal were involved on a larger scale and for a 
longer period than ever before, since reinforcements in sufficient numbers were not made 
available by the Imperial government before the second invasion of Zululand. Initially, 
however, there were not many more levies than were mobilised against Chief 
Langalibalele kaMthimkhulu in 1873, in which conflict 6 000 African levies were 
involved. 1 The levies, as subjects of the Supreme Chief, the Lieutenant-Governor of 
Natal, were conscripted by the Natal government to serve in Zululand with the invading 
British army as mounted troops, foot-soldiers , members of a Pioneer Corps, hospital 
bearers and military labourers. The authorities paid little attention to their effective 
leadership, equipment or training, especially of the infantrymen, and then castigated them 
for their indifferent performance. 
Limited Imperial interest and commitment had been evident in Natal before the 
Langalibalele crisis of 1873. After that, and especially after 1878, the grand design of 
confederation (or perhaps more properly , federation2) led to intensified Imperial 
intervention in Natal because of the perceived necessity to weaken or even eliminate, by 
1 
2 
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force of arms, the Zulu power before federation could be achieved. The Natal authorities 
were swept into a wider Imperial dynamic which required them to raise African military 
levies for a purpose other than keeping the peace within the Colony and on its borders. 
Since British and colonial forces to be used against the Zulu kingdom would be insufficient 
in numbers to achieve a convincing victory, these levies were to act in support of them. 
In January 1874, the imperialist Benjamin Disraeli chose the Earl of Carnarvon as his 
Secretary of State for the Colonies . If Carnarvon supported a move towards the federation 
of the British colonies in South Africa , this would transfer the cost of administration and 
internal security from Britain to the new federation; would close the last frontier in 
southern Africa , leaving a consolidated block of British-controlled states in the region; 
would strengthen the Egyptian and Cape links in the strategic trade route to India; and 
allow for the future extension of British hegemony . 3 
To this end , Carvarvon's Federation Despatch of May 1875 was followed by the 
Confederation Conference of August 1876 in London. Stumbling-blocks were evident, and 
measures were taken to remove them. In 1877, Carnarvon appointed Sir Bartle Frere , 
who had served with considerable ability and distinction in British India , as Cape 
Governor and High Commissioner for Southern Africa, with a view to his smoothing the 
path to South African federation . This dual role bestowed upon him far-reaching 
3 
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discretionary powers which stretched beyond the Cape.4 He was to playa major role in 
the machinations which preceded the Anglo-Zulu War. In January 1878, Lieutenant-
General Sir Frederic Thesiger (who became the second Baron Chelmsford in October 
1878, and who will hereafter be cited as Lord Chelmsford) who was more amenable to 
Frere's plans, was appointed in place of Sir Arthur Cunynghame as Commander-in-Chief 
of the Imperial forces in South Africa. 
The Cape Colony was unlikely to enter a federation which might mean sharing the burden 
of war against the powerful Zulu nation. Frere's subsequent actions support the view that, 
in order to facilitate federation , he was determined to subjugate the Zulu and nullify this 
threat. He inveighed against the supposed tyranny of Cetshwayo and his menace to Natal, 
in order to justify military aggression against him.5 
Although Frere's over-riding motivation in fomenting war against the Zulu was to effect 
federation, the causes of the Anglo-Zulu War of 1879 were a not unusual multifarious 
conglomeration of imperial, colonial and personal motives , with here and there an overlay 
of ostensible altruism. A factor of underlying importance was the need for a supply of 
labour for the mines, following the mineral revolution; for the public works undertaken 
by the Natal government; and for the colonial settlers on farms and in towns. All these 
4 
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activities were labour intensive. Frances Colenso's view of the situation was that the 
colonists favoured war because of 
the revenue to be derived from a hut-tax levied upon the Zulus, and the cheap 
labour to be obtained when their power and independence should be broken .. 
6 
It was desired to achieve the increased labour supply by loosening the Zulu king's hold 
on both Zulu and Tsonga labourers to make them more readily available in Natal. The 
isibhalo system had failed to provide the public sector with adequate labour. Both this 
system and the expectation of more lucrative labour opportunities for Natal Africans in 
transport-riding to the diamond-fields and in labour for the mines, increasingly drained 
men away from the private sector which clamoured for labour. 
Frere's ostensible desire to replace supposed Zulu barbarism with Christianity and 
European civilisation, which would placate any objections to aggression against the Zulu, 
is shown in his commendation of the work among them of the Norwegian missionary, 
Bishop Schreuder.7 Bishop Colenso included this motive when he identified Frere's 
intentions. 8 Far from objecting to the proposed conquest of Zululand, two of the 
missionaries from that country, angry at having to withdraw from Cetshwayo's kingdom, 
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king of atrocities,9 and the Reverend Ommund Oftebro wrote to Frere suggesting a 
remedy for the situation which accorded well with the High Commissioner's plans: 
., nothing less than the disarming of the Zulus, the breaking up of their milita.ry 
organization and the appointment of a British resident to watch over the stnct 
1 . . f '1 10 upholding of treaties will .. settle the Zu u questlOn satls acton y. 
Alleged Zulu violations of the Natal border were seized upon to enhance the British case 
against the Zulu, as were methods of punishment of those who fell foul of the Zulu king. 
Once having resolved upon war with the Zulu, Frere had to circumvent the change of 
policy adopted by the Colonial Office. Its momentum towards federation had slowed, and 
British attention was now focused on Russian designs on Mghanistan. Sir Michael Hicks 
Beach, who succeeded Carnarvon in February 1878, did not favour war against the Zulu, 
except in defence,11 hence the early lack of reinforcements. Frere, however, was eager 
to attack the Zulu in their own territory. He took advantage of the fact that, on account 
of the slow communications between Britain and Natal, his despatch concerning the 
December Ultimatum to the Zulu king would arrive too late to be countermanded. 
Chelmsford does not appear to have been enthusiastic about a war against the Zulu. 12 
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Chief was to carry out the military campaign as ordered by Frere, his political chief, of 
whose bellicose intentions he was probably aware as he had been Frere's guest in Cape 
Town during July 1878. 13 After this visit, Chelmsford had accepted Frere's opinion that 
war against the Zulu was inevitable. 14 Early in August, he arrived in Natal to plan the 
invasion of Zululand. 
Before this invasion could become a reality, Frere and Chelmsford would have found it 
necessary to consider the British chances of success and be confident of ultimate victory. 
This would require forces superior to the Zulu in training, tactics and weaponry, although 
not necessarily . in numbers. The possible exploitation of internal divisions in Zululand 
would no doubt also have been considered. 
Since further Imperial reinforcements were not immediately forthcoming, the British forces 
available to Chelmsford in August 1878 were quite inadequate to embark on a full-scale 
war of aggression. In March of that year the Imperial troops in Natal consisted of the 
2/3rd (the 'Buffs') and the 80th (Staffordshire Volunteers) regiments. 15 These troops 
would have needed to be considerably augmented even if only for the defence of the Natal 
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against Langalibalele; and the Natal Mounted Police (formed in 1874),16 could be made 
available. 
When the Colonial Secretary was eventually persuaded that the Zulu threat warranted the 
sending of further Imperial reinforcements, British troops were despatched from the Cape. 
These arrived in time for the first invasion of Zululand. These would still have been 
insufficient to launch a campaign against the Zulu without the addition of thousands of 
African levies called up by the Natal chiefs on the orders of the Supreme Chief, Sir Henry 
Bulwer. 17 The success of the campaign would depend to a large extent, at this early 
stage of planning, on the effective mobilisation of the levies. 
Both Frere and Chelmsford had experience of the employment of levies. Frere, in India 
during the Sepoy Rebellion of 1857, had raised local levies in Sindh18 to keep the peace 
south of the Punjab but some 750 kilometres from the main centre of the troubles. 
Chelmsford had made use of Mfengu levies against the Xhosa in the Ninth Frontier War, 
which ended in May 1878. In this war, Chelmsford's experience of the lack of military 
qualities among the dispersed and weakened Xhosa had ill prepared him for a true 
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Sir Henry Bulwer and the Natal government were tardy in giving permission for the 
required levies to be raised, until they accepted that the Colony might be in danger from 
Zulu incursions. Although on 10 September 1878 Chelmsford gained the consent of the 
Natal Executive Council to establish seven defensive districts in the Colony,20 it was not 
until the end of October that he was given permission to raise 7 000 African levies 'for 
service within or without the border. ,21 This was to be the Special Native Contingent. 
The mobilisation and organisation of the Natal levies was to be the responsibility of 
Lieutenant-Colonel Anthony Durnford, R.E., not Bulwer. Frances Colenso objected 
strongly to the plan. No doubt referring to the Langalibalele crisis, she wrote that 
Durnford 
had had ample opportunity of learning, by experience, how utterly and 
mischievously useless was the plan . . of employing disorganised bodies of natives 
as troops under their own leaders, without any proper discipline and control. 
She declared, further, that these levies would be useless except as messengers, servants 
and camp-followers, and that they were likely to commit lawless violence on wounded or 
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23 f h t I tral'nl'ng and equl'pment of the levies under the Durnford's plan' or t e con ro , 
leadership of European officers and non-commissioned officers, was designed to obviate 
the problems predicted by Frances Colenso . 
When Sir Henry Bulwer, in November 1878, reluctantly allowed levies to be called 
up,24 little time remained to equip and train them. The delay in raising levies was partly 
responsible for the employment of men who were poorly trained, equipped and motivated, 
and lacking in cohesion, and whose morale was therefore generally low. The Acting 
SNA, John Shepstone, was directed by Bulwer to call up the required levies. 
Originally 6 844 levies were raised: 2 022 for the Native Contingent on Line No. I (the 
Coast Line), under Major Barton and Commandant Nettleton; 2 293 for Line No. II at 
Fort Buckingham under Captains Cherry and Montgomery and Major Bengough; and 
2 529 for Line No. III at Rorke' s Drift under Commandant Lonsdale.25 These men 
were to be attached to the British forces poised on the Natal/Zululand border. 
Although these levies had little choice in obeying the call-up, some of them may have been 
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welcomed the opportunity of attacking them in the company of a military force more 
powerful and better equipped than they were. 
The African levies were raised from the chiefs under false pretences. J. W. Shepstone 
reported that he had informed the chiefs that the necessity might arise for him to call upon 
'all or a great part of our people to defend the country, that the Govt ~) had no desire 
to make war .. ,26 Even the prospect of their followers acting on the defensive was 
received by the Umvoti chiefs with misgivings, and they stated 'that the young men who 
had grown up in Natal had never seen war and they did not know how they would behave 
in battle. ,27 Their reluctance would no doubt have been even greater had they known 
that the British army intended using the levies as part of the invading force and not only 
in defence. 
In the wake of the Langalibabele crisis, the defence of the border against possible Zulu 
incursions had been a concern of the Natal government, and to this end units of mounted 
volunteers had been formed: the Buffalo Border Guard in October 1873; the Durban 
Mounted Rifles in November 1873; the Natal Mounted Police in March 1874; and the 
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RM, Charles Boast, was instructed to call out African levies under white levy-Ieaders,29 
to guard the Mzinyathi (Buffalo) border. 
Those farmers, white and African, near the border, although they realised that defensive 
measures might be necessary, were reluctant to leave their homes which would then be 
vulnerable to attack from Zulu who could slip past border posts. However (by January 
1879), when war was inevitable, the RM of Newcastle, W. Beaumont, had established five 
Border Guard posts above the Buffalo border line, with a standing reserve of 100 African 
levies at each, and with a further 200 African men in the neighbourhood to relieve them, 
so that the guard of 100 men changed every three days. One man in ten was armed with 
a ritle. 30 These border levies were raised in addition to those sent forward for the three 
regiments, with a total of seven Natal Native Contingent (hereafter cited as NNC) 
battalions, attached to the British army invading Zululand. 
The border along the Thukela was to be defended similarly. W.D. Wheelwright, RM of 
Umvoti and Commandant of Defensive District VII, had a standing reserve of 500 African 
men in readiness in case of Zulu raids across the river, with further men available when 
a raid was imminent. 31 
Chelmsford was certainly not intending to act only on the defensive. His letter of 11 
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makes it clear that he planned to attack the Zulu, although a month was to elapse before 
the Ultimatum was presented to the Zulu envoys. He declared that once across the border 
'the first blow struck should be a heavy one.' For this offensive, he pointed out, the 
troops at his disposal were inadequate. The colonial forces which he planned to use would 
consist of 125 Natal Mounted Police; 400 mounted volunteers not yet called out; and 'the 
whole of the able-bodied male native population who are liable to be called out under the 
orders of the Supreme Chief .. ' He wrote that three months before, on his arrival in Natal, 
the male African population had had no military organisation and no arms provided by the 
government, and most of the European officers would have had to be brought from the 
Cape.32 
By November, Bulwer was under no illusion as to Chelmsford's intentions, and the 
Lieutenant-Governor stated that he was prepared to call out further African levies 'in case 
of an advance into Zulu country by the attacking column.' He suggested a possible second 
line of levies: a further defensive contingent of 10 000 men, with 2 000 men from each 
of Districts No. I, II and VII, and 4 000 from District No. VI, that is, from a solid block 
of more than half of Natal adjacent to Zululand. District No. III was to call up 2 000, 
District No. IV, 5 000, and District No. V, 3 000: another 10 000 in all from the districts 
farthest away from Zululand. 33 
32 
33 
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The Acting SNA required from the chiefs not only levies for purely military service with 
Chelmsford's force and for the Border Guard along the Thukela and Mzinyathi (Buffalo) 
rivers, but also waggon-drivers, ox-leaders ('voorlopers'), hospital bearers, men to work 
for the Commissariat, and Pioneer Corps personnel for road-building and repair, and for 
other fatigues. 34 The original draft has been recorded: Transport Service 500, Hospital 
Corps 161, Commissariat 75 and Pioneer Corps 300.35 These numbers were augmented 
during the war. A comparison indicates that levies for military service were in greater 
demand than these auxiliaries, many of whom were no doubt transferred from isibhalo 
duties. 
The Pioneer Corps men organised by Durnford were, unlike the other auxiliaries and even 
the African infantrymen, well equipped. Durnford described them in a letter to his mother 




.. 300 pioneers, natives, dressed in Royal Engineer caps, red tunics, and white 
knickerbockers, each man carrying a tool slung, and rifle and bayonet. 36 
SNA 4/1/2/8, LC No. 9/35 pp. 66 - 67 provided by l.W. Shepstone, 
Acting SNA, 17 November 1879; 
SNA 1/1/31, 1878/1501 Acting SNA to Lieutenant-Governor, 18 November 
1878. 
SNA 1/1/33, 1879/60 SNA to RM, Umgeni Division, 10 December 1878; 
SNA 1/1/31, 1878/1607 RM, Alexandra to SNA, 16 December 1878; 
SNA 1/1/31, 1878/1610 Acting RM, Umgeni to SNA, 18 December 1878; 
SNA 1/1/31,1878/1611 Acting SNA to Lieutenant-Governor, 18 December 
1878; 
SNA 1/1/31, 1878/1638 Report of Acting SNA, 27 December 1878 on 
minute of Lieutenant-Governor, 26 December 1878. 
NCP 4/1/2/8 LC No.9 Original return of Native Contingent furnished to 
the Military Authorities by the Acting SNA, 17 November 1879. 
Durnford, A Soldier's Life, p.199. 
242 
The interface between isibhalo labour and military service was evident in January 1879 
when Frere pointed out to Bulwer that, for military purposes, four roads required attention 
and should be repaired under the direction of the Colonial Engineer, viz. the coast line to 
the Thukela; between Botha's Hill and Pietermaritzburg; from Pietermaritzburg to 
Grey town; and from Pietermaritzburg to Helpmekaar via Estcourt and Ladysmith. Bulwer 
passed on this observation to the Colonial Secretary for the attention of Captain Hime, the 
Colonial Engineer. That this was to be dealt with as part of the military strategy was 
apparent since the expenses entailed were to be met by the Imperial government.37 
Since the number of military levies and labourers required was far in excess of the 1878 
isibhalo rate of one man for every thirteen huts,38 the Acting SNA would have had to 
call on many men other than those in the locations to provide the requisite numbers. In 
1877, Sir Theophilus Shepstone had stated that African men living on private lands as well 
as those on locations were subject to military call-up.39 The Attorney-General's opinion 
on this point was that' Any native not exempted .. [from Native Law] is under the power 
of the Supreme Chief .. ' even if he was the servant of a white man.40 The Acting RM, 
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In carrying out the order they [the chiefs and headmen] were told to exhaust. the 
locations first and then if the number was not complete to take unemployed natIves 
from private land. 41 
By carrying out these instructions, the SNA ran the risk of antagonising white farmers. 
In 1881, W. Proudfoot, a farmer, stated that this was indeed the case during the Anglo-
Zulu War, and 'this could not be permitted long. It would create great dissatisfaction 
among the farmers if it was often done. ,42 
Some chiefs, in an effort to complete the numbers required, called up their adherents from 
other divisions. This action was queried, but it was pointed out that it was in order .43 
Chiefs and headmen punished or threatened to punish men who refused to obey the call-
up, by fining them in cattle, because 'compulsion in one form or another is necessary, and 
.. unless they made some show of authority, the required number would not be 
forthcoming. ,44 The chiefs were then instructed not to fine men but to report them to 
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Summary punishment by the chiefs to enforce obedience was therefore made impossible 
and the chiefs' lack of power widened the rift between them and their followers. Not only 
did chiefs have difficulty in locating enough men for their quota, but many of those men 
called up showed reluctance to obey the order. The raising of an efficient and well 
motivated army of levies was crucial to the success of Chelmsford's plans. 
In negotiating rough terrain, horsemen would be invaluable to Chelmsford's three 
columns, because of their greater mobility. Far from showing the same unwillingness to 
serve as the foot-soldiers did, some of the African mounted men came forward willingly, 
for example the Hlongwe (Tlokwa) under Chief Hlubi from the Weenen district,46 and 
Kholwa living on mission lands. In September 1878, Captain Barrow applied for thirty 
horsemen of 'the Basutu tribe under Chief Hlubi .. if required for active service in either 
this colony or country adjacent. ,47 The original return of 307 mounted ' natives' sent 
forward shows that, under the leadership of Captain Shepstone, there were fifty-two of 
Chief Hlubi's Tlokwa and fifty-two Edendale Kholwa. Also under Captain Shepstone 
were 157 of 'Sikhali's men' (Ngwane), while Major Barrow had, under his control, forty-
six men from Chief Jantje (Mqundane) of the Ximba people.48 The Ngwane and the 
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These horsemen received superior equipment and better treatment than the foot-soldiers, 
and this resulted in their greater self-respect, cohesion and higher morale. In addition, 
their being on horseback gave them an advantage over men on foot, as most of the Zulu 
were. 
The military involvement of Natal levies has been well documented in a considerable body 
of edited and published contemporary accounts, letters and official compilations as well 
as in numerous recent secondary works. These have not been especially concerned with 
the extent of the unrelenting and callous exploitation of the African adult male population 
of Natal to serve as military levies and labourers during the Anglo-Zulu War. The 
opposition, by African men, to this exploitation may be indicated by the number of levies 
initially wrung from the African people of Natal in comparison with the early over-
sanguine expectations of the number which could be raised. 
Just as the original rule, that any military or labour levy should come from the ranks of 
unmarried men living in locations, had been waived in the raising of the isibhalo levy, so 
it was ignored in raising military levies for war against the Zulu. Even then, some chiefs 
and magistrates had difficulty in raising the levies called for. The RM, Umsinga, for 
example, complained that the RM, Weenen, had called out some of Chief Mganu's and 
Chief Phakade's men resident in Umsinga to make up their required numbers.49 This 
may have arisen because most of Chief Ndomba's men in the Ween en district were not 
available as they lived on private farms or had gone to work on the diamond-fields or in 
49 
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other parts of the colony. 50 The objection to calling out men from other districts was 
swept aside, when the Acting SNA declared that ' .. any chief has authority when ordered 
by the Supreme Chief to call out men of his tribe even should they be resident in another 
division.'51 By 11 January 1879, perhaps by poaching his men from other districts, 
Chief Phakade had raised more levies (732) than the 600 he was required to send 
forward. 52 
In November 1878, the Acting SNA confidently reported that for service with the regular 
troops on the Lower or Coast Line, he could raise 2 000 men from the Inanda and Lower 
Tugela magistracies, of whom 500 each would come from the Chiefs Mqawe (Qadi) and 
Musi (Qwabe).53 By the end of November only 866 men had come forward, including 
313 from Mqawe and ninety-seven from Musi.54 From the Weenen magistracy, of the 
2000 men called for, only 1 400 had come forward by 18 December 1878.55 
There were some men who came forward willingly for reasons other than loyalty to the 
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cattle diseases, especially lung-sickness (bovine pleuropneumonia) and redwater, were 
rife.56 Both crop-farmers and cattle-farmers faced hard times; and there was a land 
shortage. 57 Pay for levies, in cash and captured cattle, was an attractive prospect to 
men whose economic circumstances were uncertain. 
A strong motivation for some of the chiefs who raised levies was their animosity towards 
the Zulu kingdom. Two such chiefs were Phakade kaMacingwane of the Mchunu people 
and Mkhungo kaMpande, whose hostility was of long standing. Macingwane, Phakade's 
father, had fled from Shaka. His sons, including Phakade, had returned to Zululand in 
Mpande's time, but Phakade, fearing persecution, fled into the Umsinga division of Natal 
towards the end of Dingane's rule.58 Mkhungo, Mpande's son, escaped from 
Cetshwayo to Natal in the 1850s59 and, after a period at Bishop Colenso's Bishopstowe 
mission station, became a chief in the Ween en district, where he was called upon to raise 
300 levies. 6O Sikhota, his brother, who had also fled from Zululand, likewise brought 
levies from the Weenen district to join the 3rd NNe. Norris-Newman remarked on the 
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.. seemed only too anxious to get into Zululand and have a brush with their soi-
. d h· . 61 disant and blood-thirsty relatIves, Cetywayo an IS warnors. 
Also motivated by hostility towards the Zulu were the 300 men of the inDluyengwe, led 
by their induna, Mvubi, who left for Natal after the quarrel between the inGobamakhosi 
and uThulwana regiments in January 1878 over the incorporation of the new draft into the 
latter ibutho. 62 These men, called up by the Weenen magistrate, 63 formed companies 
8, 9 and 10 of Hamilton-Browne's battalion of the NNC. The 8th company under Mvubi 
took a major part in the successful attack on Sihayo's stronghold in January 1879.64 
Durnford, in his memorandum,65 had proposed detailed provisions for the equipment, 
training, pay and rations of the military levies. The realities of the situation were very 
different, and the short time available to make the levies battle-ready exacerbated the 
problems. Early in 1878, the Acting SNA advised that the levies should be armed with 
weapons with which they were familiar; and that they should be commanded by white men 
known to them, who would take an interest in their welfare.66 A hundred men called 
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In thus arming the infantry levies inadequately, the seeds of poor morale, lack of cohesion 
and ineffective action were sown early. The subordinate status of the levies is made clear 
in this statement: 
In order to reduce the risk of thus arming possible enemies, rifles were only issued 
to 10 per cent of the rank and file, while a strong white element of 95 officers and 
non-commissioned officers per battalion was introduced, and no use was made of 
the tribal organisation under which the natives are accustomed to dwell. 68 
It would seem either that the fear of arming these men with firearms overrode any 
consideration of their effectiveness, or that the British and colonial military authorities 
were confident that their own fire-power was sufficient to make up for any deficiencies 
in these auxiliary troops. Also, the Zulu forces were underestimated. Lieutenant-Colonel 
Arthur Harness, writing in 1880, makes this point clear: 
It is certain that none of us valued, to its proper extent, the many military qualities 
possessed by this savage nation: their discipline, their undoubted bravery, their 
disregard for life, and their powers of endurance. 69 
Although the short time between the mobilisation of the levies and the advance into 
Zululand was no doubt a contributory factor in the poor arming and equipping of the 
levies against the Zulu, this was no worse than it had been in previous actions when levies 
had been used against less powerful groups. Perhaps it is an indication that the Zulu were 
regarded as being not much more menacing than these groups. 
The inadequacies of the equipment and rations provided for the levies placed them in a 
position where they were treated by some observers with ridicule and contempt. A jocular 
68 
69 
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and condescending tone is evident in descriptions of the levies, and reflects their generally 
shabby treatment. Lieutenant Coghill described the levies wading through the Mzinyathi 
(Buffalo) at Rorke's Drift with the mounted men as being 'amusing to look at .. with their 
shields, sticks, blankets, feathers and other paraphernalia entering the cold water .. ,70 
The British infantrymen crossed on the punts. This derisory tone is repeated in a letter 
from an officer of the Natal Native Pioneers in describing, with some contradiction, the 
levies' rations: 
Beef rations are issued to them monthly. They would eat up a whole bullock or two 
in one day, and then go without; they are not particular as to its being gamey, which in 
this hot climate it generally is. 71 
The 'ordinary and recognised' ration for one day for a hundred men was one full-sized 
beast. 72 Here again, the levies were treated with contempt, as this was not made 
available to them, according to the Ween en men of the 3rd NNC, whose spokesmen were 
the Chiefs Mkhungo, Sikhota, Ndomba, Mganu and some representatives of Phakade. 73 
These men complained that only a quarter of a beast was issued daily for 100 men, and 
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Pay in cash is recorded for the levies. On enlistment, Mganu's and Phakade's men from 
Umsinga were promised 20/- per month to serve in Commandant Lonsdale's 
contingent. 76 The Commissariat Department was to pay £3 per month for drivers and 
£1 lOs for 'foreloopers' (ox-leaders) as well as their rations,?7 Men called up for the 
Pioneers, whether drivers, 'foreloopers' Of labourers, were informed that they would be 
paid £1 per month. The Military Transport Department, however, paid more: drivers of 
Pioneer carts received from £3 to £5. 78 These rates were not markedly higher than the 
highest isibhalo monthly rate of 15/_79 in 1875, and the 1873 waggon-driver's rate of 
£2 lOs and ox-leader's rate of £1 5s per-month.so 
The expectation of pay in cattle, which would certainly have been an incentive to serve, 
was evident when, after the Anglo-Zulu War, the Inanda magistrate, instructed to pass on 
the Supreme Chief's commendation to chiefs for their good work, reported that they 
mentioned captured cattle promised to them by J. Shepstone and a Mr. Drummond. 81 
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The role of African levies in the expected conflict with the Zulus was perceived by Sir 
Michael Hicks Beach as being that of soldiers effectively drilled and equipped to provide 
for the defence of Natal against 'native attacks. ,82 Chelmsford regarded them as 'troops 
in the field. ,83 Lieutenant-Colonel Durnford stated that the levies called out from 
Richmond, 'should be told they are Fighting Men,,84 However, with little in the way 
of equipment or training to make them battle-ready, the African infantrymen were used 
mainly to reconnoitre;85 to flush out the enemy and bring them to battle (as Lonsdale's 
Mfengu levies had been instructed to do in the Amathole mountains in Marchi April 
1878);86 to assist the Pioneer Corps in the making and repairing of roads;87 to escort 
baggage waggons;88 to seek out and pursue the fleeing enemy;89 and to capture and 
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The report on the disbanding of Lonsdale's 3rd Regiment, NNe, reveals the levies' own 
expectations and their perceptions of their role, and their grievances when these were not 
realised. Their spokesmen indicated their expectations with regard to looted cattle, but 
' .. when they captured cattle and asked for some to kill and eat, according to their custom, 
they were refused .. ,91 
After their disbandment, the 3rd NNe cited further reasons for discontent with their role 
and conditions of service. Grievances of this nature may well have been common to most 
of the levies employed as foot-soldiers, and they would undoubtedly have affected their 
morale. They declared that they could not understand the officers' orders since many of 
these spoke no Zulu. The men were punished by flogging of from six to twenty lashes 
for urinating or washing at certain places, although they had heard no orders concerning 
these matters. 
Further complaints by the Ween en men of the 3rd NNe revealed that they were deployed 
into Zululand in conflict with their own traditions but without their being absorbed into 
the European military milieu. What drill was attempted was incomprehensible and 
pointless to them; their own system of fighting was ignored as was their explanation of 
Zulu fighting tactics; and when out in the field the men were divided into small units and 
dispersed, making them more vulnerable. They were not allowed to kill wounded men.92 




The 3rd NNC men from Klip River made similar statements regarding their reasons for 
returning home after Isandlwana.93 
Hurried into the Zulu campaign with little training and equipment, organised in unfamiliar 
ways by European officers and non-commissioned officers, it is surprising that Lonsdale's 
3rd NNC levies acquitted themselves reasonably well in the attack on Chief Sihayo's 
homestead. Commandant G. Hamilton-Browne's 1st Battalion (four companies of Chief 
Mganu's Thembu, and three companies of the isiQoza faction) was to lead the assault, 
with four companies of the 1st battalion, 24th Regiment, under Captain W. Degacher, 
supported by Commandant Cooper's 2nd battalion, 3rd NNC (six companies of Phakade's 
Mchunu). 
Cooper's men arrived after the main action was over, and were then employed in burning 
Chief Sihayo's umuzi and rounding up about 200 head of cattle.94 After this first 
onslaught, No.8 company of Mvubi's Zulu, led by Captains Dunscombe and Murray ,95 
under Commandant Howard-Browne, kept up a constant fusillade. Chief Sihayo's Zulu 
retreated into caves and poured out a heavy fire which broke No.8 company's line and 
many of them 'turned and ran'. This last statement suggests low morale, but, of the 
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. h N' Co f t' 96 wounded) and minor casualties 'occurred exclusIvely among t e abve n mgen , 
which suggests that the NNC were in the forefront of battle. 
From the commencement of hostilities against the Zulu, the difference in the morale of 
the African infantrymen and their mounted counterparts was marked. In the case of the 
horsemen their higher morale may be ascribed to their greater motivation (as far as the 
Kholwa volunteers were concerned) and their better equipment, as well as their more 
sympathetic leadership by such men as Lieutenant-Colonel Durnford, Captain George 
Shepstone and Lieutenant Davies. 
Norris-Newman described the Kholwa from Edendale, under Lieutenant Davies, as fine-
looking and well mounted, with their own tents, horses and saddles, but with the rest of 
their kit supplied by the government. These men, he wrote, 'did most excellent service .. 
they were all armed with breech-loading rifles; and this, together with the fact of being 
mounted, gave them the confidence which the others always lacked.' He added that 
Captain Barton's Hlongwe horsemen (Chief Hlubi's men) ' .. did not look as smart as 
Lieutenant Davies's troop. ,97 
If contemporary photographs and reliable written evidence are to be trusted, the following 
description of the African infantrymen appears to be erroneous and must refer to mounted 
men: 
96 Norris-Newman, In Zululand, pp. 39, 40. 
97 Ibid., pp. 20,27. 
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It is a great error to suppose that these were without arms, ~ress or .discipline. ?n 
the contrary, a great many of them came to us well armed wIth servIceable-looking 
rifles .. their uniform was neat and .. workmanlike, and consisted of a corduroy 
tunic, or rather patrol jacket, and breeches, ~~th long boots of untanned leather, 
and a broad-leafed sombrero as a head-dress. 
A contemporary photograph of a group of thirteen NNe levies99 (possibly from 
Bengough's 2nd battalion, 1st Regiment) shows men more typical of African infantrymen. 
All of the men in the group are in traditional dress, all with shields, all with assegais, only 
two with firearms (but not bandoliers) and nine of the men have rags tied around their 
foreheads (these were no doubt the red rags issued to all levies, to distinguish them from 
the Zulu). Eight of the men were head-ringed, i.e. married homestead heads, which 
confirms the fact that the Natal government had long abandoned the principle of calling 
on only unmarried men to provide isibhalo labour and military service. 
The morale of the African infantrymen has been slightingly referred to in many primary 
and secondary sources. As they approached the Zululand border for the first invasion they 
were understandably nervous. As the 3rd NNe of No.3 column drew near to the 
Helpmekaar camp, the British forces, marching though dense fog, were constantly on the 
alert and the levies, according to Norris-Newman, 'were rather apprehensive of meeting 
any large body of Zulus who might perhaps have crossed over the Border and be prowling 
about.' Nevertheless, Norris-Newman showed admiration for the more usual cheerfulness 
of the 3rd NNe on the march: 
98 
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Very few horses can walk with them , and it is capital fun marching with a lot, as 
they are not only amusing in their manners and speech, but are also constantly 
enlivening the march by war songs, extempore and otherwise. 100 
On the night of the 21 - 22 January, the force of Natal Mounted Police and other colonials 
under Major J.G. Dartnell and sixteen companies of Lonsdale' s 3rd NNC101 were 
bivouacked on the eastern slope of the Hlazakazi heights. The men were tired and had 
no blankets or food: a recipe for low morale. On the opposite hill (Magogo) a large 
number of Zulus held a strong position, with many fires blazing. Within the British 
hollow square formed on three sides by the 3rd NNC and on the fourth by the Mounted 
Police and Volunteers, with horsemen in the centre, the men were tense. At about 
midnight, a few shots from an outlying picket led to a rush of No. 1 company, 1st 
battalion 3rd NNC, who trampled across the square and stampeded the horses. Men of 
the other battalion on the opposite side ' . . stood firm and freely used their assegais .. ,102 
A further minor alarm took place during the night. The majority of the NNC men had 
stood firm. 
With the main body of No.3 column, augmented by the forces of the No.2 column under 
Lieutenant-Colonel Durnford, in the vicinity of Isandlwana camp, there were two 
companies of the 1st battalion, 1st NNC (240 men) , two companies of the 1st battalion, 
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640 infantry levies in all. By 1 p.m. on 22 January, the Zulu attack being at its height, 
all the British and colonial forces were ranged in defensive order in an arc facing away 
from the Isandlwana mountain. Captain R. Y ounghusband' s company was north of the 
mountain, with Captain W.E. Mostyn's and Lieutenant C.W. Cavaye's companies to their 
right and Lieutenant C.D' A. Pope's company farther right of the line. Mounted men left 
behind in the camp and those who had retreated with Durnford to a defensive position 
were beyond Pope to the south-east. Two companies of the NNC were on Cavaye's right 
and the 'remainder of the Native Contingent was somewhat in the rear of the defensive 
line, and was to have been employed to pursue the enemy when recoiling from the 
attack . . ' 
Far from recoiling, the Zulu advance 'continued steadily and without check or halt.' Soon 
after 1 p.m. the Zulu ranks, outnumbering the defenders by six to one, were within 180 
metres of the NNC men 'who then turned and fled. ,104 Earlier, when the Zulu left 
hom overwhelmed Major F.B. Russell's rocket battery, Captain C. Nourse's No.4, D 
company, 1st battalion, 3rd NNC, sent out in escort, were far behind and returned to the 
camp at the double. 105 When the Zulu forces reached the camp, Captain Krohn's No. 
6 company, 1st battalion, 3rd NNC, in front of the tents , fled. 106 In the last Zulu rush 
No . 9 company, 1st battalion, 3rd NNC under Captain J.F. Lonsdale were ordered to 
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formed a new line and made a brief stand with Captain C.A. Erskine's No.4 company, 
2nd battalion, 3rd NNC (Phakade's men) and the Ngwane.
107 
They then joined the fugitives streaming down towards the Manzimyama river. The 
Ngwane, horse and foot, fell back, while Captain Barry's Mchunu (Phakade's men) of No. 
5 company, 2nd battalion, 3rd NNC stood firm until the Zulu were about 275 metres 
away, then fled. 108 Colonel Bray ' s report, gathered from fugitives the next day, 
declared, 'The Natal Native Contingent, both horse and foot, retired fighting but were 
overpowered by the Zulus.' 109 
The African infantrymen, at a severe disadvantage, since only one man in ten had a 
firearm and only five rounds of ammunition, can hardly be blamed for taking to their 
heels. The mounted men of the Natal Native Mounted Contingent from Durnford's No. 
2 column, were as we have seen, much better equipped in every way to present a more 
resolute face, and this they did. 
P .S. Thompson has described how the three units, comprising three troops of Ngwane 
('Sikhali's Horse') under their induna Nyanda (Zikhali's son) and led by Lieutenants C.D. 
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and Lieutenant A.F. Henderson; and one troop of Edendale Kholwa under Sergeant-Major 
Simeon Kambule and led by Lieutenant H.D. Davies, 'preserved their organization, helped 
cover the retreat of the disorganized troops, and retarded the pursuit of the enemy. ,110 
At Nyezane on 22 January 1879, the same day as the Isandlwana battle, the African levies 
in Colonel C.K. Pearson's No.1 column initially behaved creditably in battle, but were 
hampered by their inadequate weaponry. Having led the column, a company of the 2nd 
Regiment, NNC, dispersed Zulu scouts on Majia's hill. Later, when a large body of Zulu 
appeared on the hill about 365 metres away and directed a heavy fire on them, they 'could 
make no effective reply as only ten in the company, besides the European non-
commissioned officers, carried rifles .. ,' and the company beat a 'hasty retreat.' 111 
Not all retreated, however. Four NNe men died. Pearson reported that few of the 
officers and non-commissioned officers of the NNC could give orders in Zulu. Presumably 
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This hardly suggests low morale in spite of the levies' disadvantages. After the battle, 
with some companies of the British 3rd Regiment (the Buffs), the 99th Regiment and the 
NC . d· d· . th 113 cavalry, the N asslste m Ispersmg e enemy. 
The disaster to British arms at Isandlwana on 22 January was not only viewed with horror 
by the survivors but also with dread by the whole Colony. Chelmsford, reporting on the 
defeat, wrote: 
The effect of this disaster throughout the Colony has already shown itself, and the 
European colonials generally are in great alarm. 
The result of this had been to produce a similar effect upon the native mind, and 
our Native Contingents are beginning to lose heavily by desertion. 114 
Ripples were felt everywhere. The RM, Umsinga, was unable to supply twelve men to 
work the punts at Rorke's Drift because 'the natives have been in a state of panick (§k) 
. .'115 Norris-Newman reported that he found large numbers of government and hired 
baggage waggons stuck at Mooi River because drivers and ox-leaders refused to go 
forward after hearing the 'alarming reports' from Native Contingent fugitives from 
Isandlwana who 'had created almost a panic along their road of flight.' 116 
The 3rd NNC who had been with Hamilton-Browne and had missed the main battle at 
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mission station while their white officers and non-commissioned officers were entrenched 
behind the barricades. Many of the 3rd NNC had deserted by morning, and Commandant 
Lonsdale disbanded the rest. Their meagre kit, except for their blankets, was taken from 
them. 117 Early in February 1879, their grievances were aired118 and some of these 
were redressed. 
Considerable official correspondence followed Glyn's statement that the 3rd NNC had 
deserted at Rorke's Drift, followed by the hospital bearers. 119 
Bulwer's minute gave possible reasons for this action which included the depressing effects 
of the Isandlwana disaster and the cavalier treatment of the levies at Rorke's Drift,120 
He evaded the underlying causes of the low morale of the NNC: poor leadership, training 
and equipment; as did Chelmsford. Bulwer and Chelmsford were side-tracked into an 
acrimonious discussion about the respective merits and demerits of the 'tribal' and British 
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Bulwer and Chelmsford also made much of the men' s fears for their 'homes and 
families d22 and their anxiety about 'their property and belongings.'123 This line of 
thought was pursued when a meeting was called of Major-General Lloyd and the RM of 
Weenen County with the Chiefs Mkhungo, Sikhota (a survivor of the Isandlwana battle), 
Chiefs Ndomba and Mganu and some representatives of Chief Phakade whose men had 
belonged to the disbanded 3rd NNC. There now appeared to be a new use to ~e made of 
the levies which would find them better motivated than they had been in the first invasion 
of Zululand: the border chiefs were to be involved in strengthening the defences of the 
NatallZululand border. 
The chiefs, on being consulted on the matter of preventing a possible inroad of Zulu into 
their territory, declared 'they would resist any invasion to the utmost .. ' and asked that 
they be allowed to fight' in their own way , ' with the assistance of a few white leaders who 
would understand them; and they requested that they be supplied with arms and 
ammunition. Lloyd responded to the chief's requests by suggesting a constant watch on 
the NatallZululand border. As a result, Chief Phakade's men were to guard the left bank 
of the Mpofana (Mooi) river to its junction with the Thukela. Chiefs Ndomba, Mganu, 
Mkhungo and Faku (of Ween en county) would form a continuous chain along the Thukela, 
from Colenso to the crossing of the Grey town and Newcastle roads.124 No doubt, 
having seen the Zulu in action, these men would be more resolute in defence of their 
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The first phase of the use of levies by the British and Natal authorities during the Anglo-
Zulu War ended with the salutary lesson of Isandlwana. Mistakes made were identified: 
the Zulu had been underestimated and could not be opposed by levies on foot, whose 
morale was low because their leadership, training and equipment were inadequate; nor 
should these African foot-soldiers be used as front-line troops. The emphasis should now 
be placed on mounted troops and auxiliaries. Regulations were now clearly laid down for 
their leadership, conditions of service, pay, rations, equipment, compensation for the loss 
of horses, and even badges, instead of the haphazard and inefficient arrangements which 
had existed since levies had first been raised in the 1840s. As a result, the Natal levies 
performed more effectively in the second phase of the Anglo-Zulu War. 
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CHAPTER IX 
The changing role of the military levies during the second 
phase of the Anglo-Zulu War; the First and Second 
Anglo-Boer Wars; and Bambatha's 'Rebellion' 
The second invasion of Zululand during the Anglo-Zulu War of 1879 ushered in a new 
phase in the use of African levies from Natal. In view of the Isandlwana experience, it 
was necessary for the Imperial government to provide larger numbers of British troops to 
bring the war to a successful conclusion, l and ensure the imposition of colonial 
government throughout the Zululand-Natal area. Less reliance was to be placed on 
African levies whose role was now regarded in a different light. 
In the nervous months following the Isandlwana rout, the folly of expecting efficient 
martial action from poorly armed and untrained levies had become clear. Measures were 
taken locally along the Mzinyathi (Buffalo) border to strengthen the levies, who were to 
be employed in defensive positions, with better arms and training. At Ladysmith, the RM , 
D. Moodie, drilled the African levies in the Laager Guard and trained them in the use of 
firearms. At Fort Bengough, built between Umsinga and Sandspruit, with a garrison of 
1 000 men, which included levies, 300 more Martini-Henry rifles and 200 Sniders were 
issued, and rifle practice was introduced. At the end of March, Bulwer himself ordered 
1 In the first invasion, about 7 000 white troops and 9 000 African men were 
engaged; in the second invasion, some 15 660 and 6 885 respectively. 
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that Enfield rifles be sent to the Umsinga border levies.2 The 3rd battalion Natal Native 
Contingent at Kranskop was armed with Sniders and muzzle-Ioaders.
3 
The weakness in 
weaponry and training was at last addressed, but only to a limited extent, in strengthening 
the border defences. General regulations regarding these matters were still to be put into 
effect. 
A major conflict of interests and opinions arose between Bulwer and Chelmsford regarding 
the control and use of the levies,4 especially in border defence and cross-border raids. 
The military objective was to prosecute the war to a successful conclusion; while the civil 
authority, reluctant to go to war in the first place,was more concerned about the immediate 
local consequences of the measures proposed by Chelmsford, and favoured a defensive 
stance only. Chelmsford, for his purpose, required full control over all combatants 
whether in Natal or Zululand, so that levies could, if necessary, raid into Zululand at his 
command. Bulwer, on the other hand, claimed that, as Supreme Chief and Lieutenant-
Governor of Natal, he should retain authority over at least the District Commanders of the 
defensive districts, the Police and Border Guard, although he had surrendered authority 
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Chelmsford continued to gnaw at the controversy over the respective merits and demerits 
of the tribal and regimental systems of organising the levies, and the question of who 
should ultimately be in command of the Natal levies involved in the war: the Lieutenant-
Governor as Supreme Chief or Lieutenant-General Lord Chelmsford as military 
commander. 6 This vacillation continued in spite of Frere's earlier directive that no more 
time should be lost. In addition, as far as the levies were concerned, Chelmsford was 
instructed to indicate what measures should be adopted by the colonial forces for defence, 
and to specify the levies whom the Natal government should call out for offensive 
purposes, i.e. for the second invasion of Zululand. Also, that he 'should describe the 
organisation and armament' he thought 'requisite in either case. ,7 
The question of who was in command of the levies was finally resolved when the 
Secretary of State for War, Sir Michael Hicks Beach, supported Chelmsford's claim and, 
on 19 May, declared that the full command of all troops, whether 'black or white,' lay 
with Chelmsford. 8 The Lieutenant-General was later to change his views, relying on the 
additional Mrican levies raised after Isandlwana to defend the border, while the First and 
Second Divisions of the British invasion force (which included the NNC and Mounted 
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There was clearly a need to call out further levies, but their role, organisation, equipment, 
pay and rations needed to be regularised and not be dependent upon ad hoc and localised 
decisions. Early in February, a Mr. Bowker advocated a levee en masse of the whole of 
the African [adult male] population in three divisions under major chiefs and other men 
of influence, led by white, Zulu-speaking officers, to defend the border and their own 
locations. Although Bowker's plan was for defence, not attack or invasion into Zululand, 
the Acting SNA, in his comments, wrote that those who fought in Zululand, might have 
a share in looted cattle. 10 
At the end of February, Arthur Mesham of the SNA's office put forward a more detailed 
but similar scheme designed to raise 48 000 levies. 11 Although the suggested number 
of levies which could be raised was put at too high a figure, Sir Henry Bulwer, as a result 
of Mesham's suggestions, required the SNA's office to draw up rules and regulations for 
'the government of native levies,' and a regular scale of pay and rations.12 
Within a few days this was carried out. The Acting SNA, J. W. Shepstone, issued 
regulations regarding pay: liberal for a European officer (the highest pay in this category 
was £1 las per day and rations for himself and his horse for a commander of a 'native' 
corps of not less than 500, while the lowest pay was 10/- per day and rations for a 
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was less generous: from £5 per month for a chief or headman to £2 per month for a 
mounted trooper and £1 per month for an ordinary levy on foot. 13 These distinctions 
reflect ingrained British class as well as racial categories: officers and men, and white and 
African were not to receive equal treatment. Of course, the responsibility of an officer was 
greater than that of lesser ranks, and should presumably have been rewarded accordingly. 
Rations of meat and meal for 'Native Officers' and 'Natives' were laid down by 
regulation, and were no longer dependent upon the whim of the commissariat. A chief 
or headman received 4 lbs (1.8 kg) of meat per day and 1 ~ lbs (681 grams) of meal, 
while 'each Native' received lIb (454 grams) of meat and 2 lbs (908 grams) of meal per 
day .14 Badges and equipment for levies remained minimal: red bands around their 
heads; guns or assegais and shields; blankets or greatcoats; and cooking pots. 15 The 
Acting SNA (A. Mesham at this time) issued regulations for the 'Internal Government of 
any Native Corps or Tribe.' He devoted three paragraphs to their leadership and 
organisation, and laid down procedures to deal with any complaints. The second and larger 
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neglect of duty or misconduct. 16 Mesham's recipe for an efficient, professional force 
was concerned with punitive measures rather than incentives or training. 
Investigations after Isandlwana into complaints made by levies and the realisation of their 
ineffectual use made it clear to the authorities that no victory over the Zulu would be 
possible if the army had to rely on African levies equipped and organised as they had been 
during the first invasion of Zululand. Frere, Bulwer and Chelmsford were among those 
involved in considering improvements in arms, pay and compensation for the loss of 
horses. 
Bulwer maintained that 'a far larger proportion of men must be armed with firearms in 
fighting against the Zulus. ,17 Colonel A.H. Mitchell wrote that 1 700 more Enfields 
were being obtained from the Cape to arm levies, but he inclined to the view that 'the 
assegai is a more deadly weapon than the firearm in native hands.' 18 He took no 
cognisance of the report that he himself had forwarded to the High Commissioner, which 
stated that a large number of Ngwane footmen of Zikhali's chiefdom had been marched 
into action at Isandlwana armed only with assegais which they had had no opportunity of 
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Mter Mitchell had made his statement, Sir Henry Bulwer also doubted the efficacy of 
firearms rather than assegais in the hands of levies, although he conceded that the 
possession of firearms gave the men more confidence. 20 
Mitchell also reported an increase in pay and presumed that those who had lost horses 
would be compensated,21 as indeed they were from the end of April. However, again 
there were distinctions between rates paid to European officers (£20), 'native officers' 
(£15) and 'natives' (£10) for horses lost by death in action, by accident or sickness. 22 
Towards the end of March, Frere summed up the role and capabilities of the levies as he 
saw them, reducing them to auxiliaries only, and not front line troops: 
... they can be disciplined to act with European troops, and to be most efficient as 
light troops to skirmish, to examine difficult ground and thick cover, to feel 
positions, and to act as outlying posts and prevent surprises. 
But to stand an attack of overwhelming numbers they are of course not equal to 
Europeans. 23 
Since there was no marked overall improvement in the levies' arms, incentives and 
training, their role had to be modified. Frere's analysis of this role did not, however, 
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the fleeing enemy and the killing of the wounded. Another use made of the levies is clear 
from this statement: 
Two companies of natives made up the force, which perhaps was the largest patrol 
ever furnished in this war for such a duty as the burning of kraals.
24 
When the news of the Isandlwana debacle reached Britain, reinforcements were sent from 
the United Kingdom, Ceylon, St. Helena and Mauritius to strengthen Chelmsford's forces, 
the first troops leaving from February 1879. A total of 9 548 officers and men arrived 
in Natal during March and early April and some 866 reached Durban only on 4 June.25 
While, in the first invasion of Zululand, 44% of the troops had been white and 56% 
African, this proportion, in consequence of these reinforcements, was very different in the 
second invasion, being 69% and 31 % respectively. 26 Chelmsford's plea for 
reinforcements received a response so overwhelming that transport and supply became 
major problems;27 and the new emphasis on 'white troops underlined the distrust in our 
native levies,28 arising from their relatively poor performance in Glyn's column. 
The arrival of the reinforcements provided a considerable stiffening for Chelmsford's army 
in the second invasion of Zululand. No doubt his hopes were high that victory would be 
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colonial army. However, Chelmsford was to find out that extreme nervousness of the 
expected ferocity of the Zulu was not confined to the African levies from Natal, and that, 
on the contrary, these levies fought effectively when well armed. 
On 12 March, not long before the bulk of the reinforcements began to arrive, Lieutenant 
H.H. Harward of the 80th Regiment, by no means a raw recruit, galloped off to 
Luneburg, ostensibly to obtain reinforcements, when his men were surprised by a large 
Zulu force on the banks of the Ntombe river. His explanation was accepted by the Court-
Martial of 20 February 1880, and he was acquitted of cowardice. However, when the 
case came before Sir Garnet Wolseley for review, he recorded his disapproval of the 
verdict: 
The more helpless the position in which an officer finds his men, the more it is his 
bounden duty to stay and share their fortune, whether for good or ill. 29 
By 29 March, Chelmsford was ready to send two brigades to the relief of Eshowe, 
besieged since 23 January: the advance division under Lieutenant-Colonel Law, R.A, and 
the rear division under Lieutenant-Colonel Pemberton, 60th Rifles, with Chelmsford 
himself accompanying them. On their way to Eshowe, at the Gingindlovu battle of 2 
April, in which these divisions were engaged, the NNC,30 in their role as support troops 
and in pursuing the fleeing Zulu, behaved with considerable spirit. In the pursuit, Major 
Barrow's Mounted Infantry, using their sabres, were followed by the NNC on foot. After 
half an hour only wounded Zulu remained behind, 'most of whom,' wrote Norris-
29 
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Newman, 'were unfortunately killed by our natives. ,31 By this time, the 4th Battalion 
NNC, at least, was armed with Martini-Henry rines, which, wrote Norris-Newman, ' .. 
put them more on a footing of equality with the enemy, and certainly gave them more 
confidence and pluck. ,32 
After the relief of Eshowe, which was effected on 3 April, Chelmsford's column started 
back towards the Thukela. Early on the morning of 6 April, a sentry of the 91st 
Regiment33 fired a shot at what he thought were Zulu. A picket of the 60th Rifles
34 
and some of John Dunn's scouts35 raced back into the entrenchment. The men of the 
60th Regiment within the fortification shot or bayonetted five of their own men and nine 
of Dunn's scouts. 36 
Further examples of this kind of apprehension regarding the Zulu, especially after 
Isandlwana, were evident on other occasions, and were not confined to African levies from 
Natal. Lieutenant-Colonel Evelyn Wood wrote slightingly of the African men under his 
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... I confess to being somewhat weary of struggling with demoralised Blacks who 
desert every time a Zulu dog barks . . 37 
These men with Wood have been confusingly identified as 'Native Contingent, ,38 which 
seems to indicate that they were levies of the NNC. In fact they were Wood's Irregulars, 
who were mainly Swazi, led by Major Leet and Commandant Loraine White; and Zulu 
defectors of Chief Hamu kaNzibe's people, under Lieutenant Williams.39 They were 
employed in capturing cattle,40 and, after the battle at Khambula on 29 March, in 
pursuing the neeing Zulu, of whom 'great numbers were killed with assegais. ,41 Also 
with Wood were seventy-four 'Mounted Basutos,42 (probably most of these were from 
Chief Hlubi's Hlongwe - Tlokwa -). These formed part of Lieutenant-Colonel Buller's 
force of 669 horsemen and were doubtless in the pursuit. They later acted with 
considerable courage at Ulundi. 43 
By mid-April, most of the reinforcements from Britain and the colonies had arrived. 44 
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task to reorganise his forces, and to assign Mrican horsemen, foot-soldiers and auxiliaries 
such as pioneers and waggon-drivers to various sections of his army. He divided his 
forces into new divisions. No. I Division (formerly the No . I or Coastal Column), under 
Major-General H.H. Crealock, consisted of two brigades, one at Gingindlovu and one on 
the lower Thukela. This division included some 2 000 men of the 4th and 5th battalions, 
NNC,45 Jantze's Native Horse from Ixopo (from mid-May),46 and Mafunzi's Mounted 
Natives,47 as well as the 'Amazuma Corps' of fifty mounted men from Chief Lugaju's 
Nxamalala people, who owned numerous horses. 48 No.4 Column under Wood became 
Brigadier-General Wood's Flying Column [Wood had been promoted], and now included 
Captain Cochrane's Natal Native Horse (117 men) from the Edendale Mission, and 
Captain Nolan's non-combatant Natal Native Pioneers (104 men) based initially at 
Khambula. 49 No. II Division, under Major-General Newdigate in the north, included 
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The Cavalry Brigade, eventually attached to the 2nd Division, was encamped near Lord 
Chelmsford's headquarters in Durban, and had 108 'natives attached,' listed as 
'Amangwani Scouts' and 'Amatonga' (or Amaboma).51 These 'natives attached' were 
Ngwane and Bomvu respectively. 52 
In the first invasion of Zululand, which led to the Isandlwana defeat of British and colonial 
troops; and their signal victory at Rorke's Drift, the British could afford to be supercilious 
about the comparison between the often poor morale of the African levies and the stand 
made by the seasoned troops, especially of the 24th Regiment, at both battles. These men 
had been welded together in their campaign in the eastern Cape. Major C. F. Clery, Staff 
Officer to Colonel Glyn, referring to the night scare of 21 - 22 January on the Hlazakazi 
heights, could write in February 1879: 
The certainty that the first result of a night attack would be that our native allies 
would at once bolt was not reassuring. They fully confirmed this estimation of 
their character by actually attempting to do so when one of our guns went off by 
accident. 53 . 
In the second invasion of Zululand many of the young soldiers, sent out to Natal with the 
flood of reinforcements for the British army, were untried raw recruits whose morale was 
suspect even when stiffened by the presence of veterans. Some of the veterans had 
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propensities lost nothing in the telling when related to the new arrivals. It is not 
surprising that Frank Russell remarked after Ulundi: 
What strikes one more than anything is the extraordinary funk which the Zulus 
inspired between Isandlwana and Ulundi. After the disaster there seems to have 
been utter prostration .. 54 
The young recruits and the NNC were blamed for several night scares which occurred 
while the British and colonial troops were advancing on Ulundi. It would appear, 
however, that senior officers were not immune to the general nervous apprehension. 
Major C.F. Clery, at this time staff officer to Wood, writing from 'Fort Funk' [Fort 
Newdigate] described a 'disgraceful scare' on 6 June. In this incident heavy firing from 
both artillery and infantry came from the pickets whose field officer had ordered the firing 
of volleys, and from N. Battery, 6th Brigade, RA, whose commanding officer, Major F.L. 
Le Grice, had ordered his battery to open fire. 55 Frightened transport mules, plunging 
about in the laager, added to the confusion, which had been caused by clouds crossing the 
moon 'which had somewhat the appearance of advancing bodies of men .. ,56 
With the men's nerves on edge, it is not surprising that, as they moved nearer to Ulundi, 
further night alarms took place. One such occurred on 1 July. A sentry fired at NNe 
officers returning from visiting their outposts. The shots alarmed the NNC outside the 
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young soldiers of the 1st Battalion, 24th Regiment, left their position and got under the 
waggons.57 A similar alarm took place on the night of the 3 - 4 July, not surprisingly, 
since the Zulu were heard all night 'singing war songs and making a curious weird 
humming noise, firing guns, etc: ,58 enough to unsettle the strongest nerves. 
The blame for the low morale of part of the invading army was laid on the presence of 
untried young men who had arrived with the reinforcements; and to the short-service 
system. In order to encourage volunteers, Lord Cardwell, Secretary of State for War, in 
his Army Enlistment Act of 1870, had provided for enlistment for twelve years: six with 
the colours and six with the reserve, although men living in Britain could pass into the 
reserve after only three years. Earlier, enlistment had been for ten years, with the option 
of serving twenty-one years in order to qualify for a pension. 59 
Major c.P. Clery declared that 'the young soldiers who have recently come out are in a 
mortal funk of the Zulus. ,60 Major Robinson wrote' .. one could not help feeling that 
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8 July, Major Clery wrote to Alison about the evident weaknesses of the new draft: ' ... 
the exceedingly low morale of our young soldiers and all those in the new regiments out 
here.' He put this down 'to their being so very young and having no nucleus of old 
soldiers to form their characters on .. ' He also blamed the system of laagering every 
camp, adopted since Isandlwana, as ' .. the reinforcements .. have been taught to consider 
themselves in danger whenever they were outside strong entrenchments. ,62 
Other critics, analysing the situation later, also deplored the short-service system and the 
quality of the new arrivals, some of whom, it appears, arrived independently. Not only 
were the regular army men affected by them, but also the African levies, according to 
Frank Russell. He wrote: 
Every sort of scapegrace and ne'er-do-well in England seems to have turned up 
here, and nearly all got employment in the native levies or elsewhere, and to this 
I trace very much the failure of the auxiliaries .. 
He deplored the short-service system and the 
horrid practice of filling up regiments by volunteers from others. They are always 
the scrapings who have no esprit de corps and come to regiments where they are 
known neither to officers nor to non-commissioned officers .. 63 
Captain C. Lacon Harvey added his voice to this disapproval of 'The evil of young 
soldiers .. ' and maintained: 
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An army constituted entirely of short-service volunteers with?ut the tone. and 
individuality which general conscription gives to it, cannot I belIeve, be a relIable 
force. 64 
Even harsher criticisms of the morale of the young, short-service British soldiers were 
recorded. They were described as 
raw, sickly, unseasoned and untutored boys, who, being the sweepings of half the 
regiments in her Majesty's service, could not possibly have any feeling of 
communion, or traditional sympathy, with the corps into which, before a 
formidable enemy, they found themselves pitchforked ... they had the appearance 
of a mongrel pack, unused to discipline, and useless in the field ... 65 
The reasons for the poor morale of the new recruits in the British reinforcements were 
thus given: fear of the Zulu, their youth, their inexperience in war, the short-service 
system which partly accounted for their inexperience and for the lack of the steadying 
influence of long-serving men and of esprit de corps as the men were not known to 
officers and non-commissioned officers in regiments into which they were newly drafted. 
Except for the matter of youth, all these characteristics can be seen in the Mrican levies 
and the system which enlisted them. Some, from personal experience, had good reason 
to fear the Zulu. Called up for a brief period before hostilities began, and given minimal 
training, they were inexperienced in war itself, as well as being unfamiliar with its 
discipline and rationale as waged by the British. Their service was short indeed, being 
the few months of the duration of the war. The only veterans among them were those 
who had served, very briefly, as levies against chiefdoms, especially the Hlubi, who had 
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fallen foul of the colonial authorities. When few officers and non-commissioned officers 
in command of the levies could speak Zulu, loyalty and esprit de corps could hardly be 
expected. The African infantry levies were not volunteers, as the British recruits were, 
but conscripts who were not always enthusiastic about the job in hand. However, even 
some of these, in spite of these disadvantages, came in for some praise. On 
reconnaissance towards Isandlwana, during the second invasion, the actions of Major 
Bengough's 'native' battalion (part of the 2nd Battalion, NNC) under Major Black are thus 
recorded: 'The manner in which Bengough's well-trained men scoured and scouted was 
most gratifying to observe' .66 
Again, in the second phase of the war, the mounted African troops, better equipped, 
armed and led than the African infantrymen, and with a record of successful enterprises 
in the past, performed military actions with panache. On the approach to the site chosen 
for the Ulundi battle, Buller's men of the Frontier Light Horse were 'well supported by 
Shepstone and his Basutos, who skirmished splendidly .. ,67 
Some of the horsemen of the Ixopo Native Contingent (hereafter cited as the INC) raised 
for border defence in March, proved to be an exception to the general rule that the morale 
of the mounted levies was higher than that of those on foot. Recruited from District No. 
4 on the Mpondo border, they lived too far away from the Natal-Zulu border to have any 
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soon waned, and by the end of April, the RM, Ixopo, forwarded the roll of deserters from 
the INC: 253 footmen and 112 mounted men. 69 Once these men had returned home, 
the remaining INC levies, horse and foot, assisted, with some success, in defending the 
Natal-Zulu border and taking part in Major A.C. Twentyman's raid on 20 May.70 
At Ulundi, the last significant encounter of the Anglo-Zulu War, the steadying training and 
discipline of even the short-service British troops, the importance of mounted troops, 
including African men, and the reduced role of the African infantry levies, were all 
evident. The Gatlings and heavy guns of the artillery were placed on the perimeter of the 
hollow rectangle formed on the open plain. In line with these were the British infantry 
companies in close formation preparatory to taking up the traditional positions of the 
British 'square'. Bengough's levies of the 2nd Battalion, NNC and Wood 's Irregulars 
were in the centre of the rectangle, with the ammunition and tool carts and the 'Bearer 
Company' (presumably the Natal Pioneers and 'natives attached' to the medical corps). 
This formation moved forward shortly before 8 a.m. on 4 JUly, with the horsemen of 
Wood's Flying Column, led by Lieutenant-Colonel Buller; and the 17th Lancers and 1st 
Dragoon Guards under Colonel Drury-Lowe in support. By 9 a.m. all the mounted men 
had retired within the rectangle. 71 
Battle commenced when the Zulu advanced in their crescent attacking formation , and the 
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to Archibald Forbes, 'Lads of the new regiments, who had never seen a shot fired in 
anger, were as cool as the seasoned veterans of the 13th and 80th. ,72 Their discipline 
and drill stood them in good stead in a situation for which they had been trained. 
When the Zulu attack began to falter, the horsemen prepared to act. Chelmsford ordered 
Drury-Lowe's men out of the 'square' in pursuit. The Zulu, faced with the terrifying 
charge of the arme blanche, were dispersed. Buller's men followed up the British cavalry 
and joined in the rout, picking off the fleeing Zulu.73 Among them, the Natal Native 
Horse, under Captain W.F.B. Cochrane of the 32nd Light Infantry, who had fought with 
success at Hlobane and Khambula, now 'distinguished themselves .. by their dash.' They 
exceeded their duty when Colonel Buller ordered them to draw the Zulu closer to the 
'square.' An account in the Cape Journal describes their exploits: 
Instead of firing a few shots and falling back, they made a stand and poured volley 
after volley into the advancing masses of the enemy. When told to retreat they 
asked their officers what was now to become of them? They were under the 
impression that they had to remain outside the square, and wait patiently until they 
were all killed ... The Basutos retreated sullenly. They thought it would be more 
exciting to die fighting than when flying, but when they drew near the glittering 
line of bayonets and saw the veteran 13th open a way for them to enter into the 
square, they saw that they were not to be aimlessly sacrificed ... A few minutes 
after the Lancers swept out .. the Basutos dashed out.. 74 
The British cavalry and the African horsemen had thus played a vital role in winning the 
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Chelmsford's terse description of the role assigned to the African levies on foot indicates 
how much this role had been reduced. Having taken no active part in the battle proper, 
'The Native Contingent forming a part of the garrison were sent out after the action, and 
assisted in the pursuit, ,75 that is, they pursued the fleeing enemy and killed the 
wounded. 
Further changes in the use of African levies took place after the arrival in Natal, on 28 
June, of General Sir Garnet Wolseley . He superseded Sir Bartle Frere as High 
Commissioner, Sir Henry Bulwer as Governor of Natal, and Lord Chelmsford as 
Commander-in-Chief of the British army in South Africa, and none of these men could 
gainsay him. Arriving too late to rob Chelmsford of his Ulundi triumph, Wolseley's task 
as he saw it, was to put his stamp on the final demise of the Zulu power and the 
submission of all the Zulu chiefs. In order to achieve this, his plan was to capture the 
Zulu king and pacify north-western Zululand.76 He also intended to solve the major 
problems of transport and supply which had plagued Chelmsford. In all these endeavours, 
African levies raised from the Natal chiefdoms were to take part. 
Lieutenant-Colonel C.M. Clarke's column, formed from the disbanded 1st Division, and 
including Jantze's Native Horse, Mafunzi ' s Horse, the 4th Battalion NNC (Barton 's 
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companies of Barton's 'Natives' to its numbers, and included Shepstone's Native Horse), 
were to assist in capturing the Zulu king and inducing the Zulu chiefs to submit to 
Wolseley in person. Major R.J.C. Marter of Clarke's column was ordered to pursue 
Cetshwayo into the Ngome forest to which he had fled. With Marter were two companies 
of the 4th NNC, useful for searching through rough terrain where horsemen could not 
ride. In the last few hours before the capture of Cetshwayo, one of these companies, with 
Major Marter, entered a steep valley on foot and assisted in surrounding the KwaDwasa 
homestead, where Cetshwayo was captured.78 
Lieutenant-Colonel Baker Russell's column, made up from Wood's disbanded Flying 
Column, moved on to pacify north-western Zululand. There, trouble was expected from 
the Quluzi and from Manyonyoba, a former Swazi chief owing allegiance to Cetshwayo. 
Russell was to be supported by a column from the Transvaal under Lieutenant-Colonel the 
Honourable G. Villiers, stationed at Luneburg; a Swazi force; and Hamu's men. With 
Russell were Major Bengough's 2nd Battalion NNC and Shepstone's Native Horse, 
Jantze's 'natives' and Mafunzi's 'natives,' and later, Thetheleku's Horse. 79 
Lieutenant-Colonel W. Black, under Russell's command, was ordered to advance against 
Manyonyoba on the Ntombe river, with a force of mounted infantry and Thetheleku's 
Horse. Thetheleku, chief of the Mphumuza people in the Umgeni division, had, in 
78 
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February 1879, been expected to raise a hundred horsemen and fifty footmen. 80 Two 
hundred and fifty-three men came forward and were placed in the Reserve Levies to 
defend the Mzinyathi river border.81 With the Natal Native Pioneers they had formed 
part of the garrison at Fort Melvill in August 1879.82 
In the operations against Manyonyoba, Thetheleku's men, on hearing a shot fired, acted 
with brutal enthusiasm by killing Zulu prisoners left in their charge,83 thus spoiling the 
chance of negotiation. The behaviour of the Natal levies in this instance and in other 
engagements when the British were in control of a situation, especially after a battle such 
as Ulundi, where they were victorious, and their earlier less assured behaviour when the 
Zulu appeared to be an overwhelming and invincible force, suggests that there was some 
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that we were winning in any fight that they could be got to fight at all. So though 
the natives magnified our numbers, they were under certain conditions a decided 
source of weakness; yet, on the other hand, it was expected that when we were 
successful they would be most useful in following up the enemy. 84 
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In spite of the robust behaviour of Russell's column, north-western Zululand was finally 
pacified only as a result of Wolseley's settlement in September 1879. 
Wolseley's attempt to solve the transport and supply problem began when, on 30 June, he 
met seventy Natal chiefs and outlined his plan for providing carriers whom the chiefs 
agreed to raise among their followers. These men were to retain what weapons they had, 
i.e. assegais, were to carry a load of approximately twenty-five kilograms, would be paid 
30/- a month besides rations, and be provided with a blanket and a soldier's coat. Two 
thousand of these porters were to come from Captain Lucas's force of 3 500 on the lower 
Thukela, many of whom had been raised to defend the border. Initially, they were to join 
Crealock's First Division under the control of seven European officers and twenty 
izinduna. 
Carrying maize bags on their heads, they were marched from the lower Thukela at Fort 
Tenedos, to Fort Chelmsford. There were some desertions en route. From Fort 
Chelmsford their commander, Major Schwabe, took them to Port Durnford, since they 
were to ply between this port and St. Paul's, bringing supplies inland. They were 
disbanded in September 1879.85 This arrangement worked well in rough country, but 
was wasteful compared to ox-waggons on a good road.86 
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Although they were armed, these African levies had virtually become labourers, as were 
the Natal Native Pioneers raised earlier in November and December 1878, who served 
with No.1, 2 and 3 Columns in the first invasion of Zululand, while some served later 
with Wood's Column. 87 Perhaps this emphasises the British and colonial perceptions 
of the Natal African people as being primarily a labour force to be exploited. 
Although the Natal African levies had their limitations for reasons already discussed, and 
many of the men called up failed to appear, it is remarkable that no chiefdoms, especially 
those near the Zulu border, who had social links with the Zulu over the river, took 
advantage of the situation to mobilise against the colonial power and join the Zulu. The 
fear that this might happen was certainly in the minds of some Natal colonists. As Dean 
Green pointed out: 
After Isandlwana, new-comers like the military thought our natives would rise; but 
their wives, children, waggons, cattle, etc., were in the colon~, so they made 
common cause with us, and showed themselves zealously loyal. 8 




All through the War the Natives behaved admirably. Every movement was watched 
with the greatest anxiety, and thoughtful men saw and understood the magnitude 
of the struggle which was going on, and what the dreadful results of a reverse or 
invasion would be; and yet, there was never a shadow or thought of desertion or 
treason. They felt that our interests were one. 89 
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This was again confirmed in the statement by the Lower Tugela chiefs following the 
announcement to them of the Legislative Council's resolution which expressed appreciation 
for the levies' services. 90 They conveyed 
the assurance of their continued loyalty as well as that of the natives under their 
charge and their determination to uphold the authority of the Government.91 
The emphasis on African levies as labourers and, to a lesser extent, mounted scouts, was 
again evident during the First and Second Anglo-Boer Wars. However, in 1906, when 
defence and warfare were placed in the hands of the Natal authorities during Bambatha' s 
'rebellion,' a dramatic return was made to the use of levies as front line troops at the 
beginning of hostilities. 
In pursuance of Lord Carnarvon's confederation scheme, but with doubtful wisdom, 
considering the de stabilisation and opposition to which this act would give rise, Sir 
Theophilus Shepstone, Her Majesty's Special Commissioner, annexed the South African 
Republic in April 1877.92 At that time the republic was too weak to evict Shepstone, 
but by December 1880, the decision was made to resist the loss of independence. The 
republican forces invaded Natal, inflicting a severe defeat on the British troops at Majuba 
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cessation of hostilities, and, in August 1881, to the Pretoria Convention which restored 
self-government to the Republic.93 
Until the signing of this treaty, the British forces were to remain in readiness for further 
acts of war. To this end not only Natal European colonial troops but also African men 
were called up throughout Natal as cot-bearers for the medical department, drivers and ox-
leaders for the Imperial transport department, and as mounted scouts. At first the most 
pressing need appeared to be for men to serve as grooms, waggon-drivers and ox-
leaders,94 in order to keep the army mobile and well supplied. However, by the end 
of March, there was no longer an urgent demand for African auxiliaries for service with 
the Imperial transport service,95 no doubt because a settlement with the South African 
Republic was expected. However, those who had been employed for three months by the 
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were less in demand. 97 Only a handful of mounted scouts were called for. Chief 
Ncwadi of the Ngwane supplied seventeen,98 and Chief Thetheleku from Umgeni sent 
forward scouts who were presumably mounted, but they were unsatisfactory and 'more 
intelligent men' were requested as replacements. 99 This indicates that the chiefdom's 
enthusiasm for the war was not great as the best men were not sent. Pay was low. 30/-
per month with rations was offered for commissariat grooms and men attached to the 
Imperial transport department in January and February; 100 but in March, pay offered 
to first class drivers was from 60/- to 80/- per month, while the pay for ox-leaders 
remained 30/- plus rations. 101 Perhaps the reluctance of some African men to 
serve102 accounted for this new incentive for drivers. 
A further interface between levies and isibhalo workers and an indication of the emphasis 
placed on Natal African men as little more than an exploitable labour force is evident 
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from a military point of view. When magistrates asked questions about service, pay and 
rations, they were ordered, in a peremptory manner, to comply with the order and send 
forward 200 men from Inanda, Tugela, Ixopo and Alfred. 103 
Throughout the First Anglo-Boer War, except for a limited number of mounted 
scouts,104 the role of Natal levies was seen as that of a labour force. Before the 
Second Anglo-Boer War, major changes had taken place, affecting Natal's political 
position as well as her situation vis-a-vis her African population. In 1893 the Imperial 
government had granted responsible government to Natal. Imperial troops were to remain 
in Natal for another five years to allow the colony time to organise her own defences. 
Thereafter there was to be a gradual withdrawal of the Imperial forces. The passing of 
the Volunteer Act of 1895 was part of the Natal scheme to arrange for her own 
defence. 105 
The Anglo-Boer War of 1899 - 1902, because considerable deposits of gold had been 
discovered in the Transvaal, involved men and materiel on a vast scale to ensure military 
success and the possession of the gold-mines. Again, Natal Africans were called up as 
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In September 1899, before the outbreak of the war, all chiefs and headmen in the Zululand 
Province and in fourteen of the Natal magistracies were informed: 
That, in the event of war breaking out between the English and the Dutch, the 
Queen wishes the Natives to remain within their own borders, as the war will be 
a White-man's war, but they may, of course, protect themselves and their property 
against attack or seizure by the enemy. 107 
In reporting this directive and 'the general conduct and loyalty of the Natives of this 
Colony' the SNA underestimated the magnitude of the involvement in the war of African 
levies and volunteers from Natal. 108 He mentioned 'services for intelligence purposes 
and in various other ways' and that African men were sent to Ladysmith with letters and 
despatches. He did not, however, reveal, or perhaps at that time did not know, that Lord 
Kitchener had armed African men with riiles, supposedly to protect stock and occupied 
blockhouses, but in reality to adopt an offensive stance; and their numbers were 
considerable. Kitchener himself admitted that 4 618 of the men came from Natal. 109 
African scouts were promised bronze medals, and to this end, 2 000 medals were sent to 
the SNA, G. Leuchars, in April 1903. This gives some indication of the numbers of men 
involved as scouts. That many of these were levies from the chiefdoms and not Kholwa, 
and that they served for the duration of the war is indicated in this letter from J. Gumede 
of Chief Ncwadi kaZikhali's chiefdom. He knew that Leuchars had a list of levies who 
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This gentleman after receiving these lists, kept them in his office, stating that the 
Natives do not want medals only the Christian Natives gives ~) all the trouble 
asking for medals. So we shall not get the long promised medals any more; after 
we served the Military from the beginning to the end of the Anglo-Boer war.1 l0 
The failure to distribute the medals referred to in this letter was one of the many 
ungenerous acts which caused disillusionment among Kholwa and levies alike, although, 
in spite of this, some came forward voluntarily to serve at this time. 
The distinguished and disciplined conduct of the Kholwa during the Anglo-Zulu War in 
1879 turned the attention of the colonial authorities to employing, them as scouts during 
the Second Anglo-Boer War. Levies from the chiefdoms were less likely to come forward 
willingly. R. C.A. Samuelson, appointed on 3 October 1899 to raise these scouts, collected 
150 men, some mounted, some on foot, from Chief Johannes Kumalo's Driefontein 
settlement; 111 further scouts from Chief Timothy Gule at Nyanyadu;112 and others 
from Chief Stephen Mini's Kholwa at Edendale. 113 With these men, all Kholwa, 
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By September 1901 , when reports reached Major-General Lyttelton, Officer Commanding 
the British forces in Natal, of General Louis Botha' s intention to invade Natal and march 
on Dundee,115 Lyttelton planned a three-pronged counter-attack through Utrecht in the 
north, Dundee in the centre and Grey town in the south. The forces which were gathered 
in Grey town and Pietermaritzburg were not Imperial troops but local volunteer forces 
commanded by the General Officer Commanding Natal , Major-General Sir J .G. 
Dartnell. 116 Volunteer staff officer, Major H . T. Bru-de-Wold, on 23 September 1901 , 
requested Samuelson to organise a communication line of scouts for the Mobile Column 
on its way to Grey town and Krantzkop with the help of Acting Chief Sibindi ' s Bomvu 
levies117 and levies provided by other chiefs118 living in the area. These were not 
mobile units like the Kholwa scouts but carriers of supplies from Ntingwe and 
Qudeni. 119 They were stationed at their own imizi , with much at stake if the Boer 
invasion succeeded. Botha, however, was repulsed before the scouts could be involved 
with the Boers. 
Bambatha's ' rebellion' of 1906 involved Natal Africans as levies on the side of the Natal 
colonial government and as rebels opposed to the government. The collection by the Natal 
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males not subject to the Hut Tax, which in effect meant unmarried men. This imposition 
provided the flash-point following on sixty-five years of exploitation and deprivation of 
the Natal African population, and was to lead to the rebellion spearheaded by Chief 
Bambatha kaMancinza of the Zondi people. The grievances laid before the Natal Native 
Commission of 1906 _1907,120 for which some sought a solution in rebellion, ranged 
from dissatisfaction with their governance at the highest level in Natal, to the 
disintegration of their daily family lives, caused by legislation. The status of chiefs, the 
political machinery of the chiefdoms, the landholding of the African people, their chances 
of economic advancement as peasant farmers , and even their human dignity and self-
respect had all been subjected to an inexorable grinding away over the years . 
Such a smouldering accumulation of grievances could be expected to produce spontaneous 
outbursts against those regarded as being responsible for the wrongs which had elicited the 
complaints. Some African people, in both Natal and Zululand, when ordered to pay the 
Poll, refused to pay as it seemed to be the ultimate burden. The objectors, some wearing 
the tshokobezi headdress121 and shouting the warcry 'uSuthu!' were defiant and abusive 
120 
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towards the magistrates, although they did not attack them .122 Only eleven of the 
chiefs named by the magistrates in these demonstrations were held personally responsible 
for the behaviour of their followers. 123 
By 1906, the Natal authorities were not in a strong enough position to call up levies unless 
there was a reasonable chance of obedience. For instance, Sibindi, the Bomvu chief, who 
had been a court induna in the employ of Major T. Maxwell, the Umsinga 
magistrate,124 and who had assisted the colonial troops in September 1901, owed his 
position to the Natal government and could be expected to remain loyal. Acting Chief 
Tabhane, son of the 'loyalist' Ngwane chief Ncwadi and grandson of Zikhali, both of 
whom had provided mounted scouts in the past, was requested to raise scouts again.125 
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chiefs and their people, or some of their people who had been former allies of the British 
government and its heir, the Natal government, had changed their allegiance over the 
years because of their grievances and changed circumstances. Some had pressing personal 
reasons for shifting their allegiance away from the colonial government and becoming 
restive or rebellious. 
Although many Natalians were complacent about their ability to deal with a large-scale 
rising of the Mrican people,126 the excessive and even savage punishment meted out 
once the unrest had surfaced, suggests that the perpetrators were, to a large extent, 
motivated by fear. Examples of this are the execution at Richmond of the killers of Sub-
Inspector S.K. Hunt and Trooper G. Armstrong after a drum-head court-martial, even 
though it seems that Hunt fired the first shot at a handcuffed prisoner; 127 the heavy fine 
imposed on Chief Charlie Fynn (1161 head of cattle and 1163 sheep and goats) whose 
people had demonstrated against the imposition of the Poll Tax, but had not rebelled; the 
heavy fine imposed on Chief Ngobizembe128 for his people 's defiance of the Mapumulo 
magistrate, and the subsequent shelling of his umuzi by Colonel Leuchars because the 
chief had not handed over all the demonstrators. 129 Leuchars 's action was approved 
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His idea of destroying the kraal by artillery fire instead of by the match, although 
perhaps somewhat theatrical, has had a splendid effect. 130 
Imizi of disaffected Africans were burnt on a considerable scale during Bambatha's 
'rebellion', on the pretext that rebels obtained food and shelter there.131 The shelling 
of Ngobizembe's umuzi was a refinement intended to terrorise . 
Since the Natal chiefdoms were often divided and even their grievances had not given 
them enough common ground for a concerted rising, Bambatha's 'rebellion' failed. The 
number of levies employed from the Natal and Zululand chiefdoms was probably between 
2000 and 3 000. Those who were on foot came mainly from near the area of operations 
and were from the chiefdoms of Ntuli (Chief Mfungelwa), 132 Tembu (Acting Chief 
Ngqamuzana) , 133 Qadi (Chief Mqawe),134 Bomvu (Acting Chief Sibindi),135 and 
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Those chiefdoms who sent forward levies found it expedient to side with the colonial 
power base as more likely to triumph than the rebels. Others clung to the forlorn hope 
that their lot might be improved if they, with Bambatha, could receive the support of the 
Chief Dinuzulu kaCetshwayo of the Usuthu, regarded by some as being the natural heir 
to the Zulu kingdom. 
Some Kholwa were reluctant to volunteer to support the Natal government because they 
had been cheated of their promised medals in previous campaigns,137 as had the levies 
from the locations. The latter, however, were not given the option of volunteering or not. 
Many Kholwa Africans from Natal were, in addition, disillusioned with the Natal 
government to the extent that they took part with the rebels in the insurrection. 138 The 
killers of the two policemen, Hunt and Armstrong, at Trewirgie near Richmond139 on 
7 February 1906, were Ethiopian Christians. Nevertheless, Kholwa men from Edendale, 
Driefontein and Nyanyadu came forward with the Ngwane horsemen, to form the Natal 
Native Horse under Major G.Moe and Captain R.C. Samuelson.140 
The infantry levies provided little more than an increase in numbers for the organised 
colonial troops engaged in quelling Bambatha's 'rebellion'. From a military point of view 





SNA 1111316, 1905/107 Minute paper concerning native scout medals, 
containing minute from Commandant of Volunteers to Minister of Justice , 
2 September 1903, and Army Order No. 94, April 1901. 
Stuart, Zulu Rebellion, pp. 420 - 421. 
Ibid., p. 125. 
Ibid., pp. 62, 557. 
302 
colonial period, acting as ill-armed but mobile support troops in rough country. Poorly 
equipped and inadequately armed, the levies were again objects of contempt to the colonial 
forces. With limited financial resources, the Natal government could not consider the issue 
of blankets or even firearms as standard equipment for the levies. 141 
Colonel Leuchars was especially disparaging of the levies, regarding them as useless as 
a fighting force (except for Sibindi's men), useless at 'skirmishing down broken, bushy 
valleys;' but useful as scouts and camp followers. 142 Where it was necessary for the 
levies to be effectively trained and adequately armed, they were not, and they could not 
therefore come up to the unreasonable expectations of Leuchars. Although they purported 
to be fighting men during Bambatha's 'rebellion', in reality, as in the second phase of the 
Anglo-Zulu War and in the Anglo-Boer hostilities, their main use was as a labouring 
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CONCLUSION 
The unique characteristics of colonial Natal in the nineteenth century with regard to labour 
practices and to the provisions made for defence and the repression of possibly 
destabilising actions may be more clearly identified by way of comparison with 
developments in other contemporaneous British colonies such as Australia and New 
Zealand, where the colonial context had some similarities. A comparison might also serve 
to highlight the exactions of forced labour and military service as major factors in the 
Natal colonial drive to dominate and control the indigenous people. 
Although the British had finally annexed Natal and established a colonial government by 
1845, the indigenous inhabitants were dispossessed of their land in a process which 
gradually unfolded rather than became immediately effective. 
Natal, Australia and New Zealand all had European settler populations originally 
outnumbered by the indigenes. However, in Australia by 1860, as a result of further 
immigration, imported diseases such as smallpox, l and the relentless killing of large 
numbers of Aborigines, the European population exceeded the pre-invasion number of 
Aborigines. 2 In New Zealand, disease reduced the Maori people considerably, and soon 
1 
2 
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the European settlers outnumbered them.3 In Natal, however, the African people 
maintained their numerical superiority and survived the invaders, partly by becoming their 
'indispensable servants. ,4 
All these colonies sought to acquire land at the expense of the indigenous people. As in 
Natal, the early explorers and settlers of Australia perpetuated the myth of an 'empty' land 
and 'unpeopled wilderness. ,5 In the future Victoria district of Australia, Surveyor-
General Mitchell, in his diary, recorded daily encounters with Aborigines, sometimes in 
groups of more than 200, on his journey with Aboriginal guides, but in his official report, 
he described the land as 'still without inhabitants. ,6 This perception would appear to 
justify land dispossession which was of paramount importance to the colonisers in gaining 
domination over the indigenes. 7 
Each group of invading Europeans sought to develop, along European lines, the colony 
established by the dispossession of its original inhabitants, and all required a body of 
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In 1788, in Australia, Botany Bay and Sydney Cove in New South Wales had been 
established as a convict settlement, with convicts and soldiers forming the first labour 
force. 8 The Aboriginal inhabitants were overwhelmed by what became a large-scale 
intrusion of Europeans, whose concept of land use and ownership differed from their own, 
'which was governed by the ecology of their habitat. ,9 The newcomers ruthlessly 
annexed and exploited their land,lO threatening the economic and even spiritual 
component of their society.11 Their conflicts with the Europeans left those who were 
not subjected to 'purification by force ,' i.e. being killed, to a pauper's existence in the 
lowest socio-economic level of Australian society.12 They were not, however, drawn 
into any large-scale, government-organised system of providing labour and military service 
for the colonial government, as in Natal. 
Some discharged convicts and military officers who were given land grants and provided 
with convict labour, became farmers . 13 In the 1840s, when the lack of a plentiful and 
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again become a penal settlement. When the settlers strenuously objected, the plan was 
shelved in 1849. 14 
Western Australia initially employed free labourers from among its own settlers, but in 
1849 the colony became a penal settlement when the colonists petitioned the British 
government to send convicts to work on public buildings, roads and bridges: 15 work 
which almost paralleled isibhalo labour in Natal. 
Edward Gibbon Wakefield, the British theorist on colonisation, maintained that a reliable 
labour force was crucial to the development of South Australia. He suggested bringing 
out wealthy English squires with free English labourers to work for them. 16 This plan 
was similar to that proposed by Bishop J. W. Colenso in N atal17 in the 1850s. The 
South Australian colony faltered for a while, but in the 1840s wheat-farming and sheep-
grazing as well as the invention of the automatic harvester brought the colony prosperity, 
using only free labour. 18 
At no time was any significant reliance placed on the indigenous people of Australia as 
a labour force or as subordinate military levies, as it was in Natal. Some of the indigenes, 
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to areas which were inhospitable to any but hunter-gatherers. Those in Tasmania were 
unable to retreat. They were reduced to two hundred in number, were rounded up and 
sent to Norfolk Island, where they died. 19 
In Queensland, as in Natal, sugar planters required cheap and plentiful labour, and from 
the early 1860s they applied the same solution to this problem as did the Natal sugar 
planters: they imported indentured labourers (in this case, Melanesian Kanakas from the 
South Pacific). These were not repatriated until 1906 - 07.20 
In the early settlement of New Zealand, the New Zealand Company planned to purchase 
land and transplant a hierarchy of English social classes, following Wakefield's 
colonisation model. 21 
In 1840, Britain assumed the sovereignty of New Zealand. Boundaries between land 
appropriated by European settlers and the unalienated land of the Maoris were more 
clearly defined after the Maori War of 1843 - 1847.22 The British settlers relied on 
their own labour, and, against the spirited resistance offered by the Maoris in the Maori 
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indigenes were employed as labourers or auxiliary troops, as in Natal, nor was any 
attempt made to introduce labourers under compulsion from beyond New Zealand. 
In the colony of Natal, labour was urgently needed. There was a large African population 
rendered powerless by the dislocations of the early nineteenth century, and unable 
effectively to resist or evade the demands made upon them for labour and military service. 
They could not retreat into the interior as the survivors of the indigenous Australian people 
could, nor had they a separate, although limited area of settlement in which no colonial 
demands could be made upon them, as the Maoris had. The influx of white settlers to 
Natal was limited in number and there were too few of them to provide a distinct 
labouring class. They therefore turned to the indigenous African population to provide 
this need. 
The exactions of labour and military levies in Natal were made possible by metropolitan 
and colonial attitudes. These included perceptions of the distinctions in colour and class; 
of the work ethic for those in the lower ranks of society; and the drive to spread European 
civilisation. These attitudes were reinforced by some Christian missionaries who equated 
the Christian ethic with their own cultural attitudes and mores. This led to a drive to 
'civilize' and proletarianise the African people in Natal to serve the interests of the 
colonisers, as occurred in Australia. 24 
In order to build up an infrastructure of roads and bridges in Natal, the colonial 
government required a plentiful and regular supply of labour. To prevent any attempt to 
24 Lines, Taming the Great South Land, p. 41. 
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build up any power base in competition with the colonial power, an effective military force 
was necessary. These two requirements led to the system of forced labour (isibhalo) and 
military service exacted from the Natal Africans. 
The coercion of African men in locations to serve as isibhalo labourers for public works 
(mainly the building of roads) became a regular practice throughout the colonial period. 
The periodic raising of military levies was intended to subdue any African group showing 
signs of building up an alternative power base, or of destabilisation by inter-group 
hostilities; and to guard against threats of destabilisation along the Natal borders. 
In order to justify, to themselves and others, the exaction of labour and military service 
and, perhaps, colonisation itself, the British colonisers of Natal repeatedly declared that 
Natal had been devastated and virtually depopulated on their arrival. They maintained that 
the African people who subsequently entered 'empty' Natal were immigrants with no claim 
to the land. 
The colonial government therefore, established locations to settle these supposed intruders, 
for which land grants the location-dwellers were to show their gratitude by providing 
isibhalo labourers for public works, and military levies to act as surrogates in keeping the 
peace and defending the borders. The exactions served as measures of control and 
domination, with power and responsibility being delegated from the Lieutenant-Governor 
as Supreme Chief to the magistrates; while responsibility but no palpable power descended 
from the chiefs, through the homestead heads, to the dependent unmarried men who 
initially provided labour and military service. 
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In some cases the Natal Africans were acquiescent collaborators, partly because they saw 
that some benefit might accrue from the demands, or because they were powerless to resist 
the government exactions effectively. However, as new opportunities opened up for them 
in free employment in towns and on private farms as well as on railways and mines, an 
increasing number of men evaded the government demands for isibhalo labour in particular 
and, to a lesser extent, military service. 
In 1876, an official enquiry from the British Colonial Office about the isibhalo system 
elicited from the Natal government officials an elaborate fiction to justify the requirements 
not only for isibhalo labour, but also for military levies. They declared that this system 
was exactly parallel to the exactions imposed by the Zulu king, to whose position that of 
Supreme Chief in Natal was likened. The inaccuracies in this analogy are evident in 
considering the checks and balances imposed by the Zulu system on the king and his 
advisers, whereas in colonial Natal the chiefs and all their people were powerless, until 
some of them found ways of becoming free labourers. 
As opportunities opened up in more lucrative employment, and at the same time more 
isibhalo labourers were needed for expanding public works, the Natal government called 
on labourers from categories other than those originally tapped. There was abundant 
evidence that the isibhalo system was unsatisfactory in supplying the colonial labour needs; 
with inadequate pay and poor working conditions. The Natal government was reluctant 
to improve the position by raising taxes from the white population. 
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Resistance to colonial demands, and the realisation of their waning power caused several 
chiefs to attempt to build up their power bases in opposition to the colonial authority. 
This took the form of rallying and controlling their people by holding imikhosi: annual 
ceremonies designed to consolidate the chiefs' power and control over their followers. 
As time went on, the Natal government needed even more men to labour on public works, 
while more potential labourers evaded the government demands. The Natal authorities 
then abandoned the fiction that each chief was calling up his followers to work for him, 
and transferred isibhalo labourers from one division and even one county to another. 
Until 1891, with little clear legislation to restrict or define the power of the Natal 
government to call up labourers, the SNA was able to apply ad hoc solutions to his labour 
requirements. With only some twenty years of Natal colonial rule left, at last Law 19 of 
1891 clarified the hierarchy of power and the isibhalo system. By this time it was too late 
for the system to operate satisfactorily as far as the Natal government was concerned. The 
commissioners of the 1906 - 1907 Commission admitted that the isibhalo system was 
unsatisfactory, and recommended that it be abandoned. 
With the advent of larger numbers of British settlers from 1849, early in the colonial 
period, the Natal government and the colonists competed for labour. As the colonists 
became more firmly established, they turned to imported Indians, Zulu and Tsonga to 
satisfy their labour demands. When isibhalo labour was insufficient for their needs, the 
officials of the Native Mfairs Department also relied on labourers other than those called 
up through the isibhalo system. Zulu refugee labourers, and political prisoners after the 
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Langalibalele affair and Bambatha's 'rebellion' augmented the labour supply for the 
Colonial Engineer's department. When Natal joined the Union of South Africa in 1910, 
the isibhalo system was abandoned. 
In the first thirty years of British colonial rule in Natal, San raiders drove off the cattle 
of white and African farmers, because the areas from which they derived their own 
sources of food in hunting and gathering had been wrested from them. It was not difficult 
for the colonial government to raise levies from the African people to augment their own 
forces against the San, as they had borne the brunt of raids, and the colonial demands 
were on a limited scale. 
In 1848, however, when some African chiefdoms, in becoming more powerful, appeared 
to be a challenge to the colonial government, Theophilus Shepstone organised the Africans 
in the Natal locations into divisions so that he could call upon the leaders whom he had 
appointed, to send forward levies. He paid particular attention to any perceived threats 
to the stability of the Natal/Zululand border and of the southern border. 
In 1847, before Shepstone had organised the chiefdoms into military divisions, the actions 
of Chief Fodo kaNombewu of the Nhlangwini on the southern Natal border, gave cause 
for alarm. Shepstone prevented him from launching further attacks on the Bhaca and thus 
destabilising the southern border. 
In the following year, 1848, the Hlubi and amaNgwe, massing on the Natal/Zululand 
border in their flight from the Zulu king, Mpande, presented a possible threat in this area. 
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Shepstone used his military organisation into divisions to force the Hlubi and amaNgwe 
to move away from the border, and to exercise control over them. At the same time, their 
re-settlement in the country at the foot of the Drakensberg provided a barrier against San 
raids. 
A further perceived threat to the stability of the southern Natal border presented itself in 
1857 when Chief Sidoyi kaBaleni of the Nhlangwini quarrelled with the Memela chief. 
With the assistance of military levies, Sidoyi was deposed and all his cattle seized: severe 
measures intended to overawe, and to restore colonial control. 
Having settled the southern border, the colonial forces, reinforced by levies, turned their 
attention, in 1858, to subduing Chief Matshana kaMondise of the Sithole, who was viewed 
as a possible threat to peace on the N atallZululand border. This chief fled to Zululand 
with his people, and thus escaped colonial domination. 
Even more alarming to the Natal government than the possible destabilisation of the Natal 
borders was the fear of any chiefdom which presented insidious competition to the colonial 
government or settlers in the realm of economic prosperity and as an alternative power 
focus . The Natal government perceived the Hlubi as such a threat. In 1873, British 
military forces and colonial volunteers, with some 6 000 levies called up from the Natal 
chiefdoms, launched a campaign against the Hlubi on the pretext of their being in 
possession of unlicensed firearms. When the Hlubi chief, Langalibalele kaMthimkulu, fled 
across the Drakensberg with his fighting men, leaving the old men, the women and the 
children with the amaNgwe people, they were pursued and savagely punished, as were the 
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amaNgwe. Except in a brief skirmish with Durnford's men , Langalibalele, like Matshana 
of the Sithole, offered no determined resistance. Both chiefs were fleeing from Natal, and 
this action could hardly be construed as rebellion, unless one defines rebellion very 
loosely, to include removing oneself from the authority of the Supreme Chief. 
To provide labour to develop communications in Natal, and an auxiliary military force to 
support the colonial state in exerting its power and control over a subject people, the Natal 
government drew African men from the loc&tions on the pretext that this was the custom 
in the Zulu state. A different situation arose when the Anglo-Zulu War was planned in 
1878. Although similar methods were employed to raise both labour and levies for the 
prosecution of the war, they were not to be used only for the benefit of the Natal colony 
and to sustain its domination over Natal Africans. They were to support a broader plan 
set in train by the Colonial Office and War Office in Britain. 
Having underestimated the military capabilities of the Zulu, the British army obtained, 
from the Natal colonial government,the services of some 7 000 levies and labourers to 
support its offensive against Cetshwayo's people. The military levies on foot were ill 
equipped and inadequately armed, with minimal training. Not surprisingly, they generally 
performed badly in the early phases of the war. The levies in the field were, perhaps 
deliberately, given no opportunity to build up any esprit de corps or pride in their 
regiments, as this might have enabled them to strengthen any antagonism they might have 
harboured against their oppressors. 
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The mounted levies and mounted Kholwa volunteers were, in contrast, well armed and 
equipped, and performed well. The men from the chiefdoms near the Zulu border were 
set to guard their families and homes against possible Zulu incursions in the second phase 
of the war. These men were better motivated and better armed. 
In this phase of the war the poor performance of the inexperienced British recruits, in 
some measure, could be attributed to reasons similar to those which accounted for the poor 
morale of the levies, viz. their inexperience and lack of esprit de corps. 
In the last phase of the war, many of the Natal levies on foot became little more than 
labourers. Sir Garnet Wolseley made use of them to alleviate the transport and supply 
problems which faced the British. 
In the first and second Anglo-Boer Wars, the role of levies, with some exceptions such 
as mounted scouts, remained that of labourers. However, in the 1906 'rebellion' of 
Bambatha, the infantry levies reverted to the role formerly assigned to them, viz. as 
auxiliary troops, since Imperial forces had been withdrawn. According to the exigencies 
of a situation, the roles of military levies and isibhalo labourers, drawn from the same 
population group by the same methods, were interchangeable. . 
In order to control the Natal Mricans and perpetuate their subservient position, the 
colonial authorities and settlers used their collective political and economic power to 
prevent effective competition from such Natal Mricans who showed signs of economic 
prosperity, ~ the Hlubi; and to prevent the incorporation of the Kholwa into European 
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society. Any signs of the establishment of a power focus alternative to that of the existing 
colonial power base were severely suppressed. In these endeavours the Natal colonial 
authorities made the most of existing weaknesses and divisions among the Natal Mricans 
on the 'divide and rule' principle. The subjugated Mricans, for their own survival, sought 
some accommodation within the system. 
Only in 1906, at the end of the colonial period, was the breaking-point reached, when 
aggressive attitudes and actions, levelled at the Natal government authorities, surfaced. 
By this time, the Natal Mricans had lost much of their social cohesion, their chance to 
acquire economic prosperity and their traditional roles in their Mrican polity. 
Nonetheless, much of the energy engendered by their oppression was to surface even 
before the end of the colonial period, transformed into covert political opposition. The 
Kholwa, especially, frustrated in their hopes of ultimate enfranchisement, provided leaders 
in this opposition. 
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APPENDIX I 
STATEMENT OF THE APPROXIMATE NUMBER OF NATIVES WHO 
ENTERED SERVICE IN THE COLONY DURING THE YEAR 1901 




Description of Service 
Average No. of Natives in No. of Natives who entered 
Service at one time Service 
DOMESTIC SERVANTS 
1. Rural Districts 21 ,730 (1) 43,460 (1) 
2. Durban 5,716 (4) 16,000 (3) 
3. Pietermaritzburg 4,123 (6) 13,345 (7) 
TOGT LABOURERS 
1. Durban, 48,530 4,000 (7) 12,000 (8) 
Monthly Licenses 




1. Durban, 21,884 1,800 (10) 5,500 (9) 
Monthly Licenses 
2. Pietermaritzburg 664 
7,973 Monthly 
(14) 2,000 (13) 
Licences 
AGRICULTURE 13,068 (2) 26,000 (2) 
COAL MINES 2,035 (8) 4,000 (11) 
FACTORIES, &c., 6,475 (3) 14,000 (6) 
POLICE 1,332 (12) 1,332 (15) 
PUBLIC WORKS 2,000 (9) 4,112 (10) 
DEPARTMENT 
MILITARY WORKS 14,483 (4) 
RAILWAY WORKS 4,700 (5) 14,100 (5) 
HARBOUR WORKS 717 (13) 1,400 (14) 




Division Location' Mission Crown Private Farms 
(County in brackets) lands Reserves Lands Occupied Unoccupied 
Umgeni (pmb) 4018 549 294 3192 557 
Lions River (pmb) 439 Nil 93 3173* 
Umlazi (Dbn) 4916 296 Nil 324 Nil 
Klip River (KlipR) Nil Nil 407 4937 1995 
Newcastle (KlipR) Nil 66 590 375 Nil 
Inanda (Victoria) 4333 5264 Nil 466 540 
Lower Tugela (Victoria) 5853 1541 231 2747 3496 
Umvoti (Umvoti) Could not compile return without assistance 
VVeenen (VVeenen) 4073 277 502 4488 4161 
Alexandra (Alexandra) 1992 737 1747 525 618 
Alfred (Alfred) 324 Nil 104 75 Nil 
Lower Umkomanzi (pmb) 800 69 36 2990 200 
Ixopo (pmb) 2356 174 1382 3294 799 
Umsinga (KlipR) 5642 0 23 268 
Ipolela (pmb) 2140 Nil 360 1094* 
Lower Umzimkulu (Alexandra) 2 Nil 44 23 Nil 
Dundee (KlipR) 1 - 70 4227 75 
36826 8973 5883 Combined Total 
44639 
* Both occupied - unoccupied 


















Approximate No. of Number called out 
natives liable to be from 1 Jan to 30 Sept 















Based on SNA 1/1/109, 1888/876 
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as well as those of Umvoti 
Do 
Supplies Klip River and Newcastle Divisions 
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Supply their own wants and those of Klip River and Newcastle 
Supplies its own wants as well as Harbour Works 
Supplies its own wants 
Do 
Do as well as Lions River and assists Upper Umkomanzi 
Supplies its own wants. 
Based on SNA 1/1/109, 1888/876 
APPENDIX V 
SCHEME FOR NATIVE CONTINGENT 
CONFIDENTIAL REPORT OF DITTO 
NATIVE CONTINGENT 
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In the event of a Zulu war, it is proposed to raise a force of 5 500 fighting men consisting 
of 500 Mounted Basutos, and 5 000 Natal Zulus (infantry). Their duties, to lead every 
column, acting as light troops. 
Organization 
1 Commandant 
1 Staff Officer 
1 Interpreter 
5 Asst. -Commandants 
6 Medical Officers 
The Commandant and Staff Officer should be soldiers, and as many of the Asst.-
Commanders as possible. It is desirable that the Medical officers should speak Zulu. The 
Interpreter must be a thorough good Zulu talker. The Commandant commands the whole 
Contingent and especially the Mounted Men. The Staff Officer acts as Major of Brigade, 
&c. The Interpreter attends the Commandant. Each Asst.-Commandant commands a 
Regt., and has attached to him one Medical Officer. To be raised from all classes in 
Natal. 
Officers. 
Farmers' sons speaking Zulu, brought up with, and known to the men of the Contingent. 
Traders and Hunters in the Zulu country . Men who have served Her Majesty, either as 
officers, soldiers or seamen. All officers to be mounted, finding their own horses, &c. 
To be armed with the same weapon as the men for the sake of uniformity of ammunition, 
and to be dressed in the same general style, to avoid loss of life, at their own cost. 
Mounted Men 
Five troops of Basutos of 100 men each. Each troop of 5 sections of 20 men each. Each 
section (20 men) being led by a white man. Each Basuto brings with him horse, saddle, 
and bridle. 
Infantry 
Five Regiments of Natal Zulus of 1 000 men each. Each Company of 10 sections, of 10 
men each. Each section (10 men) being led by a white man, necessary to efficiency , 
where the Natal Zulu is concerned. 
Dress: 
Mounted Men 
















Waist-belt with 2 pouches for 30 rounds each, supported by 
suspenders over the shoulders 
Blanket 
Havresack 
3 Great-coat straps 
Infantry 
Scarlet Serge or Blanket Jumper 
Flannel Shirt 
Corduroy or Canvas Knickerbockers 




Waist-belt, with 2 pouches of 30 rounds each, to carry also bayonet 
and knife, supported by leather suspenders over the shoulders 
Havresack 
Great-coat Straps 
The Native Contingent require no tents for either officers or Tents, 
&c.for man. 
No Commissariat arrangements are required, except the provision of meal and slaughter-
cattle, whilst the Contingent is in a friendly country, and perhaps for a few days in that 
of the enemy; after which, it is hoped, it will be self-supporting. 
Officers make their own arrangements for everything, once in the enemy's country; until 
which, rations as per equal grades in the Regular Forces. 
Ammunition, Mounted Men 
Each troop of 100 Mounted Men is to have, as Regimental Reserve, 6 pack-horses (private 
property), each led by a mounted lad (12 pay boy) to carry each about 700 rounds of 
ammunition, weighing some 70 lbs., and packed in raw-hide bags, and 5 pack-horses for 
the use of officers. This will give the troop 
In possession per man 60 rounds 
Regimental Reserve 42 rounds 
Total 102 rounds 
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Infantry 
Each company of 100 men to have on its strength 16 well-grown lads as carriers (~ pay 
boys), one for each officer, to carry his blankets, &c., and one for each double section 
of 20, to carry the cooking-pot for porridge (iron pots being replaced by Kaffir clay-pots 
as soon as possible). One being a spare lad to replace casualties. 
These lads to carry one assegai, one knobkerrie, and one stick each. Each company of 
100, to have on its strength 12 young men as ammunition carriers, each armed with one 
stabbing assegai, one knobkerrie, and one stick. Each ammunition carrier takes 350 
rounds of ammunition, sewed up in raw hide, which is perfectly waterproof, and travels 
well on the head or shoulder, as may be desired by the carrier, weighing about 35 lbs. 
This will give the company: 
In possession per man 60 rounds 
Regimental Reserve 42 rounds 
Total 102 rounds 
The Regimental Reserve is to be completed, as occasion requires, from the First Field 
Reserve. 
Medical arrangements 
Each Medical officer should have with him a "Medical Field Companion" carried by a 
Native orderly (taken from the ranks) [weight 12 lbs]. 
Discipline 
Patriarchal. The only kind suitable to this class of white men and natives. 
Drill 
Shooting (as steadily as possible) - advancing - moving to the right or left. Increasing or 
diminishing front. The Native is a born skirmisher. 
Recruiting 
For officers: By the selection of the Commandant. 
For men: Natal Basutos and Zulus. Ordered out for service by the Lieutenant-Governor 
of the Colony according to Native custom, and placed under orders of the Commandant; 












Basutos from British Basutoland may best be recruited by the Commandant of the Force 
with the sanction of H.E. the High Commissioner. ' 
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Officers and Sub-Officers 
In recruiting the officers, it will be necessary to visit the localities from which the clans 
are to come, so that it may be ascertained who, of the young Farmer Class, are at home; 
and this on account of the migratory character of this class of people, who are at home 
to-day, and at the Diamond or Gold Fields to-morrow. 
The Hunter and Trader Class, equally migratory, are to be met with all over the Colony, 
but chiefly along the Coast country. 
Men who have served the Queen, everywhere - all to be enlisted or engaged as sub-
officers, and promoted according to deserts. 
All engagements to be for six months, with six months renewal if required. 
Discharge at pleasure. 






Commandant - Nil. 
Staff Officer - A soldier, £1 a day, in addition to his Cost, Regimental Pay, or 
£365 a year. 
Interpreter - £365 a year. 
Asst.-Commandants - If soldiers, £1 a day each, in addition to Regimental Pay. 
If civilians, each £500 a year. 
6 Medical officers, each £500 a year. 
Total cost of Staff, £5,555 or £6,230 a year, which covers everything. 
Captains, £365; sub-officers, £250. 
Officers 
525 Officers and sub-officers, at an average of £300 a year each, £157,500. 
Mounted Men (Basutos) 
Pay: Fighting men, 500 at 2s. 6d. a day each; per year, £22,812 lOs. 
Pack-horses, each led by a mounted lad, 55 at 3s. a day for lad, horse, and pack-horse, 
£4,015. Mounted lad 2s. 6d. a day, Pack-horse 1s. 6d. a day. 
Clothing: Two complete suits in the year, for 555 men and lads, at £10 each, £5,550. 
Infantry 
Pay: Fighting men, 5000 at 1s a day each; per year, £91,250. 
Carriers, 800 at 6d. a day each; per year £7,300. 
Ammunition carriers, 600 at 1s. a day each; per year £10,950. 
Clothing: Two complete suits a year, for 6400 men and lads, at £6 each, £38,400. 
FIGHTING MEN 
Summary of cost, includine officers, for one year 
£5,555 or £6,230 
£157,500 
14 Staff 
525 Officers and sub-officers 




55 Pack-horses and 55 Mounted Leaders 
Infantry 
600 Ammunition Carriers 
800 Carriers 
Clothine 










Grand total for one year, for a force of 14 staff, 525 officers and sub-officers, 500 mounted 
men, and 5000 infantry, all fighting men, with 1455 auxiliaries, £343,332 or £344,007, 
according as Military or Civil Asst.-Commandants are employed. Which gives about, per 
month, £28,667, or nearly £3. 6d. a head a month all ranks included. 
General Remarks 
Two suits of clothing are estimated for each man for one year, as in the absence of war clothes 
wear out. 
The Contingent are dressed in scarlet: (a) To impose on the enemy. (b) To ensure safety from 
the British side. The cost of provisions is not included, as the force, once well in the enemy's 
country, should keep itself. 
Per diem: 3 Ibs meal, 5{7 meat 
But until then, it may be put down at is. a head a day for officers, and 8d. a head a day for 
men. 
In addition to this estimate of the cost of the Native Contingent, gratuities should be given for 
death or wounds; and compensation for loss of horses, to Mounted Men. 
Honours and Rewards 
At the end of the Campaign, each man should receive a proportion of the cattle captured by 
the force, according to a scale to be laid down, and at the discretion of the Commanding 
Officer; and those who had displayed conspicuous valour should be decorated, Native fashion, 
with the Head-ring, and permitted to carry an assegai at all times. 
Want of time from pressure of work must be my excuse for this very imperfect Memorandum. 
A.W. Durnford, LT.-Col. R.E. 
17 August, 1878. 
Lieut.-Colonel E. Durnford(ed), A Soldier's Life and Work in South Africa (L6ndon, 
Sampson Low, Marston, Searle & Rivington, 1882), pp. 333 - 339. 
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APPENDIX VI 
Theophilus Shepstone's divisions of levies, 1848 
Division 
Shepstone' s list of chiefs and Hut tax lists of chiefs 
'Tribe' 
some 'tribes' 1849 and 1853 
First Quenge* (untraceable) amaMpumuza 
Lugajo uLugaju amaXamalala 
Dibinyika uDidileka amaMpumuza 
(Thetheleku) 
Nocasa uMacansa (1849) amaFoze 
unocasa (1853) 
(Inhlangwini) * Inhlangwini 
Commandant: Nobanda 
Second Mahlukana uMahlukana amaDubi 
Musi Musi amaCwabi 
Dubulana uDubiana amaNyuswa 
Sipunhla Sipanhla amaNgongoma 
Nomsimekwana uNosimikwana (1849) amaCosele 
unomsimikwana (1853) 
Manzini Manzini amaNganga 
and am aN colosi 
Faku Faku amaNcolosi 
Mnyeka umYeka amaPepeta 
Mngeni 
Mapumlo 
Timuni utimuni (1853) Tetwa 
Commandant: Mankayana 
Third Pakade uPakade amaCunu 
Somahashe uSomahatye amaBomvu 
Magedama uMakedama amaKabela 
Langalibalele Langalibalele amaHlubi 
Putile uPutini amaNgwe 
Commandant: Umkizwana 
Fourth Nodada uNodada abaTembu 
Zikali uZikali amaNgwane 
Job [whose son was Matyana abaTembu-
Mondise and Sithole 
grandson, Matshana] 
Commandant: Not Named 
Division 
Shepstone's list of chiefs and 
some 'tribes' 
Hut tax lists of chiefs 
1849 and 1853 
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'Tribe ' 












* Yenge kaNontshiza, regent for Nobanda kaNgwane (see J. Wri~ht, 'Before 
























Commandant: Zulu kaNogandaye 
* These are ' tribes', not chiefs 
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Notes on Sources 
In this study, the Secretary for Native Affairs file proved to be an abundant and valuable 
source of infonnation regarding the system of raising isibhalo labourers and military 
levies. The often arbitrary nature of these exactions is unconsciously revealed, as few 
magistrates and officials saw anything reprehensible in the system. This may account for 
the lack of care in identifying clans and chiefs exactly , although at that time Zulu 
orthography was not finnly established. 
Official sources were less concerned with the ramifications of the system, which may 
account for the relative paucity of official material and the late definition of the system. 
Subsequent publications on Natal history have been more concerned with the colonial 
dynamic and the fury of war than the hardships experienced by both labourers and levies , 
and the consequences of the Natal government exactions. 
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